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I. ORIGINS OF THE MODERN APPRAISAL RIGHT: THE DICKERSON COMMITTEE
The enactment in 1975 of a statutory appraisal right in the Canada
Business CorporationsAct (CBCA) t that allowed shareholders to insist,
upon the happening of certain events, that the corporation buy their shares
was intended to substantially alter the balance of rights between majority
and minority shareholders on fundamental changes. 2 Pointing to the
reluctance of courts to intervene to protect minority shareholders where
there is no fraud or bad faith, and the absence of any effective control
over the behaviour of majority shareholders, the Dickerson Committee
concluded that "the present state of the common law is at best unsatisfactory, at worst downright unjust."3 The appraisal right, adapted from
similar provisions in New York's Business CorporationLaw,4 was intended
to strike a new balance between majority and minority shareholders.
While the majority could, "if they go through the proper formalities,
and if they pay any dissenting shareholders, effect almost any fundamental
1 S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, s. 184.
2 The CBCA appraisal provisions are far from being Canada's first. The earliest example

of such a provision appears to have been in the reconstruction provisions adopted in a number
of Canadian statutes in the latter half of the nineteenth century, including one adopted in Ontario's
The Joint Stock Companies' Winding-up Act, S.O. 1878, c. 5, s. 13. In 1953, Ontario adopted an
appraisal right in respect of private corporations in The CorporationsAc4 1953, S.O. 1953, c.
19, s. 99. The first modem appraisal provisions applying to a variety of fundamental changes
in public corporations were adopted in the British Columbia Companies Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 18,
s. 228.
In the CBCA, appraisal rights or procedures arise in a variety of contexts. Section 184 enumerates
a number of fundamental changes in which a shareholder may insist on an appraisal as a matter
of right (see also s. 217, sale of assets for securities or distribution of assets in specie on winding
up). A shareholder may also insist on an appraisal in respect of a compulsory acquisition of shares
(ibid s. 199). In at least two other contexts, an appraisal may arise not as of right but pursuant
to a court adjudication of entitlement. Under the oppression provision the court may, as a remedial
tool, order the corporation or any security holder to buy the shares of the complainant (ibid s.
234(3Xf)). Similarly, where a statutory arrangement is undertaken, the court has authority to order
that any shareholder or shareholders may dissent under s. 184 (ibid s. 185.1(4)(d)).
In the Bu.siness CorporationsAc 1982 (OBCA), S.O. 1982, c. 4, the appraisal provisions are
based on those in the CBCA and are broadly similar (OBCA, ss 181, 184, 187, 203, 247). However,
the OBCA also allows a shareholder to require the corporation to buy his or her shares if any
security holder acquires 90 percent or more of that class of shares and provides an appraisal procedure
similar to that in CBCA at s. 184 to determine fair value (OBCA, s. 188). In addition, although
the OBCA expressly allows "going-private" squeezeouts (other than under the "compulsory
acquisition" provisions), it allows a dissenting shareholder to require an appraisal of his or her
shares on such a transaction (bid s. 189).
The CBCA provisions have been adopted in the same or substantially similar form not only
in Ontario, but in Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick. See Alberta Business
CorporationsAct, (ABCA) S.A. 1981, c. B-15; The CorporationsAct, (MCA) S.M. 1976, c. 40;
New Brunswick Business CorporationsAct, (NBBCA) S.N.B. 1981, c. B-9.1; Saskatchewan Business
CorporationsAct, (SBCA) R.S.S. 1978, c. B-10.
3 R.W.V. Dickerson, J.L. Howard & L. Getz, Proposalsfor a New Business CorporationsLaw
for Canada,vol. I (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at 114-15 (hereinafter Dickerson Report).
4 Ch. 4, Consolidated Laws, Law 1961, ch. 855.
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change with impunity," 5 the minority would have the right to opt out
of the enterprise on the undertaking of the change and, if enough
shareholders dissented, the further ability to block the fundamental change
altogether. In the Committee's view, "[t]he result is a resolution of the
problem that protects minority shareholders from discrimination and at
the same time preserves flexibility within the enterprise, permitting it
to adapt to changing business conditions." 6
Discrimination was not the only problem to which the new tool
was addressed. The Committee envisioned the appraisal provisions as
performing a second distinct function: allowing the minority to escape
fundamental changes that "change fundamentally the nature of the
business in which the shareholder invested." 7 Thus, the changes that trigger
the appraisal right include such fundamental changes as a sale of all
or substantially all of the assets of the business; removal, addition, or
alteration of restrictions on the business or businesses the corporation
may carry on, or of the right to transfer shares; alteration of the terms
of outstanding securities; continuance in another jurisdiction; and amalgamation (which may substantially alter the natureof the business carried
on in addition to its profitability).8
I have styled the two rationales identified above the "antidiscrimination" and "bail-out" rationales for the appraisal right.
Although the appraisal right was to be of pivotal importance in
the overall design of the fundamental change provisions, it was nonetheless
designed to supplement and not supplant alternative remedies to which
the shareholder might have resort. The provisions of the Draft Bill of
the Dickerson Committee and the CBCA provide that the shareholder's
appraisal entitlement may be exercised "[i]n addition to any other right
he may have.... ."9 Thus, the appraisal right is non-exclusive of other
remedial techniques available to shareholders. 0
5 Dickerson Report, supra,note 3 at 115.

6 Ibid
7 Ibid
CBCA, supra,note 1 at s. 184.
9 Dickerson Report, supra, note 3, vol. 2 at cI. 14.17(3); CBCA, supra, note 1 at s. 184(3).
This provision has been copied in the OBCA, supra note 2 at s. 184(4), and in Alberta (ABCA,
ibid at s. 184(3)), Saskatchewan (SBCA, ibid at s. 184(3)), Manitoba (MCA, ibid at s. 184(3))
and New Brunswick (NBBCA, ibid at s. 131(3)). But cf the British Columbia Companies Act,
supra, note 2, as am. Company Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 59, s. 231.
10 There are few reported decisions on the issue of exclusivity. In Re Brant Investments Ltd
v. Keeprite Inc (1983), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 116 (Ont. H.C.), the plaintiff commenced an action for
oppression while simultaneously claiming the appraisal right. The defendants argued that, per CBCA
s. 184(11), the dissenting shareholder sacrificed all interests as a shareholder "other than the right
to be paid the fair value of his shares" and that the plaintiffwas thereby disenabled from simultaneously
alleging oppression. The court rejected this contention in view of the wording of s. 184(3) (ibid,
and accompanying text), holding that although the shareholder claiming the appraisal right lost
8 See
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The appraisal right was part of another important design of the
Dickerson Committee - that of making the Act "self-enforcing," by
certain rights, he or she did not lose the status to assert oppression. The court pointed also to
the fact that the oppression remedy is expressly extended to current and former shareholders of
the corporation per CBCA s. 231(a) (definition of "complainant"). See also In The Matter of M.
Loeb, Limited and In The Matter of Loebex Limited, (1978) Bulletin of Ontario Securities Comm.
333, in which the Ontario Securities Commission held that the appraisal right was not intended
to be the shareholder's exclusive redress in a freezeout amalgamation.
However, in McConnell v. Newco Financial Corporation(1979), 8 B.L.R. 180 (B.C.S.C.) the
court, in obiter dictum, held that the loss of shareholder status accompanying a claim under the
appraisal provision would preclude an oppression application. In Jepson v. The CanadianSalt Company
Ltd (1979), 7 B.L.R. 181 (Alta. S.C.), there are further obiter remarks suggesting that the appraisal
right is the shareholders' exclusive redress.
An exclusive appraisal right strikes a very different balance in the relative entitlements of
majority and minority and has not secured much support amongst academics. The clearest statement
of the rationale for a non-exclusive appraisal right is to be found in J. Vorenburg, "Exclusiveness
of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right" (1964) 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1189. See also N.D.
Lattin, "Minority and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes" (1958) 23 Law
& Cont. Prob. 307; Note (1979-80) 84 Dick. L. Rev. 543.
Although the Dickerson Committee intended to facilitate the accomplishment of fundamental
changes by majorities (see supra, note 5 and accompanying text), it clearly intended to preserve
for minority shareholders potential resort to other remedial tools to block fundamental changes
that were unfair or in breach of relevant legal obligations. The non-exclusivity of the appraisal
right only emphasizes that absent unfair discriminationor other unfair or inequitable conduct the
majority have a right to proceed with the fundamental transaction. This view is confirmed by one
of the principal drafters of the Dickerson proposals; see J.L. Howard, "The Proposals for a New
Business Corporations Act for Canada: Concepts and Policies" (1972) L.S.U.C. Special Lectures
17 at 47-50.
There is a potential inconsistency between the Committee's expressed desire of allowing a
majority to proceed with the fundamental change free of any hindrance by the minority and the
policy of non-exclusivity. If the statutory appraisal right was intended to augment the existing
entitlement of a majority of shareholders by allowing them to proceed more easily with fundamental
changes, this logically leads in the direction of exclusivity. By relegating the minority shareholder's
claim to the status of a liability (and dispensing with his or her entitlement to block a proposed
transaction) the majority is afforded maximal freedom to engage in fundamental changes short
of a taking without compensation.
Exclusive resort to the appraisal right on fundamental changes may also result in substantial
savings in litigation costs. See infra, part V. Further, to the extent that exclusivity may result in
increased risks to shareholders, one would anticipate that this would simply be incorporated in
the price investors would be willing to pay for the company's shares, leaving shareholders with
a normal risk-adjusted expected return. Fischel has suggested other reasons in favour of an exclusive
appraisal right; where each shareholder can block the transaction, the corporation must buy out
the entitlement of each, generating holdout problems and significant transaction costs. See D.R.
Fischel, "The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law" [1983] 4 A.B.F. Res. J. 875 at 898-901. Although
the point is well taken, Fischel appears to have overlooked the likelihood of the joinder of numerous
plaintiffs as well as the effect that issue estoppel would have in barring successive litigations of
the same issue by new plaintiffs. Fischel also suggests that an exclusive appraisal right would
comport with the usual rule that injunctive relief is not available where damages are an adequate
remedy. In cases involving public corporations, the 'damages' awarded pursuant to the appraisal
cashout will almost always be an adequate remedy. This may not be true, however, in cases involving
private corporations.
It has been suggested that the appraisal right transforms the shareholder's interest into a mere
liability, de-individualizing his or her entitlement. B. Manning writes: "[w]e are all accustomed
to observe, or to have pointed out to us, the rolling ground swell during this period [roughly the
last century] from a law of fixity to a law of mobility, from a law centering on ownership to
a law centering on claim, from a law focusing on the individual to a law focusing on groups."
B. Manning, "The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker" (1962) 72 Yale
L. 223 at 229. From the above discussion it should be clear that this transformation of entitlement
is only true if the appraisal right is the exclusive redress of the shareholder.
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means of private action rather than administrative oversight or penal
sanction." In this sense, the appraisal right was in part a substitute for
the removal of the requirement to obtain supplementary letters patent
on fundamental changes.
This article critically re-evaluates both the theoretical premises upon
which the statutory appraisal right is based and the practical success
it has had in achieving these goals. Part I of the article considers the
theoretical rationales for an appraisal right and suggests that the Dickerson
Committee correctly identified the reasons why shareholders may desire
to have this protection. In Parts III and IV these rationales are examined
more closely. It is suggested that three valuation objectives are possible
when valuing the shares of minority shareholders: pre-transaction value
based on market price, and hence, publicly available information; pretransaction value based on inside information; and post-transaction value,
including any synergies or benefits that may arise as a result of the
fundamental change. The most suitable valuation objective will depend
on whether the right is claimed under the bail-out or anti-discrimination
rationale. Both the utility of the appraisal right to shareholders and the
optimal valuation objective may also depend on the type of fundamental
change and corporation type. The CBCA and cognate statutes do not
currently make these distinctions.
The practical problems of designing and administering an effective
appraisal right are considered in Part V; these include the allocation
of the burden of costs, taxation of the award, questions of procedure,
and other issues relating to the workability of the current statutory
appraisal right. It would appear that the current provisions are inadequate
in a number of important respects. Suggestions are made for
improvements.
Part VI considers the relationship between the appraisal right and
other remedial techniques that might serve the same interests. The focus
in this Part is on identifying some of the potential deficiencies of these
other remedies and the features of the appraisal right that differentiate
it from other remedial techniques.
Two major revisions to the statutory form of appraisal right are
suggested in Part VII. First, the appraisal right should be made nonmandatory. The second suggestion is that instead of employing a single
form of appraisal right, corporate law statutes ought to offer multiple
competing forms of appraisal right. Each corporation might choose the
form best suited to its needs, a custom-designed appraisal right or no
appraisal right at all. Both these suggestions derive from a conviction
I Dickerson Report, supra, note 3 at 158, 160, 168.
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that securities markets operate with sufficient informational efficiency
that the market, and not legislators or administrators, should be the final
arbiter of the efficiency of the appraisal right. The statutory appraisal
right serves an enabling function in an informationally efficient market;
where the statute furnishes a standard form of appraisal right, it becomes
unnecessary for the corporation to take the time and expense of drafting
an appraisal right into its constitutional documents, eliminating transaction
costs that in the aggregate may be fairly substantial. It is suggested that
the default valuation objective (that which applies if the corporation has
not indicated to the contrary) should be pre-transaction market value
for all public corporations. In the case of private corporations, the
presumptive valuation objective should include an assessment of any latent
values in the enterprise discoverable only on the basis of inside information,
as well as any transaction gains or synergies.
Part VIII evaluates current valuation practice in Canada under the
appraisal provisions in light of the earlier recommendations.
Part IX sketches out some preliminary thoughts on a unified theory
of those transactions that ought to serve as triggers for the appraisal
right. It is suggested that the current statutory selection of triggering
events can be rationalized by reference to a small number of defining
principles.
II. WHAT INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED BY THE APPRAISAL
RIGHT?
The interest of the majority of shareholders in maintaining the ability
to undertake fundamental changes is relatively clear. The exigencies of
business often demand a great deal of flexibility in adapting the enterprise
to changing fortunes or business conditions. Such changing environments
may demand an internal recasting of the capital structure of the enterprise,
perhaps including an alteration of the relative rights of outstanding
securities, or the addition or even elimination of a class of securities.
Business conditions may also dictate a rescaling of the enterprise either
by corporate combination or by increase or reduction in the size or scope
of the enterprise. Finally, markets may suggest a partial or wholesale
change in the nature of the business carried on by the enterprise.
The potential interests of the minority are more problematic. The
minority may desire protection against fundamental changes resulting
in an alteration of the risk of the business but not impairing the value
of the firm's securities, as well as unwise business decisions impairing
enterprise value and thus diminishing the market value of the firm's
securities. The minority may also value protection against discriminatory
changes in the relative rights of security holders, which diminish the
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value of the securities held. One form of discrimatory transaction that
may be seen as posing particular dangers to the minority is the going12
private transaction.
In broad form this taxonomy of interests to be protected parallels
that of the Dickerson Committee. In the two Parts that follow, these
potential rationales for an appraisal right are examined in more detail
in light of relevant insights supplied by modem capital theory.
III. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF THE
BUSINESS: ALTERATIONS OF RISK OR ENTERPRISE
VALUE
Shareholders may wish to protect themselves against being forced
"to participate in ventures beyond their initial contemplation"; 3 that is,
to continue to invest in an enterprise that has altered its character in
some material respect from the investment initially contemplated. The
appraisal right may furnish such protection. It is therefore important to
understand just what sorts of alterations investors may be concerned
about (and in what situations).
One such alteration is a change in the risk of the enterprise. Some
investors may be more risk averse than others; for them, an increase
in risk may make continued investment in the enterprise unattractive.
Equally, a diminishing of risk may make the investment unattractive
for shareholders who are less risk averse or are risk preferring.1 4 Further,
views of shareholders may differ as to the efficacy and profitability of
a given fundamental change. In the view of some investors, the change,
whether or not it alters the risk of the enterprise, may threaten to diminish
the value of the enterprise. In either case, the appraisal right may provide

12 As with alterations of the terms (or relative terms) of outstanding securities that nevertheless
leave minority shareholders within the enterprise, going-private transactions may be a way ofeffecting

a discriminatory redistribution of values amongst classes of security holders in the enterprise.
13 F. lacobucci, M.L. Pilkington & J.R.S. Prichard, CanadianBusiness Corporations(Agincourt,
Ontario: Canada Law Book Ltd, 1977) at 169.
14 Perhaps the most important empirical datum about the market is that most investors are
risk averse. All other things being equal, a less risky security will therefore command a higher
price. The degrees of investor risk aversion will clearly vary, however, and investors may therefore
have differing preferences with respect to those factors that determine enterprise risk, such as the
nature of the business, the degree of financial leverage, et cetera. The circumstances in which risk
may be controlled externally by the shareholder alone, rather than only internally (by means of
adjusting the activities or structure of the enterprise), are discussed at infra,note 23 and accompanying
text.
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an 'exit' option to avoid the perceived undesirable consequences for the
investor of remaining in the fundamentally changed enterprise. 15
A. Alterations in the Risk of the EnterpriseNot Diminishing Security
Values
Generally speaking, investors in public companies 6 will not be very
concerned with shifts in the risk of the enterprise that do not diminish
the market value of the class of securities held by those investors. 17 In
contrast, investors in small, private firms may have good reason to be
concerned, even where there is no adverse effect on the value of the
class of securities held. In the former case the appraisal right is likely
to be of little value, but in the latter it may be of great value.
Two factors are central to this conclusion: modem capital theory,
including both portfolio diversification theory and the capital asset pricing
model; and the existence or non-existence of a market-exit option.
1. Changes in the risk of the enterprise, modem capital theory, and
shareholder welfare
Modem capital theory' 8 gives us some indication of when shareholders are likely to be concerned with shifts in the risk of the enterprise
that do not adversely affect security values. Financial economists divide
the risks facing investors into two types. This division reflects the fact
15 Since the economic value of an investment may be completely characterized by its risk
and expected return, investors will be primarily (and in the greatest number of cases, exclusively)
concerned about these two determinants of value. Hence, concern about protecting shareholders
on fundamental changes must necessarily focus on changes in either risk or expected return (or
both) arising out of the change. Elaboration of specific shareholder protections must therefore take
into account the effect on the investor of changes in risk or expected return and must as well
be grounded in some normative theory of shareholder entitlement (or 'just desert') against which
the propriety of the remedy may be measured.
16 In this article, the term 'company' is used interchangeably with 'corporation'. The legal
definition of a 'private' corporation, as distinguished from a 'public' or 'publicly-traded' corporation
(again used interchangeably), will differ from one jurisdiction to another. However, a workable
definition of a private corporation is an incorporated firm that does not offer (and has not offered)
its securities for sale to the public, has a small number of shareholders, restrictions on the transferability
of shares, and a high degree of coincidence between those who are the officers, directors, and
shareholders. Cf the Ontario SecuritiesAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, s. l(l)(3 1).
17 Since the value of an enterprise (and its securities) can only be determined when both
the risk and expected return are known, the effect of a change in risk, by itself, will produce
an indeterminant effect on value.
18 See for example T.E. Copeland & J.F. Weston, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy,
2d ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1983); R. Brealey & S. Myers, Principles
of Corporate Finance (New York. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1981); S.M. Tinic & R.R. West, Investing
in SecurMew An Efficient Markets Approach (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979).
A good introduction to the theory is F. Modigliani & G.A. Pogue, "An Introduction to Risk and
Return" (1974) 30:2 Fin. Anal. L 68.
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that some risks are specific to a given company while other risks facing
the enterprise are broadly derivative of general economic conditions and
trends that affect the market as a whole. For example, in the case of
a company engaged in manufacturing and selling children's toys, the
company (and its shareholders) face a risk that the market will not react
favourably to a new product line. Entirely aside from the success of
the new product line, however, the company's fortunes will be tied to
the health of the economy as a whole, which will determine, for example,
how much money is available for new investment, the level of consumer
demand, and other factors that affect the company's profitability. The
former type of risk passes under a variety of names, including unsystematic,
company specific, or diversifiable risk. The second is referred to as
systematic, market, or undiversifiablerisk.
Unsystematic risk can be diversified away by holding a portfolio
of securities. For example, if an investor holds a portfolio of the common
shares of ten companies, some of these companies will succeed and some
will not. The effect of a fluctuation in the price of any single security
in the portfolio arising from unsystematic influences will, on average,
be offset by contrary movements in the prices of the other securities
in the portfolio. Diversification is, in a sense, little more than avoiding
the hazards that extend from 'putting all your eggs inone basket'. The
larger the number of securities in the portfolio, the less the investor win
care about the unsystematic risk of any given security. In fact, it has
been demonstrated that adequate diversification can be achieved with
as few as ten to fifteen securities in a portfolio. 19
Thus, investors in a position to diversify their holdings will be
substantially unconcerned with changes in the unsystematic risk of the
enterprise. 20 Only investors that are unable to diversify their investment
portfolios will be concerned about changes in unsystematic risk not
adversely affecting security values.

19 See E.F. Fama, Foundations of Finance (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976) at 253-4.
Some institutional investors will not be indifferent to such shifts in risk because the shift may
render the investment non-conforming for the purposes of satisfying statutory investment requirements.
See for example the Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 373, s. 38(d), R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 746,
s. 17; Loan Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-12, s. 60(1); Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 512, ss
26-27. Nevertheless, as long as the risk shift involves no diminution in market price, such investors
will suffer no loss of capital and will incur only the transaction costs of disinvesting and reinvesting.
20 Reductions in both unsystematic and systematic risk may effect a redistribution of enterprise
value in favour of creditors and at the expense of shareholders, without altering aggregate enterprise
value. See C.W. Smith & J.B. Warner, "On Financial Contracting- An Analysis of Bond Covenants"
(1979) 7 J. Fin. Econ. 117. This is why I have assumed in this section that the change in risk
does not affect the value of the class of securities held by the potential dissenter rather than the
value of the enterprise as a whole.
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Systematic or market risk, on the other hand, is not diversifiable.
This is because, in general, the securities of all companies will tend to
be affected in the same direction by general economic conditions. Even
if an investor holds a large portfolio of securities, a change in market
conditions will induce correlated changes in the values of each of the
portfolio securities. Thus, there will be no offsetting changes in security
price movements. 21 Because investors have different risk preferences,
changes in systematic risk, whatever the source, 22 may be of concern
to some investors - including those with diversified portfolios.
The value of the appraisal right against pure changes in risk that
do not adversely affect security values will therefore depend on the ability
of investors to diversify their holdings. It will also depend, as the following
sections make clear, on the existence of a 'market-exit option'; that is,
the ability of a shareholder to sell his or her holdings in the market
in response to changes in risk that do not suit his or her risk preferences.
2. Public companies with deep markets
For public companies with well-developed markets, the appraisal
right is likely to be of little value in protecting investors against risk
shifts that do not adversely affect security value.
On a practical level, a dissentient shareholder may simply sell his
or her shares in the market without loss of capital and purchase a more
satisfactory investment. In any case, there is little reason for a welldiversified investor in a public company to be concerned about such
risk shifts. As noted, a shift in unsystematic risk is not of great concern
to the diversified investor. At first sight, a shift in systematic risk that
does not alter the value of the security may nevertheless cause some
investors to sell their shares if the investment no longer conforms to
their risk preferences. It is axiomatic both that investors have heterogeneous risk preferences and that these preferences will influence an

21 A change in the nature of the business carried on may alter either the systematic or
unsystematic risk of the enterprise.
22 A wide variety of fundamental changes may effect changes in the systematic risk of the
enterprise. For example, an amalgamation or an issuance of securities may alter the debt-equity
ratio of an enterprise, which in turn may affect the level of systematic risk. Likewise, a change
in the articles of incorporation may remove restrictions on the nature of the business the corporation
may carry on, allowing it to engage in a business with a higher systematic risk than before. These
changes may, of course, also alter the unsystematic risk of the enterprise.
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investor's investment choices. 23 However, the relevant risk confronting
an investor with an adequately diversified portfolio is the systematic risk
of the portfolio. Changes in the systematic risk of a single security in

the portfolio are unlikely to have such a substantial impact that the
portfolio requires rebalancing. Moreover, changes in the systematic risk
of portfolio securities occasioned by fundamental changes will be uncorrelated, leading to diversification against the danger of changes in
systematic risk. Changes in risk will tend, over time 'to come out in the
wash'. An appraisal right providing protection against changes in sys24
tematic risk will therefore have little value.
In those unlikely cases where a risk shift not affecting security value
causes an investor to sell his or her holdings, the appraisal right could
confer an advantage over the market-exit option only where the right
is designed to afford superior tax consequences to the latter or a payment
to mitigate the unexpected tax burden or brokerage costs incurred by
the shareholder on disposition. Modem statutory appraisal rights typically
do not furnish such advantages.25
3. Public companies with thin markets
The vast bulk of Canadian publicly traded corporations are corporations whose securities are inactively traded.2 6 As in the case of public
corporations with deep markets, investors in these companies are likely
23 The capital asset pricing model suggests an optimal investment strategy for investors with
any given risk preferences. That strategy is to determine a desired level of risk experience and
to adjust portfolio risk to that level by buying a combination of a 'risk-free' asset (such as government
bonds) and the 'market' portfolio. The market portfolio consists of a weighted average of all capital
investments available in the market in the proportion that the value of each bears to the aggregate
value of all capital investments. Although transaction costs and indivisibilities clearly inhibit purchase
of the market portfolio, the insight yielded is that comparatively risk-averse and risk-preferring
investors will, in theory, differ in their investment strategies only in respect of the portion of the
portfolio invested (or disinvested, by borrowing) in the risk-free asset.
24 The de minimus character of a change in portfolio systematic risk resulting from a change
of risk of an individual security, and the tendency for offsetting changes in risk to cancel out,
will be especially true for investors with very large portfolios, such as institutional investors. It
will also be true for individuals who invest through an institution such as a mutual fund.
25 Arguably they should not do so: see Parts V.B.I.-2., infra. It should be noted that where
changes in the risk of a given security prompt an investor to rebalance the portfolio, the rebalancing
need not involve the sale of the particular security in respect of which the fundamental change
occurred: it might just as well involve the buying or selling of other investments to rebalance
the risk characteristics of the portfolio. This may involve disinvestment of any of the risky securities
in the portfolio in favour of a 'riskless' asset such as Treasury Bills or investment in a bank account,
or vice versa.
26 See DJ. Fowler, C.H. Rorke & V.M. Jog, "Thin Trading and Beta Estimation Problems
on the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1980) 12 J. Bus. Admin. 77; DJ. Fowler, C.H. Rorke & V.M.
Jog, "Heteroscedasticity, R2 and Thin Trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1979) 34 J. Fin.
1201; DJ. Fowler, C.H. Rorke & V.M. Jog, "A Note on Beta Stability and Thin Trading on the
Toronto Stock Exchange" (1981) 8 J. Bus. Fin. Acct. 267.
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to be well diversified. 27 Again, there is a market-exit option. Nevertheless,
the quoted price may not be an entirely reliable gauge of fair value.
Where a company's securities are thinly traded, there is a greater risk
of short-run fluctuations in the market price of the security away from
the equilibrium value.28 Arguably, shareholders might wish to be protected
against this risk by being assured a reliable and fair exit option as supplied
by the appraisal right.
However, the argument is weak. As in the case of public companies
with deep markets, shareholders are not likely to be concerned about
changes in risk (either systematic or unsystematic) that do not adversely
affect security value. As well, given the relative costs of the appraisal
option as opposed to a market sale, it is almost inconceivable that the
appraisal right would be a valued protection for shareholders against
changes that do not affect security value.
4. Privately held companies
Investors in private businesses for which there exists no public market
may have a very different attitude towards shifts in enterprise risk than
investors in public companies. Such investors are often significantly
underdiversified since a large part of their wealth (including their
employment) is tied up in the enterprise. In the face of significant
underdiversification, individual investor welfare will depend on the total
risk of the enterprise. Therefore all risk shifts, whether company specific
or systematic, may be of profound concern whether or not such shifts
affect security value.
In most such enterprises, there is no reliable market-exit option.
Shares of private companies will generally be difficult to sell and may
in fact be subject to strict restrictions on transferability, reflecting the
quasi-partnership status of many small, incorporated enterprises. Thus,
the exit option provided by the appraisal right may be an important
protection for the minority shareholder of a private company against
the danger of shifts in either the systematic or unsystematic risk of the
enterprise. 29

27 At the very least such investors will, in most cases, have the option of diversifying their
holdings and have only themselves to blame for failing to do so.
28 See infra, notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
29 An alternative protection is that conferred by private ordering arrangements. See infra,
Parts VILC. and IX.
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5. The appraisal right as a remedial substitute for the doctrine of ultra
vires and other constraints on the corporation's line of business
An interesting parallel may be drawn between the risk-shifting
rationale for the appraisal right and other, now mostly defunct, corporate
law doctrines that protected shareholders and creditors against the
consequences of changes in the company's line of business. The require-

ment to enumerate objects and powers in the constitutional documents
of the company was one form of protection against such changes as
was the doctrine of ultra vires, which sprang out of this requirement. 30
These statutory and judicial proscriptions against changing the nature
of the business were, at least in part, attempts to protect shareholders
from changes in the risk of the enterprise whether or not enterprise value
was affected. At least insofar as protection from risk shifting is concerned,
the appraisal right may be seen as a remedial substitute for these doctrines.
B.

Unwise or Opportunistic FundamentalChanges Diminishing
Enterprise Value
Whether or not the risk of the enterprise changes, the risk-adjusted

value of the enterprise and its securities may be adversely affected by

the fundamental change. 31 This might be true if the market fails to share

the sanguine expectations of management (or majority shareholders) as
to the value of the change. This disparity may be attributable to either
a lack of managerial (or majority shareholder) business acumen or the
possession of information about the value of the change that the market
32
does not possess.

30 The earliest predecessors of our modem corporate law statutes contained requirements to
enumerate the objects or intended businesses of the corporation. In the English legislation, see
An Act for the Registration, Incorporatior and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies, 7 & 8 Vict.,
c. 110, s. IV.2. See also ss VII.2. and LVIIL2. In Canada, An Act to Provide for the Formation
ofIncorporatedJoint Stock Companies for Manufacturing,Mining, Mechanica4 or Chemical Purposes
(Can.), 13 & 14 Vict, c. 28, s. L The first Ontario legislation in 1874 contained a similar requirement;
see An Act Respecting the Incorporation of Joint Stock Companies by Letters Patent, 37 Viet., c.
35, s. 4.2. The judicial doctrine of ultra vires, first clearly stated in the signal case of Ashbury
Railway Carriagev. Riche (1875), 7 L.RH.L. 653, sprang out of the statutory requirement to enumerate
objects. One reason motivating both the statutory requirement and the judicial doctrine that it
spawned was the protection of investors against shifts in the risk of the enterprise. See L. Getz,
"Ultra Vires and Some Related Problems" (1968) 3:3 U.B.C.L. Rev. 30.
31 The value of the enterprise is the sum of the net present values of each of its productive
activities. Net present values are computed by discounting the prospective cash flow of an activity
by a discount rate that is derived from the risk of the activity. Nevertheless, the risk of the activity,
or changes in risk associated with a fundamental change, do not by themselves indicate whether
the change will increase, decrease, or leave unaffected the wealth of the enterprise's current
shareholders. See those authorities in note 18.
32 In such a case, while the change may not be 'unwise', it will be difficult for shareholders
to distinguish between this situation and an unwise change, and shareholders may desire to cash
out rather than waiting to see if management was right.
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There is another reason why managers may undertake fundamental
changes that diminish the value of the enterprise: the welfare of managers
may be increased even though firm value (and shareholder wealth) is
diminished. This might happen if one or more of the firm's managers
are substantially underdiversified; for example, if the manager's principal
financial asset is his or her job. Where this is the case, and where the
risk of the enterprise affects the value of the manager's compensation
package or security of tenure (where, for example, added risk increases
the probability of bankruptcy and the loss of the manager's job) a manager
will benefit from selecting a level of enterprise risk that conforms to
his or her own risk preferences whether or not this has a favourable
effect on firm value.33 This would be an instance of opportunistic behaviour
effected by managers at the expense of all shareholders (assuming that
no shareholder is similarly underdiversified and benefits in like fashion).
The degree to which shareholders will desire protection against either
unwise or opportunistic fundamental changes that diminish enterprise
value will likely depend on the nature of the enterprise. Since the argument
for such protection is probably strongest in the case of private corporations,
this type of corporation will be considered first.
1. Private companies
In private companies, the dangers of both unwise and opportunistic
fundamental changes diminishing enterprise value are heightened. In
respect of the former, there is no market price to indicate the market's
verdict on the proposed fundamental change. This will deprive all
shareholders of one significant piece of evidence as to the wisdom of
the fundamental change, rendering majority approval of an unwise
fundamental change more likely. Moreover, many managers of small,
private concerns may lack the skill of their counterparts in larger public
enterprises and make more errors in judgment.
Opportunistic fundamental changes designed to accommodate the
risk preferences of managers or majority shareholders are also more
likely to occur. The managers of private corporations will often be
significantly underdiversified, given that both their private wealth and
employment will be tied up in the enterprise, thereby compounding the
dangers of opportunism. Even if the managers are not themselves

33 Aside from shareholder control exercised through the voting (or other) mechanism, the
market for managers necessarily constrains the degree to which managers will sacrifice profits
for a level of risk that suits their own preferences. Excessive slack or diversion of corporate resources
may ultimately cost the manager his or her job or imperil chances for future employment. See
E.F. Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" (1980) 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288.
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significant or controlling shareholders, the likelihood of the existence
of a controlling shareholder or coalition of shareholders is great. These
shareholders may again be underdiversified, leading them to spearhead
fundamental changes that suit their risk preferences and increase their
welfare at the expense of enterprise value and the wealth of minority
shareholders. As a result, events provoking a minority shareholder to
desire to bail out of the enterprise in response to an anticipated diminution
in value are likely to arise with some frequency.

The absence of a market-exit option increases the value of the
appraisal right. If protection is desired against unwise or opportunistic
fundamental changes that the majority have approved, the appraisal
procedure is likely to be - aside from private ordering arrangements
to effect the same result 34 - the only exit option available.
The argument is incomplete, however, without considering the effect
of statutory requirements for shareholder approval of the fundamental
change. Most fundamental changes must be approved by a supra-majority
of shareholders. 35 Should the majority withhold approval, there will be

no occasion to enlist the protection afforded by the appraisal right. There
is typically no requirement, however, that the fundamental change be
approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders of the corpo-

ration.36 Thus, voting approvals are far from foolproof minority shareholder protections where interested shareholders control sufficient shares
to determine the outcome of the vote. This will frequently be the case
in private corporations. 37

34 See Parts VILC. and IX, infra.
35 Such required voting approvals are typically by special resolution; that is, two-thirds of
all shareholders normally entitled to vote. In some cases, all the corporation's shareholders may
vote, whether or not they have been given a vote by the company's articles. See for example,
CBCA, supra, note I at ss 36 (reduction of capital; no enfranchisement of otherwise non-voting
shares), 170 (amendment of articles; provides that non-enfranchised classes may vote), 177(3)
(amalgamation; non-voting shares participate in a company-wide vote), 182 (continuance out of
jurisdiction; non-voting shares participate in company-wide vote), and 183(4)-(5) (sales of all or
substantially all the corporation's assets; non-voting shares participate in company-wide vote). These
provisions also generally require a class vote where shareholders of any class stand to be affected
by the fundamental change differently from other classes of shareholders, whether or not the class
is normally entitled to vote. The OBCA, supra, note 2, has similar provisions, but does not enfranchise
otherwise non-voting shareholders except in respect of a required class vote. See OBCA ss 34,
169, 175, 180, 183(3)-(8). In most cases, a majority of the minority voting approval is not required,
but see OBCA s. 189 (going private), and Ontario Securities Commission Policies 1.3 (issuance
of restricted voting or non-voting shares) and 9.1 (going private). The stock exchanges may also
require a majority of the minority approvals in some circumstances. See generally J. Macintosh,
"Some Changing Patterns of Minority Shareholder Protection on Fundamental Changes in English,
Federal, & Ontario Company Law" (on file at the Osgoode Hall Law Journal).
36 Ibid

37 Further discussion of this point may be found at infra, Part VI.A.1.
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2. Public companies with deep markets
At first sight (as in the case of simple risk shifts) it would appear
that shareholders in a large, public corporation can always liquidate their
holdings in the market, obviating the need for the exit afforded by the
appraisal right. M.A. Eisenberg has suggested, however, at least two
reasons why the market-exit option may not be an adequate protection
for shareholders. 38 First, large shareholders who are forced to sell quickly
to escape the fundamental change may realize an inferior price in the
market because of the hurried liquidation of the large block.39 Second,
all shareholders, whether large or small, may only be able to realize
a price that already reflects the market's anticipation of the effect of
the fundamental change.40
These two claims are potentially inconsistent; in an efficient securities
market, one would indeed expect that once an announcement of the
proposed fundamental change is made, the anticipated effect of the change
on firm value (based on all publicly available information) would be
quickly and completely reflected in the price of the firm's securities.
However, one would also expect the quantity of securities offered for
sale in secondary markets to have little or no effect on price. The sole
determinants of security value will be risk and expected return, and the
volume of securities offered for sale (or orders for purchase) should not
41
ordinarily affect either of these factors.
Evidence from the securities markets in both the United States and
Canada does, in fact, suggest that new information is reflected rapidly
and completely in securities prices. 42 There is also evidence, however,
that the sale of a large block of securities may temporarily depress stock

38 M.A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976) at
79-84.
39 The same may result if a flood of sell orders of small shareholders come to the market
at the same time, disadvantaging both large and small shareholders. Ibid at 82.
40 Ibid
41 In an efficient market, securities of equal risk will be perfect (or near perfect) substitutes,
Assuming that the block sale does not in fact have any influence on underlying risk or expected
cash flows (and is not a signal of inside information: see infra, note 45 and accompanying text),
any downward movement of security price will increase the expected return of the security, yielding
a higher risk-adjusted expected return than on other securities of comparable risk. This will quickly
summon forth purchases by those seeking arbitrage profits, driving the price back to its original
value and restoring an equilibrium to the expected return given the risk of the security. See authorities
in note 43, infra.

42 A market that responds rapidly and completely to new publicly available information is
said to be efficient in the 'semi-strong form'. Evidence in both Canada and the United States suggests
that the securities markets are indeed efficient in this form. See infra,note 197.
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prices.43 The magnitude of the price depression associated with block
trades is typically no more than a few percentage points of stock price

and in most cases only a fraction of a percentage point.44 The source
of the price effect appears to be an attribution by the market of
informational content to a block sale by a shareholder who may be in
possession of inside information bearing on stock value combined with
the cost of liquidity services supplied by block positioners. 45 These figures
do not completely rule out the possibility that some large shareholders
may value the appraisal right as protection against the cost of sale of
a large block. However, the cost of liquidating the block, simpliciter,
is likely to overstate the true cost to the dissenter. The cost of liquidating

an investment would be borne in the normal course of events by the
security holder at some point in time when the investment is sold. Thus,
the cost to the shareholder of the accelerated liquidation is not the entire
cost of the liquidation, but the difference between the liquidation cost
and the net present value of the liquidation cost that would have been
anticipated in the normal course of events. Further, the larger the block,
the more likely it is that the holder will be able to use his or her voting
43 L.Y. Dann, D. Mayers, & RJ. Raab Jr., "Trading Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of
Price Adjustment" (1977) 4 J. Fin. Econ. 3; N. Close, "Price Reaction to Large Transactions in
the Canadian Equity Markets" (1975) 31:6 Fin. Anal. J. 50; A. Kraus & H.R. Stoll, "Price Impacts
of Block Trading on the New York Stock Exchange" (1972) 27 J. Fin. 569; M.S. Scholes, "The
Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share
Prices" (1972) 45 J. Bus. 179. See generally Copeland & Weston, supra, note 18 at 327-32; K.D.
Garbade, Securities Markets (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982), at 256-59, 454-60, 47576.
44 See supra, note 43. Evidence suggests that in some respects the Canadian securities markets
are less transactionally efficient than the American markets. See infra, note 197; S.M. Tinic &
R.R. West, "Marketability of Common Stocks in Canada and the U.S.A.: A Comparison of Agent
Versus Dealer Dominated Markets" (1974) 29 J. Fin. 729. However, Close found that price
depreciation associated with block sales was usually less than 5 percent of share price, with the
average about 0.5 percent (Close, supra, note 43). The figure may be overly conservative: it would
appear that many of the larger block trades take place through the American markets, where
the cost of liquidity services is lower. See J.E. Walter & J.P. Williamson, "Organized Securities
Exchanges in Canada" (1960) 15 J. Fin. 307. The accessability of the American trading route
tends to vitiate the argument that because block trades are expensive in Canada, the appraisal
right has a value to Canadian holders of large equity positions.
It is probably also true that the transactional efficiency of the stock exchanges has improved
with the introduction of negotiated commissions and an increase in dealer market making. In respect
of the latter, see for example, Toronto Stock Exchange by-law 338, Dec. 13, 1983, effective Feb.
8, 1984; by-law 387, effective May 7, 1985 amending The GeneralBy-Law ss 11.67-11.68 dealing
with principal transactions. See generally 4 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 815-821.
45 Block sales will often be by insiders or by those whom the market might rationally anticipate
to have superior access to privileged information about the firm. As in the United States, Canadian
markets have not been found to be efficient assimilators of insider information. See DJ. Fowler
& C.H. Rorke, "Insider Trading Profits in the Canadian Equity Market" (May 1985) [unpublished];
J.B. Baesal & G.R. Stein, "The Value of Information: Inferences from the Profitability of Insider
Trading" (1979) 143 J. Fin. Quan. Anal. 553; DJ. Fowler, et aL, "A Preliminary Examination
of Insider Trading in Canada," (Proceedings, Administrative Sciences Association of Canada, 1977).
This evidence does not refute the claim that markets are efficient as to publicly available information.
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power to defeat the fundamental change, obviating the need for an
appraisal right. And, if the block is not large enough to carry sufficient
voting power to influence the vote, the market is less likely to interpret
the sale as a signal of unfavourable inside information. This is because
the shareholder is less likely to have access to such information. As
a result, the magnitude of the decrease in price associated with sale
of the block will be less. Finally, as I will suggest below, there may
be good reason to leave this cost, in any event, in the hands of the
46
shareholder rather than add it to the appraised value of the shares.
Thus, for both small and large shareholders, the market will be an
insufficient resort not because of the costs of liquidating the investment,
but because the speed of adjustment of share prices to the announcement
of the fundamental change will prevent the shareholder from escaping
the effects of the proposed change.
Despite this inability to outrace the market, an appraisal right
furnishing protection against unwise or opportunistic fundamental changes
is less likely to be of value to shareholders in a public corporation than
to those in a private corporation. Managers and shareholders have at
their disposal a convenient and low-cost gauge of the wisdom of the
proposed fundamental change - market price. Should the market reflect
unfavourably on the proposed change, share prices will drop.47 Although
it has frequently been suggested that management control of the proxy
machinery and rational shareholder indifference may lead shareholders
to approve actions that are not strictly in accord with their best interests, 48
the reputations of the managers will not be enhanced by continuing to
champion an apparently unwise change; management is therefore likely
to abandon the proposal. Should management stubbornly cling to the
unsound proposal or persevere for opportunistic reasons4 9 (if,for example,
the proposal would effect a change in risk that increases the utility of

46 See inf-a, Part V.B.1-2.

47 The price signal may not be entirely unambiguous where other confounding events potentially
affecting market price occur at or around the public anouncement of the proposed change.
48 It is rational for many shareholders to be apathetic because of the small value of their
holdings, the relatively great cost of investigations required to make an effective use of the vote,
the marginal effect on the outcome, and the fact that each shareholder has an incentive to free
ride on the efforts of other shareholders in uncovering information and voting effectively. See generally
RC. Clark, "Vote Buying and Corporate Law" (1979) 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 776; F.H. Easterbrook
& D.R. Fischel, "Voting in Corporate Law" (1983) 26 J. Law & Econ. 395; H.G. Manne, "Some
Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting" (1964) 64 Col. L. Rev. 1427.
49 Opportunistic risk shifts designed to suit management risk preferences are probably less
likely in public corporations than in private corporations. In many cases, the wealth of the managers
will be less concentrated in the enterprise, ameliorating the problem of underdiversification. Majority
or controlling shareholders are also more likely to be well diversified.
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the managers at the expense of the wealth of shareholders, as suggested
supra), shareholders (particularly institutions with significant holdings)
are less likely to vote in its favour.
Nonetheless, there is good evidence that shareholders sometimes
approve fundamental changes that are not in their best interests. 50 This
evidence suggests that an appraisal right giving protection against unwise
fundamental changes will have some value to shareholders in public
corporations although the case may not be overwhelmingly strong.
3. Public companies with thin markets
The situation in respect of thinly traded public companies is little
different from that of public companies traded in liquid markets. There
are two differences worth noting, however. The first is that the speed
of adjustment of share prices to the announcement of the proposed
fundamental change may be somewhat slower than in the case of widely
traded companies, allowing shareholders a greater opportunity to outrace
the market adjustment in selling the company's shares. This 1 difference
5
in speed of adjustment, however, is not likely to be material.
Second, should the appraisal right have some value to large shareholders insofar as the sale of a block may depress prices, this value
will likely increase as the market in the company's securities becomes
thinner. In a thin market, the price of the liquidity services offered by
block positioners will increase, since dealers who perform this role will
anticipate holding an inventory of the stock for a longer period of time
than in a liquid market and will increase their bid or ask spreads to
cover the added risk. Similarly, thin markets tend to be characterized
by greater uncertainty as to the equilibrium price of the security given
the relatively infrequent trading. This, too, might be expected to increase
dealer risk and hence bid or ask spreads.52 Many Canadian exchanges
(including the Toronto Stock Exchange) are still conducted primarily

50 For example, the evidence discloses that, on average, share prices drop on the enactment

of 'shark repellant' charter amendments which must be approved by shareholders. See infra, notes
80-82. A partial explanation (in addition to those explanations noted in the text) may be the cooption of institutional investors by means of management threats to withdraw business from those
institutions failing to vote in favour of the amendment.
51 See those authorities noted infra, note 197.
52 Price volatility will also be a determinant of bid or ask spreads. There are comparatively
more speculative (and hence volatile) stocks on the Canadian exchanges than the American, leading
(on average) to higher bid or ask spreads. See Tinic & West, supra, note 44. The widening of
spreads associated with greater volatility will not be a problem unique to block trades but may

supply potential block traders with another reason for preferring a non-market exit alternative.
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as broker auction markets without significant market making by dealers.
This may increase the cost of liquidating a large block.53
Aside from the price of marketability, the perceived informational
content of block sales may be larger in respect of thinly traded companies
for which a deep pool of evaluative information may not be constantly
available. Thus, the seller of a large block may be stuck with the very
loss he or she seeks to escape simply by virtue of the act of selling
in response to the proposed fundamental change.
Nevertheless, the little evidence available suggests that even in thinly
54
traded companies the costs of liquidating a block may not be substantial.
Thus, as with public companies trading in deep markets, this factor may
not significantly increase the value of the appraisal right to large
shareholders.
C. Majoritiesand Minorities on the Exercise of the Appraisal Right
The potentialvalue of the appraisal right lies in holding a put option
that arises on the happening of specified triggering contingencies. The
put option enables the shareholder who would not otherwise be able
to do so to cash out of the enterprise (in the case of private corporations)
or to cash out at a better price than the current market price (in respect
of public corporations) and (in both cases) to avoid the effects of the
fundamental change. This prospectively protects shareholders against
certain risks. Prima facie, this protection should have some value to
shareholders.
It must not be forgotten, however, that ex ante it may not be entirely
clear to a shareholder whether he or she will be in the majority or minority
in respect of any given fundamental change. If the shareholder is in
the majority seeking to undertake the fundamental change, he or she
will bear part of the cost of cashing out the dissenters.55 Thus, prospectively,
it may not be clear whether the appraisal right will represent a benefit
or a cost.
Nevertheless, by reducing the probability of unprofitable fundamental
changes, the appraisal right may be of value to all shareholders. In the
situation where either an unwise or opportunistic fundamental change
diminishes enterprise value, the appraisal right may function as a backstop
if the requirement to secure voting approval of fundamental changes
53 See Tinic & West,/bid Even on the Toronto Stock Exchange, registered traders will often
lack sufficient capitalization to participate in large block trades. But see Close, supra, note 43.
54 The study by Close, ibid, was performed on securities trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange,
the great majority of which are thinly traded companies. See supra, note 26.
55 See infra, note 117 and accompanying text.
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fails. Should the existence of a controlling shareholder, management
control of the proxy machinery, or shareholder apathy 6 result in the
approval of a value-decreasing fundamental change, widespread exercise
of the appraisal right may nevertheless abort the change. At the same
time, the existence of an appraisal right will not deter many valuegenerating transactions. It is certainly true that in some cases widespread
dissent may occur in a value-generating transaction where shareholders
are unable to share the inside information possessed by managers or
majority shareholders. Shareholders may not be in possession of the
information that would show the change to be a productive one; but
in this case, managers have an incentive to reveal the information to
shareholders as long as revelation will not harm the company's competitive
interests 7 If harm would result and disclosure is impossible, the company
should have little difficulty in raising money to pay out the dissenters,
since it can share the confidential information with its bankers.
D. Is the AppraisalRight an Efficient Protection Against Changes in the
Nature of the Business?
Thus far, I have focused on reasons why shareholders might value
the appraisal right as a protection against fundamental changes that either
alter the risk of the business without altering security values or that
58
adversely affect security values.
However, whether or not a security with an appraisal right will
constitute an efficient financial contract cannot be determined without
regard to additional factors. Aside from the benefits that may result from
an appraisal right (and, as noted, the cost to non-exercising shareholders
and the potential discouraging effect on productive fundamental changes)
there are a host of potential costs associated with its exercise. Foremost
56 See infra, Part VI.A.1.

57 In private corporations, where the number of shareholders is small, it may be possible
to reveal the information to all shareholders while avoiding public disclosure. This will tend to

ensure both that the fundamental change will be approved by shareholders and that few if any
shareholders will exercise dissent rights. Thus, it is even less likely in private corporations that

value-increasing transactions will be deterred by the existence of an appraisal right.
58 It should not be overlooked that there may be private ordering alternatives to the appraisal

right to achieve this protection. For example, an alternative means of protection against unwise
fundamental changes is to insert a proviso in the articles of the company stating that no fundamental
change may be consummated if it causes the market price of the firm's securities to drop. This
would protect shareholders against fundamental changes that decrease security values. However,
there are practical problems that would attend such a provision, including the determination of
whether or not the company's securities diminished in value as a consequence of the proposed
change. Only sophisticated regression techniques will yield an answer to this question. Courts, as
a practical matter, would be substantially unable to review this factual question without resort
to expert testimony, leading to difficult and expensive litigation. Of course, the appraisal right may
also generate costly litigation (see infra,Part V.B.6).
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amongst these are the mechanical costs of the appraisal right, including
tax and brokerage costs to the shareholder, the costs of inevitable delays
and uncertainties associated with the determination of value, and settlement or adjudication costs. These issues are reserved for further
discussion below. 59
It will be suggested that no a priori conclusion may be stated in
respect of whether or not shareholder risk preferences will lead shareholders to prefer a contract with an appraisal right to one without. This
is fundamentally an empirical matter and the answer may vary with
different types of corporations and different types of fundamental changes.
This conclusion will form the basis for a suggested multiple option regime
of statutory appraisal rights.
IV.

CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE RIGHTS OF SECURITY
HOLDERS: THE APPRAISAL RIGHT AS PROTECTION
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

A. DiscriminationDefined
Fundamental changes often involve discriminatory treatment of
shareholders. Indeed, discrimination is a commonplace of corporate
existence. Discrimination may arise in respect of shareholders of a single
class or shareholders of different classes, and it may arise in a variety
of contexts. In the life of an enterprise, business, economic, or financial
considerations may dictate that the enterprise undergo reformation. This
reformation may well involve, inter alia, discriminatory cancellation of
arrearages of dividends of a class of shares, removal of a retraction feature,
issuance of a class of securities superior to an existing class or classes
(thus derogating from their relative interest in the enterprise), or even
elimination of a class of securities. A corporate amalgamation may result
in discriminatory treatment of shareholders, as may reincorporation in
a new jurisdiction, or virtually any other corporate fundamental change.
Although the word 'discrimination' usually carries with it a pejorative
connotation, it is clear that the fact of discrimination by itself is not
always objectionable. The discrimination may be of a formal but not
substantive character. For example, where there is a single class of
shareholders in a corporation and the corporation undertakes a statutory
arrangement whereby the majority shareholders receive common shares
in the reorganized enterprise but the minority receive cash, the majority
and minority have clearly been treated in a formally disparate manner.
Nevertheless, as long as the economic value of the consideration received
59 See infra, Part V.
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by both majority and minority is essentially equivalent

0 -

shareholders are treated in a substantively equal manner 1

-

that is,

minority

shareholders can have little objection.

Even substantively unequal treatment is not necessarily unfair
treatment. Minority shareholders may be willing to accept substantively

unequal outcomes ex post if this maximizes share prices ex ante (which
might be the case, for example, if productive fundamental changes are
rendered more probable by a rule permitting substantively unequal

treatment of minority and majority). The correct perspective from an
economic point of view is the ex ante bargain, and it is this perspective

that will be used in this article.
This Part addresses the extent to which the appraisal right may

function as a device for preventing or affording relief from instances
of substantive discrimination associated with fundamental changes. The
extent of the protection afforded may vary. The appraisal right may be

based on a principle of unrestricted substantive equality where the
appraisal valuation will be conducted with a view to ensuring that

dissentient shareholders receive substantive equivalents to majority shareholders. Alternatively, the right might permit substantive discrimination

to the extent of preserving from encroachment the pre-transactionvalue
of the shareholders' entitlement. 62 Other intermediate solutions are

possible.
The difficulty in formulating a principle of permissible and imper-

missible discrimination results primarily from the tension between the
facilitation of the economic gains which may arise from permitting
substantively unequal treatment on fundamental changes, and the dangers

of opportunistic redistribution (and the associated economic losses)
engendered by such a rule. Thus, the discussion in this section will focus

on the risks of opportunistic redistribution (by either majority or minority)

60 'Equivalence' must be understood in a relative sense; that is, relating the prior relative
economic interests of shareholders.
61 Conversely, the receipt of formal equivalents does not guarantee that all shareholders or
classes of shareholders will be treated in a substantively equal manner. Fundamental changes carried
out with scrupulous attention paid to formal equality may have a widely differing impact on groups
of shareholders (whether within a class or in different classes). See for example, Re Fergusonand
Imax Systems Corp. (1983), 43 O.R (2d) 128 (Ont. C.A.); Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas, Ltd
(1950), [1951] Ch. 286 (C.A.); In Re Mackenzie & Co., Ltd (1916), [1916] 2 Ch. 450 (Ch. Div.).
62 These two possibilities are not exclusive of other types of appraisal right but are perhaps
the two most likely variants. As indicated below, 'pre-transaction' value is not entirely self-defining,
since value depends on the information set used in performing the evaluation. Two variants canvassed
below are value based on publicly available information as reflected in the market price of the
firm's securities, and value informed by the additional understanding derived from possession of
inside information about the company.
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under alternative substantive discrimination principles; whether the realization of gain from the fundamental change depends on, or will occur
with greater frequency under, a rule of unequal distribution; and the
transaction costs generated by the rule, including costs of bargaining,
costs associated with alterations of the bargain, policing the bargain,
and dispute resolution. This last will depend upon the relative ease with
which the rule may be applied in practice by the parties and by a court. 63
These three matters will be evaluated in a variety of transactional contexts
and in light of the type of corporation involved.
It will be suggested that a rule of unequal sharing of benefits will
in some circumstances tend to maximize the size of the corporate pie
available for distribution and will economize on adjudication and disputeresolution costs. However, this leaves open a possibility of appropriation
of values latent in the enterprise by majority shareholders. Where this
is the case, an appraisal right designed to uncover hidden values may
afford shareholders an opportunity to recapture such values. If the dangers
of opportunistic appropriation are pronounced, an appraisal right with
a full gain-sharing rule may conduce to a lower corporate cost of capital.
The relative likelihood of opportunistic redistribution and the facilitation
of gains will vary with different types of transactions and different
corporate types.
B. A Rule of Unequal Distribution"PromotingProductive Fundamental
Changes
In respect of corporate control transactions, it has been vigourously
argued by F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel that a rule permitting an
unequal distribution of benefits - subject to the minority being no worse
off than before (as measured by the pre-transaction market price of the
minority's shares) - will, ex ante, make both majority and minority
shareholders better off.64 The unequal distribution makes changes of
control more likely both because controlling shareholders are more likely
to part with their interests when they can capture a larger share of the
gain and because the acquiror's costs of gaining control will tend to
be reduced. Such control transactions produce economic gains as control
moves to the hands of those best able to manage the corporate assets.
Inefficient management may be removed. Even where management is
63 Does it involve complex and difficult calculations? Difficult evidentiary questions? Is it
likely to provoke difficult and expensive litigation, whether by minority shareholders acting bona
fde or opportunistically?
64 F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, "Corporate Control Transactions" (1982) 91 Yale L.
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not actually removed, the threatof removal promotes better management.
This enlarges the size of the corporate pie available for distribution.
According to this argument, minority shareholders will participate
in the resulting gains through at least two mechanisms. The first is simply
by virtue of participating in better-run companies: the capital market
discipline of managers will be facilitated, benefitting all shareholders.
A second is by means of holding diversified portfolios of both parent
and subsidiary companies. As shareholders of subsidiary companies,
minority shareholders may fail to participate directly in the gains generated
by corporate control transactions. However, as shareholders of parent
companies (majority or controlling shareholders of the disenfranchised
subsidiaries), the minority will participate in the gains since these benefit
the entire company. Moreover, any added risk of variability in returns
experienced by minority shareholders under an unequal distribution rule
may be diversified away.65

Fischel has independently suggested - consistent with the above
theory - that it is appropriate in appraising the value of dissentient
shares to exclude any gains that may arise from undertaking the control
transaction by awarding pre-transaction market value.66 In principle, the
argument in favour of a rule allowing substantive discrimination, subject
to protecting the pre-transaction value of the minority shares from
encroachment, may be extended to all corporate fundamental changes.
Protecting the pre-transaction value of minority shares while allowing
the majority to capture the economic gains generated will arguably
produce more of all types of productive fundamental changes.
C. The Rule of Unequal Sharing in Canadian CapitalMarkets
The argument advanced by Easterbrook and Fischel in favour of
a rule of unequal sharing in order to foster economic gains rests in part
on the assumption that both the minority and majority have an opportunity
to participate -

whether directly or indirectly -

in the gains arising

from the non-sharing rule. To the extent that majority and minority
shareholders are not overlapping classes in the market but form discrete
classes of capital contributors, the argument weakens.
65 It is not clear that the variability (and hence the risk of the returns to minority shareholders)
is increased under an unequal sharing rule. In fact, the opposite appears to be the case. A rule
dividing gains unequally tends to result in a more rather than less certain return to the minority
shareholders. Since corporate control transactions are uncertain future events, a gain-sharing rule
would tend to carry with it the uncertainty of realization or non-realization of potential gains.
A non-sharing rule eliminates this uncertainty. See AM. Polinsky, "Risk Sharing Through Breach
of Contract Remedies" (1983) 12 L Leg. Stud. 427. Of course, if the risk is diversifiable, it matters
little; an increase or a decrease in diversifiable risk will be of little concern to diversified shareholders.
66 Fischel, supra, note 10.
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Canadian capital markets are characterized by a high degree of
concentration of share ownership. Few companies of significant size are
'management controlled'; a small number of corporate and private
shareholders hold a startlingly large portion of all marketable securities
publicly traded in Canada 67 and in many cases control vast corporate
empires. Moreover, many subsidiaries are held by privately owned parents.
In these circumstances, an asymmetrical distribution of the gains from
corporate control transactions will occur, with insiders benefitting with
much greater frequency and to a greater extent than outsider minority
shareholders. Thus, the benefits of a non-sharing rule to minority
shareholders are apparently reduced.
However, as a matter of theory, it is not clear that minority
shareholders must be able to hold the securities of parent companies
in order that a non-sharing rule constitute the most efficient rule. Minority
shareholders will be indifferent to the character of the rules as long as
any change makes them no worse off. If a non-sharing rule does indeed
enhance the wealth of majority shareholders, while not detracting from
the wealth of minority shareholders, moving to a non-sharing rule will
effect a Pareto improvement. The degree of concentration of shareholdings
may therefore only effect the distribution of the gains resulting from
a non-sharing rule as between majority and minority shareholders rather
than the magnitude of the gains.
D.

The Economic Costs of a Rule of Unequal Distribution:The
Transaction Costs of OpportunisticRedistributionand Potential
Diminutions in Enterprise Value

1. The economic costs of opportunism
Allowing majority shareholders to appropriate the gains flowing from
fundamental changes may not have the uniform property of producing
more productive fundamental transactions. It may also tend to produce
a larger number of unproductive (and possibly wasteful) transactions.
Discriminatory alterations of the enterprise may have a purely redistributional motive. The change may be nothing more than a gambit by
managers or majority shareholders to effect a redistribution between
classes of shareholders, or between shareholders within a class, under
67 See, for example, L. Hunter, "Notes for an Address to the Conference on the Changing
Regulatory Environment for Canadian Financial Institutions" (U. of T. and O.E.C. Conference
on Canadian Financial Institutions, 23 May 1985); D. Hatter, "Charmed Circle Still Firmly in
Control" (Summer, 1985) The Financial Post 50 at 58; Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate
Concentration, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1978) (Chair R. Bryce) ch. 7. See also J. Porter, The
Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).
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the guise of a change putatively for the benefit of the company as a
whole.
The risks of opportunistic redistribution are heightened due to
asymmetric possession of information regarding company value. The
majority shareholders or managers may possess inside information
disclosing hidden values that are not reflected in the market price of
the company's securities and may wish to capture these values for
themselves by excluding the minority. 68
There are a variety of economic losses that will result from
undertaking purely redistributive fundamental changes. One is the direct
costs of the transaction; the company will typically have to send out
notices to shareholders, prepare proxy materials, hold shareholder meetings, and comply with other regulatory burdens associated with shareholder and other mandated approvals. Management time will be diverted
from managing the corporation's business interests. Some transactions
that may be undertaken with purely redistributive motives may adversely
affect the corporation's capital structure, cash flows, or ability to raise
capital. A leveraged buyout, for example, might burden the corporation
with excessive debt, exposing it to unreasonable risks of bankruptcy and
co-opting cash flow to service the debt while depriving the corporation
of access to public equity markets.
In a world that permits substantively unequal treatment, the anticipation of a higher level of purely or partly redistributional fundamental
changes will lead to a higher level of monitoring of the activities of
the corporation by shareholders. This is also an economic cost.
The familiar problem of adverse selection gives rise to another cost.
Public shareholders may not be able, ex ante, to observe the likelihood
of any particular company or majority shareholder engaging in opportunistic redistribution. Thus, in setting a company's cost of capital, the
market will assume that each issuer will engage in an average amount
of opportunistic redistribution. In fact, some companies will engage in
less and some companies in more redistribution than the average. Those
companies that engage in less ('high quality issuers') will be penalized
by having a cost of capital reflecting an inappropriately large risk
premium. 69 Coincidentally, companies that engage in more opportunism
('low quality issuers') will have an inappropriately low cost of capital.

68 The term "minority" is used here to refer both to a minority of shareholders within a
class and to classes of shares without voting power or whose votes are overmastered by those
of other classes.
69 G.A. Akerlof, "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism"
(1970) 84 QJ. Econ. 488.
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This inability of investors to differentiate the quality and character
of corporate issuers will have both a distributive and an allocative effect.
A redistribution of wealth will be effected from relatively high quality
issuers to those of relatively low quality. This in turn will result in a
diminution of investment in high quality enterprises (those with lower
agency costs).
In an efficient securities market,70 however, minority shareholders
will be indifferent ex ante to the increased prospects of redistribution.
In such a market, the character and magnitude of redistributive events
and their probability of occurrence will be fully anticipated and reflected
in the price paid by shareholders for their shares.7' Thus, the full cost
of anticipated redistributions will be borne by the issuer. This generates
a potent incentive for the issuer to offer shareholders a financial contract
which reduces the probability of redistributive events. Primafacie, any
protective feature which prospectively reduces the economic costs associated with such events by more than the cost of the protection will
be adopted since it will enlarge the size of the corporate pie available
for distribution to all claimants.72 In this way, private ordering will answer
the problem of adverse selection.
If fundamental changes had a predominantly redistributive character,
the preferred rule would be a prohibition of all fundamental changes
in the interests of avoiding the above costs. This alternative is, of course,
untenable given the manifest gains that result from many fundamental
changes. 73 Prohibition, which may be self-imposed or imposed by statute,
will be a real alternative only in those cases where the prospective gains
of a particular type of fundamental change are dominated by the risks
of redistribution and attendant economic costs. 74 The focus must therefore
be on the evolution of arrangements (whether statutory or extra-statutory)
that permit such discrimination as will facilitate productive fundamental
changes while eliminating or, more realistically, reducing the probability
of changes having purely redistributive effects.
The appraisal right may be one such mechanism. An appraisal right
that allows a shareholder to secure an independent appraisal of the fair
70 The evidence, on balance, favours the view that securities markets are indeed informationally
efficient. See infra, note 197 and accompanying text.
71 See M.C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305. Part of this risk may be diversifiable
risk that will not affect share prices. See Part In. A.., supra.
72 Ibid
73 See, for example, M.C. Jensen & R.S. Ruback, "The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence" (1983) 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5; B. Espen Eckbo, "Mergers and the market for
corporate control: the Canadian evidence" (1986) 2 Can. J. Econ. 236.
74 A "pure" going-private transaction presents the strongest argument. See Part IV.E.I., infra.
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value of the shares subject to the transaction can serve as both a cure
for and prevention of the harms caused by redistributive fundamental
changes. It is a cure in the sense that if redistribution occurs, the right
will serve to make the shareholder whole. It is a prevention in the sense
that an appraisal right that effectively protects shareholders from redistribution will remove the incentive to engage in redistribution.
Thus, the firm may find it profitable to covenant against redistribution
by incorporating protections against discrimination in its constitution.
As suggested below, a corporate law statute can serve the same function
(while simultaneously reducing transaction costs) in the form of enabling
provisions that replicate the most usual form of private bargain.
2. Three possible valuation principles
One of the greatest difficulties in designing an appraisal right arises
in respect of the optimal form of valuation objective. If the appraisal
right is to protect against redistribution, what is an event of redistribution?
It is clear that the term must be used with great care, for embedded
in it are norms of shareholder entitlement. It is only possible to effect
a redistribution if values currently 'belonging' to one group of shareholders
are appropriated by another. The senses in which values may be
redistributed define the three types of valuation objective that this article
focuses on.
One standard protects against discriminatory fundamental changes
that adversely affect the current market value of the securities with an
appraisal right. A valuation objective geared to pre-transaction market
value protects vested shareholder expectations based on publicly available
information bearing on the firm's earnings prospects. Another possible
standard is the protection of pre-transaction value based not only on
publicly available information, but on inside information as well. This
valuation objective protects against the appropriation of hidden values
known only to insiders.
These two standards are similar in that they seek to protect pretransaction values - in the former case, the values are known to the
market; in the latter, they are not. A third standard is possible. This
is a rule of full substantive equality. Under this rule, whatever gains
arise from the transaction (in addition to any hidden values) must be
shared pro rata among all shareholders.
The first and third standards are related. The market price of the
firm's securities will reflect any anticipation of participating in future
values. Thus, a rule protecting current market value protects these
expectations and in effect awards the expected participation in transaction
synergies. This rule yields no protection, however, in respect of unan-
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ticipatedtransaction synergies. The third valuation principle goes the extra
distance and awards participation in even these values. The second and
third valuation principles are also linked. Transaction synergies that are
not anticipated by the market may have been anticipated by insiders,
drawing a connection between protection of hidden values and a rule
allowing for full participation in all transaction synergies. These three
valuation principles will be referred to respectively as 'pre-transaction
market value', 'hidden values', and 'transaction synergies'.
In the section immediately following, the role potentially served by
the appraisal right is evaluated in a variety of transactional circumstances.
It will be suggested that the value of the appraisal right to shareholders
and the optimal form of valuation objective will depend on the relative
danger of opportunistic redistribution associated with different types of
fundamental changes and the degree to which the appraisal right (and
the associated valuation principle) is likely to reduce the frequency of
productive fundamental changes.
E. Trading Off Encouragement of Fundamental Changes and the
Economic Costs of Opportunism The AppraisalRight as Protection
againstthe Plunderingof Hidden Values on ShareholderFreeze Outs
1. Pure going-private transactions
a) Pure going-privatetransaction defined
A 'going-private transaction' is one that forcibly evicts participating
shareholders from the enterprise so as to concentrate corporate control
and the residual interest in earnings and assets in the hands of a single
shareholder or small group of shareholders. A 'pure' going-private
transaction is a going-private transaction effected by insider managers
or majority shareholders. It includes neither two-step freeze outs effected
by an acquiror initially at arm's length with the target nor parent-subsidiary
amalgamations. 75

75 The taxonomy of transactions and related terminology in this article are adopted in broad
form from V. Brudney & M.A. Chirelstein, "A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts" (1978) 87
Yale W. 1354. See also Brudney, "A Note on 'Going-Private " (1975) 61 Va. L. Rev. 1019.
Evictions of non-participating and non-voting shareholders from the enterprise are not the
usual form of 'going-private' transaction, but they present substantially the same issues as evictions
of participating or voting shareholders and could easily be accommodated in an expanded definition
of 'going-private' transaction. However, compare the definitions of "going-private" transaction in
the OBCA, supra,note 2 at s. 189(1) and in Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1 - "GoingPrivate Transactions, Buyer Bids and Insider Bids."
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b) A rolefor the appraisalright
At least in theory, it would appear that there exists significant danger
of opportunism associated with pure going-private transactions. As noted
earlier, an invitation to opportunism arises from the asymmetric possession
of information by insider majority (or controlling) shareholders and public
shareholders. It is absolutely clear that, however efficiently securities

markets assimilate publicly available information in security prices, those
with access to inside information will have a better informed view of
the 'true' or 'intrinsic' value of the company than will the market in
which minority holdings are priced.76 It cannot be an infrequent event
that insiders become aware that the corporation is relatively underpriced
by the market. In such a situation, a going-private transaction may be
engineered in order to capture these hidden values. Indeed, the majority

may be able, by judiciously metering the flow of information that reaches
the market, to depress security values in anticipation of a future goingprivate transaction, further exacerbating the potential for transfer of values
77
from minority to majority shareholders.
At the same time, the number of ways in which corporate gains
can be generated by a pure going-private transaction are reduced in
number. These transactions do not involve operating synergies. Nor do
they usually involve transfers of control or any of the benefits attending
such transfers28
The apparently attenuated prospects for the production of real
economic gains coupled with the accentuated dangers of purely redis76 In respect of the Canadian markets, see Fowler and Rorke, supra, note 45; Baesal & Stein,
supra, note 45; Fowler et aL, supra, note 45. There is a great deal of evidence from the American
markets as well: see generally J.H. Lorie, P. Dodd & M. Hamilton Kimpton, The Stock Market
Theories and Evidence, 2d ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1985); Brealey & Myers,
supra, note 18 at 254-73; Tinic & West, supra, note 18. The classic review, although necessarily
dated, is E.F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work" (1970)
25 J. Fin. 383. An account aimed at the layman is B.G. Malkiel's A Random Walk Down Wall
Street (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973).
77 As indicated above, this includes transfer of values both between a majority and minority
within a given class and between a majority and minority of different classes.
78 It seems clear that some gains might be expected to arise from pure going-private transactions.
Real economic gains include reduction of the legal, regulatory, and administrative costs of running
the corporation (including the opportunity cost of executive time devoted to regulatory matters).
These are transaction costs that are a pure deadweight social loss. Going private may also yield
an increased ability to protect valuable confidential and competetively sensitive information and
may eliminate troublesome conflicts of interest that fetter the activities of management, or
opportunistic or vexatious minorities whose activities are detrimental to the corporation and increase
the corporation's debt capacity. Gains may arise from the realignment of managerial incentives
with the profit objective; this may be the product of the increased equity interest of management
in the enterprise, or the ability to undertake efficient schemes of compensation that would be
unacceptable to (at least some) public shareholders. The concentration of financial interest in third
party investors also improves monitoring of the corporation's activities. See generally DeAngelo
et aL, infra.
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tributional freeze outs would at first appear to render the pure goingprivate transaction a strong candidate for a rule of outright prohibition.7 9
As suggested earlier, where the redistributive motive dominates the
potential gains in respect of a given transaction type, such transactions
are likely to do little but generate dead weight social losses.
However, while there are cogent reasons to theorize that a ban on
going-private transactions might be the preferred rule ex ante, there is
evidence to suggest otherwise. If the optimal rule were a prohibition
of going-private transactions, one would anticipate the evolution of private
ordering arrangements that accomplish this end. Further, if such arrangements are beneficial, they should have a positive effect on share prices.
A number of American (but so far, comparatively few Canadian)
corporations have indeed adopted charter amendments requiring a demanding supra-majority shareholder approval of amalgamations or other
corporate combinations (or asset sales) involving insiders (sometimes
supplemented by a requirement for approval of the transaction by a
majority of the disinterested shareholders). 80 These provisions are not
designed, however, to give protection to minority shareholders in a pure
going-private transaction. Rather, it would appear that many of these
Alternatively, the corporation may experience gains that are not truly economic. Into this category
fall reductions in the burden of taxation that may flow from going-private: Income Tax Act (ITA),
R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as am. S.C. 1986, c. 6, s. 125. See generally E.G. Kroft, "The 'Going-Private'
Transaction - Some Income Tax and Corporate Aspects of a Public Company Becoming Private"
(1980) 12 Ott. L. Rev. 49. Other statutory benefits, such as those relating to the Investment Canada
Act, S.C. 1985, c. 20, or those relating to trade licences et cetera may also be secured. See generally
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra,note 64; J.C. Glover Jr. & A.M. Schwartz, "Going-Private in Canada"
(1978) 3 Can. Bus. Li. 3; A.M. Borden, "Going-Private - Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?"
(1974) 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 967 at 1006-13. See also Gregory v. CanadianAllied Property Investments
Ltd (1979) 11 B.C.L.R. 253 at 264-5, [1979] 3 W.W.R. 609 at 620 (C.A.). But cf E.F. Greene,
"Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis" (1976) 28 Stan. L. Rev. 487; Brudney, supra,
note 75.
There is little empirical evidence, but the evidence that does exist supports the proposition
that there may be real economic gains from going private. See H. DeAngelo, L. DeAngelo &
E.M. Rice, "Going-Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth" (1984) 27 J. Law &
Econ. 367, discussed at infra, note 83. With respect to the costs incurred by a public corporation
in excess of a private corporation, see C.W. Schneider, J.M. Manko & R.S. Kant, "Going Public:
Practice, Procedure and Consequences" (1981) 27 Viii. L. Rev. 1.
79 As noted above, this would eliminate the direct costs associated with going-private transactions
as well as costs of monitoring against redistribution, bonding, and dispute resolution. The sometimes
very costly exercise of resorting to an appraisal right for protection against discrimination would
be entirely avoided.
80 See "Shark Repellants and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since
1980," July 24,1985, Office of the Chief Economist of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
This study analyses a range of provisions including "fair price" and "non-fair price" varieties.
The former have a supra-majority voting requirement but dispense with it should the board of
directors so decide (a 'board out' clause) or if shareholders on the second-step cashout are paid
the highest price paid by the bidder within a specified period of time. The latter include a pure
supra-majority requirement, a supra-majority with a board out, the authorization of blank-cheque
preferred stock, and classification of the board of directors.
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provisions are adopted as 'shark repellant' designed to thwart hostile
two-tier takeover bids81 by destroying an acquiror's ability to force through
the second-step cashout. The evidence suggests that share prices drop

with management's announcement of a proposal to adopt such provisions.82 Other empirical evidence suggests that going-private transactions
produce very real economic gains and not merely private gains that arise
from the possession of inside information by those engineering the
transaction. 3 The weight of the evidence therefore suggests that it would
not be in the best interests of shareholders to prohibit going-private
transactions.

In Ontario, all forms of going-private transactions have been given
the imprimaturof both the corporate legislation and the Ontario Securities
Commission.4 The OntarioBusiness CorporationsAct requires, inter alia,
that in a going-private transaction dissentient shareholders have the
opportunity to exercise an appraisal right.85 Thus, the appropriate question
to ask is which (if any) of the three valuation standards identified above
is most appropriate in the case of pure going-private transactions. 8 6
81 The absence of two-tier bids in Canada may explain the relative dearth of these provisions.
82 Supra, note 80. Although these provisions are aimed at two-step takeovers initiated by
arm's length outsiders, rather than insider bids that constitute pure going-private transactions, they
mechanically apply to both types of transactions. Thus, evidence as to their purpose and effect
is useful in analysing the propriety of pure going-private transactions. See also G. Jarrell, "Shark
Repellants and Stock Prices: The Role and Impact of Antitakeover Amendments" SEC [198485 Decisions] FederalSecurities Law Reporter, (CCH), 1984, para. 83,714. But see also H. DeAngelo
& E. Rice, "Antitakeover Amendments and Stockholder Wealth" (1983) 11 J. Fin. Econ. 329
(finding no significant effects from the adoption of shark repellant); S. Linn & J. McConnell, "An
Empirical Investigation of the Impact of 'Antitakeover' Amendments on Common Stock Prices"
(1983) I1J.Fin. Econ. 361 (finding share price increases on the adoption of shark repellant provisions).
The SEC study, supra, note 80 includes the largest number of sample firms, the most recent data,
and is probably the most reliable.
83 DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, supra, note 78. The authors found that in the two days
surrounding the announcement of a going-private proposal, the price of the publicly traded stock
increased by an average of 22.3 percent (abstracting from risk-adjusted market movements). In
the two months before the announcement (and including the announcement) the price rise was
30.4 percent. Most of the firms in the sample experienced positive price increases, and the results
were not attributable to dramatic price increases in a small number of cases. On the basis of
their data, the authors rejected a "signalling" explanation of the price increase (that is, that the
price increases could be attributed purely to new information about the intrinsic value of the company).
The authors also found that when a going-private proposal was withdrawn, the market price of
the publicly traded securities slumped by an average of 8.9 percent. The median pre-offer management
equity ownership was 50.9 percent for the firms in the sample. The authors concluded that the
source of the increases was real economic gain arising out of the going-private transaction and
the market's anticipation that the firm would be worth more as a private than as a public firm.
See also Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra, note 78.
84 OBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 189; Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1.
85 OBCA, ibid. s. 189(7).
86 The value of the appraisal right as protection against discrimination depends on the degree
to which other market and legal devices constrain opportunism. This question is reserved for Part
VI.A.l, infra.
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The first alternative is to protect shareholders against an expropriation
at less than current market values. Awarding pre-transaction value on
an appraisal would protect shareholders against appropriation of known
values based on publicly available information. While an appraisal right
with this valuation standard might well have some value to shareholders,
it will fail to protect shareholders against a potentially more serious danger;
the plundering of hidden values known only to insiders. Where opportunistic redistribution (and attendant costs) is a serious worry, an appraisal
right affording shareholders the opportunity to test the value of the
corporation against relevant insights possessed only by insiders may be
of value to shareholders. Although the empirical evidence supports the
proposition that, on average, going-private transactions tend to produce
gains for all shareholders, 87 it may still be the case that some of these
transactions are purely redistributional in character.88 It is again significant,
however, that private ordering arrangements based on this valuation
standard have not evolved in the marketplace. 89
The case in favour of the third valuation objective is considered
below.
2. Two-step freeze outs effected by initially arm's length acquirors.
a) Two-step freeze out defined
A two-step freeze out consists of a takeover bid followed immediately,
or shortly thereafter, by a second-step transaction (frequently a freeze
out amalgamation) forcing out those shareholders who declined to tender
to the initial takeover bid.
b)

The appraisalright: prospective gains and losses

The issues raised in two-step freeze out transactions effected by
initially arm's length acquirors are fundamentally different from those
raised by pure going-private transactions9 0 The potential economic gains

87 See, supra,note 83.
88 The study by DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, supra, note 78, did not, in measuring the gains
arising from going-private transactions, distinguish between going-private transactions in which
managers alone (or key shareholders) obtained 100 percent of the equity and those that involved
the acquisition of a significant equity position by outside investors. The former may present greater
dangers of exploitation of inside information.
89 This is not conclusive, however, against the value of an appraisal right with this valuation
objective. One explanation may be that such private arrangements have been rendered unnecessary
by the statutory appraisal right. Another is that the cost of drafting such protection into the corporation's
charter may exceed the prospective benefit. See Parts VILC. and IX., infra.
90 See infra, notes 93-95.
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are far greater, and the dangers of opportunistic exploitation of minority
shareholders are considerably reduced.
It is generally acknowledged that corporate takeovers perform an
important economic function. Takeovers may generate gains by exploiting
operating synergies between acquiror and acquired, by replacing in-

efficient management, or simply by moving corporate assets to the hands
of those best able to use them.91 Moreover, the acquiror in this instance
is not initially an insider, but an outsider who is not in a position to
exploit insider information bearing on hidden values.9 2 Because of these

factors, the controversial issue in respect of two-step freeze out transactions
is not whether minority shareholders should share in the gains arising
from the transaction, but whether minority shareholders are entitled to
the same price offered in the first step of the takeover,93 something
91 There is a considerable body of empirical evidence supporting the efficiency explanation
of takeovers. Some of this evidence is reviewed in L.A. Bebchuk, "The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers" (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028; F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, "The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer" (1981) 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161.
See also Jensen & Ruback, supra, note 73.
92 It must be recognized that the line between a two-step acquisition and an amalgamation
between a parent and subsidiary of long standing is not an entirely clear one. As the period between
the initial takeover bid and the subsequent cashout becomes longer, the former grows more and
more to resemble the latter. Thus, it is impossible to be completely scientific about the interval
of time after which a two-step takeover should be treated as a parent-subsidiary amalgamation.
Greene suggests that where the second step is delayed longer than a year, the additional shareholder
protection of a judicial hearing to determine the fairness of the offered price should be required.
Greene, supra, note 78.
93 Brudney and Chirelstein suggest that two-step 100 percent acquisitions (by whatever means)
should be analogized to a "unitary asset acquisition" (a sale of assets) approved by the target's
shareholders by a supra-majority, rather than viewing the second step on a par with other freezeout
transactions. In a merger formally consummated as a sale of assets (or a statutory amalgamation),
'majority rule' governs, and the minority are forcibly cashed-out of the enterprise. As long as there
is no problem of side payments, the negotiated price is an arm's length price and bears the market's
certification of fairness, allaying fears of mistreatment of minority shareholders. In a takeover,
where a similar majority of shareholders has 'approved' the transaction by tendering their shares,
the market has also rendered a verdict of fairness. Therefore, the acquiror ought to be able to
go ahead and cash out the remaining shareholders at the same price.
See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra, note 75; Brudney, supra, note 75; V. Brudney & M.A.
Chirelstein, "Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers" (1974) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 297.
Bebchuk's analysis of the problem conforms to that of Brudney and Chirelstein. However,
Bebchuk proposes a different mechanism for ensuring that the degree of shareholder approval on
a two-step acquisition conforms to that required in a unitary asset acquisition. He suggests that
tendering shareholders ought to be able to make a conditionaltender that would effectively transform
the tendering process into the equivalent of a shareholder vote. Shareholders would be able to
tender "no" to the takeover offer but with the condition that if a sufficient majority of shareholders
tender favourably (and unconditionally), they should be bought out as well. In the usual case of
shareholder voting approval by supra-majority, this condition is implicit. L.A. Bebchuk, "Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers" (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1695.
Under the federal compulsory acquisition provision, the second-step freezeout must be effected
at the same price as the initial takeover. Shareholders also have the option of submitting their
shares to an appraisal. Further, the courts appear now to have foreclosed the possibility of a twostep acquisition not effected under the compulsory acquisition legislation. See Carlton Realty Comp.
Ld v. Maple Leaf Mills Ltd (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 198, 93 D.L.R. (3d) 106 (H.C.); Alexander v.
Westeel-Rosco Ltd (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 21, 93 D.L.R. (3d) 116 (H.C.); Burdonv. Zeller's Ltd (1981),
16 B.L.R. 59 (Que. C.S.). CBCA, supra, note I at s. 199.
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incrementally less than this price, 94 the market price that prevailed before
the first step of the takeover,95 or that price which, when used to compute
a weighted average of the takeover price and the cashout price, assures
each tendering shareholder of securing pre-transaction market value for
his or her shares.96
In the federal legislation and cognate statutes, the "compulsory
acquisition" provisions 97 allow an acquiror to forcibly cash out dissenters
where 90 percent of the shares that are the subject of the bid, excluding
those shares initially held by the acquiror, tender into the bid. These
statutes allow shareholders who initially failed to tender into the bid
to elect to take either the same consideration offered in the bid or a
court determination of "fair value." Allowing shareholders to make this
election may render successful takeover bids more difficult by offering
the hope to minority shareholders of realizing a better price by declining
to tender into the bid and claiming the appraisal right on an anticipated
second-step cashout.98 Coincidentally, because of the relative confidence
in the fairness of the offered price (indicated by substantial majority
acceptance of the offer), the appraisal right fails to serve a useful antidiscrimination function. Consequently, there appears to be little justification for retaining the appraisal election in the context of two-step
The OBCA compulsory acquisition provision (OBCA, supra,note 2 at s. 187) confers comparable
protection against low price cashouts. The OBCA confers additional protection against illiquidity
lock-ins in some circumstances (OBCA at s. 188). The OBCA going-private provision also contains
a mechanism, not substantially different in effect from the Bebchuk conditional vote, requiring
approval of any going-private tranaction (other than one effected under the compulsory acquisition
provision) by a majority of the minority shareholders (OBCA at s. 189). In addition, dissentients
may apply for a court appraisal of their shares (OBCA s. 189(7)). The Bebchuk mechanism offers
the possible important advantage of by-passing entirely the proxy machinery, the intercession of
which may tip the scales in favour of the acquiror under the OBCA provisions. See the comparable
protections in OSC Policy 9.1.
94 Borden, supra, note 78. Otherwise, the incentive to tender to the takeover is impaired.
95 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, note 64.
96 Fischel, supra, note 10. Thus, where the pre-takeover market price was $75, and a takeover
offer is made for 50.01 percent of the shares at $100 per share, a cashout price of $50 would
ensure that a shareholder who tendered into the bid (assuming pro-rated pick-up of shares tendered
as mandated in most jurisdictions) would receive an average consideration for all of his or her
shares of $75 per share (ibid at 896-8). This mechanism clearly allows the corporation to whipsaw
minority shareholders into tendering by offering a lower price on the second step cashout than
the pre-takeover market price. This can be defended as a means of fostering productive fundamental
changes by eliminating the incentive of shareholders to free ride by withholding tender.
97 See CBCA, supra, note 1 at s. 199. The comparable provisions in the Ontario legislation
are found in OBCA, supra, note 2 at ss 187-188.
98 Re Whitehorse Copper Mines Ltd v. Lueck (1980), 10 B.L.R. 113 (B.C.S.C.) amply illustrates
the incentive of shareholders to withhold tender and claim the appraisal right. The appraised cashout
price was $6.50, as against a takeover offer of $4.00. See also Cyprus Anvil Mining Corp. v. Dickson
(1982), 40 B.C.L.R. 180 (S.C.), discussed infia, note 148, not following prior jurisprudence that
had placed a heavy burden of proof on the dissentient shareholder to show that the offered price
was unfair in order to justify a higher appraised value.
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takeovers undertaken by initially arm's-length acquirors. Paying dissenters
the same price offered in the initial takeover offer is quite adequate.99
3. Parent-subsidiary freeze outs where the parent is a public
corporation
As with two-step freeze out transactions, parent-subsidiary amalgamations in many cases offer the promise of generating significant
economic gains. Foremost amongst these are the attainment of operating
synergies and the elimination of conflicts of interest that become
particularly pressing in a parent-subsidiary relationship, especially where
the parent and subsidiary carry on the same business. 100 However, as
in pure going-private transactions, the insider (in this case, the parent)
dictates a non-arm's length price to the frozen-out minority of the
subsidiary, giving rise to the same dangers of opportunistic exploitation
of inside information.
The difficulty of policing against redistribution is marginally less
in a parent-subsidiary freeze out than in connection with a pure goingprivate transaction. A benchmark exists for evaluating the market's
assessment of any hidden values the market price of the parent's shares.
On the assumption that any hidden values would be those that the parent
wished to imminently exploit, the market price of the parent in some
period - perhaps a year - following the going-private transaction could
be consulted in order to reassess for hidden values.
This might be a perilous practice, however. Increases in the market
price of the parent's shares subsequent to the going-private transaction
might arise as a result of revelation of hidden values (by virtue of the
exploitation of the hidden opportunities or otherwise). But an increase
in price might as easily arise as a result of synergies, other economic
benefits produced by the transaction, general market forces, or unanticipated good fortune in the company's business. Allowing the cashedout minority a power of subsequent reassessment of the cash-out price
creates the danger of allowing the minority to participate in the good
fortune of the company or synergies of the transaction without taking
any of the risk. Nevertheless, it will still be clear in some cases that
an increase in the value of the parent's stock can only be attributed
99 In fact, even this may be too generous. See supra, notes 94-96. The SEC study, supra,
note 80, found that simple "fair price" amendments designed to ensure that shareholders cashed
out on the second step of a two-step takeover received the same consideration as that paid to
shareholders on the first step takeover bid cause share prices to fall. However, the drop was small
(0.65 percent) and not statistically significant. This suggests that a 'same price' standard may do
little harm. It also suggests, however, that a more generous valuation standard is misconceived.
100 See those articles in notes 93-95, supra.
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to values latent in the (former) subsidiary at the time of going private.
Thus, it will be somewhat easier than in the case of pure going-private
transactions to police for the opportunistic capturing of hidden values.
The likelihood that these transactions will be inspired by and produce
real economic gains (rather than mere redistribution) is greater than in
the case of pure going-private transactions. Equally, the ability to protect
shareholders against poaching of hidden values through a rule of liability
attaching to non-disclosures of material inside information is enlarged.
Correspondingly, the need for an appraisal right with a valuation rule
yielding participation in hidden values 10 ' is weaker. Given the costs of
conducting a valuation at the time of the transaction uncovering hidden
values, a valuation objective based on pre-transaction market price is
comparatively more attractive than in the case of pure going-private
transactions.
4. Parent-subsidiary freeze outs where the parent is a private
corporation
Parent-subsidiary amalgamations or other going-private transactions
where the parent is a private corporation present an intermediate case
between pure going-private transactions and going-private transactions
effected by public parent corporations. Like parent-subsidiary amalgamations where the parent is a public corporation, parent-subsidiary
amalgamations where the parent is a private corporation present the
likelihood of real economic gains. But, as with pure going-private
transactions, there are dangers associated with the exploitation of inside
information. These transactions present the same post-transaction monitoring problem that pure going-private transactions do. Thus, the relative
worth of a valuation principle yielding participation in hidden values
(or full transaction synergies, discussed below) increases where the parent
is a private rather than public corporation.
F. A Rule of Full Substantive Equality
To sum up thus far, the non-sharing rule advanced by Easterbrook
and Fischel has certain attractive properties. It appears to generate
incentives that maximize the probability of productive transfers of control
or other fundamental changes benefitting all shareholders. The rule is
simple and easy to apply and minimizes the costs of shareholder litigation
disputing the "fairness" or "business purpose" of the transaction or
attempting to capture a larger share of the corporate pie. Shareholders
101 Or a rule awarding full participation in transaction synergigs. See infra, Part II.F.
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are merely entitled to pre-transaction market value, which is readily
ascertainable. Moreover, if the rule allows for some opportunistic redistribution of values, as long as the possibility of redistribution is fully
anticipated, share prices will simply adjust to the point where minority
shareholders earn a normal risk-adjusted return. The appraisal right serves
a relatively limited (although not necessarily unimportant) role in constraining opportunism by protecting pre-transaction security values (as
measured by market prices) from encroachment.
This argument may be weaker in Canadian capital markets, where,
owing to the concentration of shareholding interests (and relatively large
number of private parent corporations), the gains of the unequal sharing
rule are divided unevenly between those who hold majority positions
and minority shareholders. In such a market, the risks of opportunistic
redistribution may not be entirely diversifiable. A rule of unequal
redistribution may allow for greater variability in the returns of minority
shareholders by allowing an opportunistic shifting of enterprise values
to the hands of the controllers. Nevertheless, this may be anticipated
and factored into the price of the minority shares.
However, as indicated above, if redistribution generates significant
associated transaction costs or diminutions in enterprise value, an appraisal
right with more extended protection may conduce to a lower cost of
capital. Such protection may be supplied by an appraisal right that is
designed to protect both pre-transaction market value and hidden values
that are latent in the enterprise at the time of the fundamental change
and discoverable only on the basis of inside information. This redefined
valuation objective would tend to make opportunistic predations effected
by managers or majority shareholders less profitable, reducing the
incidence of such transactions and the associated dead weight social losses.
This valuation procedure introduces its own set of difficulties and
costs, which are explored at greater length below. For now suffice it
to say that procedural, evidentiary, and conceptual difficulties attend the
determination of hidden values. Objective evidence of hidden values will
be hard to come by. These values will be discoverable (if at all) in a
careful search of the books and other documents of the company, and
then only -

particularly in respect of a large public company -

with

great effort and expense. Sometimes the inside information will only
be known to the insiders themselves and not subject to documentary
or other discovery.
The difficulties of calculating hidden values might well suggest that
the costs of so doing exceed the benefits. However, difficulties of
calculating hidden values might also be used to argue in favour of a
full gain-sharing principle. If the danger of opportunistic redistribution
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and associated economic costs is large, and it is difficult for a court
to differentiate between transaction synergies and hidden values, it may
be easy for the majority engineering the transaction to successfully
characterize hidden values as transaction synergies. A rule allowing for
the recovery of transaction synergies by the dissenter would render this
strategy of little avail and would thus operate as a strong disincentive
to opportunistic plundering of hidden values. 02 As has already been
suggested, this may have the unfortunate property of discouraging
productive fundamental changes where the realization of the gain depends
on, or is more likely under a rule allowing for, unequal distribution of
the gains of the transaction. Thus, the argument in favour of a fullsharing rule is strongest where the marginal discouragement of a particular
03
variety of fundamental change caused by a sharing rule is small.
As in the case of a rule protecting hidden values, a full gain-sharing
rule generates additionaltransaction costs on an appraisal (as compared
to a pre-transaction market value rule) associated with calculation of
transaction synergies. These costs may be far from trivial.' 04 However,
to the extent that the dangers of opportunistic capturing of values are
reduced, the costs of monitoring against opportunism will also be reduced;
further, the transaction costs associated with unproductive fundamental
changes will be avoided. The costs introduced by adverse selection will
also be mitigated.
The strength of the argument will vary depending on the type of
transaction involved. Pure going-private transactions present the strongest
case for a full gain-sharing rule. The dangers of opportunism are greatest
while the likely benefits foregone are the least, although calculating
105
synergies (as well as hidden values) may present some difficulties.
The argument for full gain-sharing can be extended to parent-subsidiary amalgamations in which the parent is a private company. Here,
the dangers of opportunism and the difficulties in detecting it remain
great. Although the benefits that potentially result from such transactions
are numerous, a full gain-sharing rule may not seriously impair the
102 Ideally, the answer to an underinclusive recovery is to refine the accounting process to
make the recovery more exact; that is, to design valuation procedures that distinguish between
hidden values and transaction synergies. The assumption in the text is that this is not possible.
If so, the next best solution to remedying the problem may therefore be an overinclusive recovery.
Of course, as the text following indicates, this may generate new problems.
103 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, note 64. The authors acknowledge that: "In many cases
the apportionment of the gain makes little difference to the success of the transaction ... in some
marginalcases apportionment is the decisive factor" (ibid at 708-9 [emphasis added]).
104 See Part V, infra.
105 This did not deter the court in Re Ripley InternationalLtd, infra, note 217, from refusing
permission to proceed with a statutory arrangement where the minority shareholders did not receive
a prorata share of anticipated taxation benefits from the transaction.
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incentives to undertake them. While it is true that the returns to majority
shareholders for undertaking the change will be less under a full gainsharing rule than under a non-sharing rule, any positive return is arguably

a sufficient incentive. Unlike sales of control blocks or takeover bids,
effecting a parent-subsidiary amalgamation cannot deprive the controllers
of psychological benefits associated with relinquishing control, and a
rule of unequal distribution of benefits may therefore be unnecessary
to generate incentives to undertake the change. Whatever the transaction

costs of the amalgamation, as long as these costs are shared pro rata
between parent and subsidiary, moving to a gain-sharing rule should
not deter many gain-generating amalgamations. 06
In parent-subsidiary amalgamations where the parent corporation
is a public company, the dangers that the transaction will be undertaken
for opportunistic rather than sound business reasons is lessened. Moreover,
it will be easier for minority shareholders to detect opportunism ex post,
strengthening the deterrent effect of a liability rule for non-disclosure.
Thus, the case for a full gain-sharing rule is weakened.

A gain-sharing rule may nevertheless be justifiable on the basis that
the costs of assessing hidden values and transaction synergies (one of

the key objections to a full gain-sharing rule) may be entirely avoided
through recourse to what might be called an appraisedshareholder right
of re-entry. This right would enable a cashed-out shareholder to insist
that a public parent company effecting a freeze out of minority shareholders in a subsidiary pay a dissentient shareholder in the currency of
the parent's own participatingsecurities. 07 The appraisal would serve
the function of fixing the ratio of conversion of the subsidiary's securities

106 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, note 64, suggest that a prorata apportionment of the gain
as between majority and minority favours the minority since the majority remain in the enterprise
and take the risk of the gains materializing or not while the minority take their money and run.
However, as long as the gain is evaluated by taking into account the risk of the prospective cash
flows (building risk into the discount rate, as would normally be done) this argument fails. For
example, assume that the probability distribution of the gains from the transaction is a 25 percent
chance of a $1000 loss, a 50 percent chance of a $1000 gain, and a 25 percent chance of a
$3000 gain. The expected value of the gain is $1000. Assume that the majority holding is 60
percent, and the minority holding 40 percent, and that the risk discounted value of the gain is
$800 (normally, the "beta" of the project would yield the appropriate discounting factor, a reasonable
approximation is the beta of the firm). Therefore the minority would be entitled, on a full gainsharing basis, to $320 of the anticipated gain. Even though the majority actually experiences the
risk of the project and the minority does not, the minority receives only what they would be willing
to pay for a 40 percent interest in the risky project, and are not therefore overcompensated.
Easterbrook and Fischel further argue that majority shareholders are not compensated for
the opportunity cost of the time spent planning the transaction under a full gain-sharing rule. However,
if the transaction is substantially planned and engineered by managers without substantial shareholdings, this argument fails as well.
107 At present, appraisal payouts must be in cash. See Canadian Gas and Energy Fund Ltd
v. Sceptre Resources Ltd (1985), 29 B.L.R. 178 (Alta. Q.B.).
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into participating securities of the parent. If the ratio is fixed on the
basis of the relative market values of the parent's and subsidiary's shares
prior to any public announcement of the transaction, 108 this will ensure
that the dissentient minority shareholder captures his or her full pro rata
share of any hidden values as well as any synergies generated by the
transaction because of the participating character of the securities received.
This appraised right of re-entry depends on readily ascertainable values
and would not therefore give rise to difficult or expensive litigation or
uncertainty of adjudication. The same result might be accomplished by
paying the dissentient shareholder sufficient cash to purchase an equivalent
number of the parent's participating securities. One potential advantage
of making the payment in securities rather than cash, however, is the
avoidance of a short-run cash drain that might imperil the fundamental
change.109
G. The AppraisalRight and Other Fundamental Changes
There are a great variety of fundamental changes with an equally
great variety of purposes. As with freeze outs, these fundamental changes
may generate economic gains or be, in whole or in part, instances of
opportunistic redistribution. As in all other cases, the value of the appraisal
right will depend on the relative importance of opportunism, the number
and magnitude of profitable transactions foregone because of the existence
of an appraisal right with a given valuation objective, and the relative
transaction costs generated by the right.
Two situations where the dangers of opportunism will be particularly
pressing are alterations to the terms of outstanding securities or other
constitutional amendments and reincorporation in another jurisdiction.
In either of these cases, majority shareholders may be able to shift values
away from minority shareholders to themselves. For example, although
an amendment to the articles of incorporation to cancel arrearages of
dividends on preferred shares may be essential to resurrect a failing
company by enabling it to secure new financing, the amendment may
be intended only to secure an advantage for the common shareholders
at the expense of the preferreds. The non-payment of dividends leading
up to the cancellation of arrearages may indeed be part of a scheme
designed precisely to shift value from the preferreds to the commons.
Similarly, a reincorporation in another jurisdiction may achieve financial
108 This is the formula suggested by Brudney & Chirelstein, supra, note 93. For a critical
comment see S.M. Lome, "A Reappraisal of Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers" (1978) 126 U.
Penn. L. Rev. 955.
109 This may not be a serious problem in any case. See infra, Part V.B.7.
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benefits but may also substantially alter the balance of majority and
minority rights in a manner favourable to the majority.'n 0
Even if shareholders are not forcibly evicted from the company,
an appraisal right protecting only pre-transaction market values may
again be an insufficient protection for minority shareholders. The ability
of the controllers to effect changes that diminish the value of the minority
holdings may amount to a de facto freeze out, forcing minority shareholders to claim the appraisal right merely to preserve the prior market
value of their investments. This would result in the capturing by majority
shareholders of hidden values.
Employing a valuation objective that includes hidden values - or
perhaps even transaction synergies - would be unlikely to discourage
productive fundamental changes of this nature. Although alterations to
the terms of outstanding securities and reincorporation in another jurisdiction may produce very real economic benefits, the realization of these
benefits does not appear to be crucially dependant upon an unequal
distribution of benefits as between shareholders.
A distinction may be drawn in this respect between control transactions such as unitary and two-step takeovers and sales of control blocks
of stock and the types of fundamental change identified above. In respect
of the former, the auction mechanism by which productive transfers of
control occur is facilitated by the unequal distribution of benefits
accompanying the change of control. However, in respect of amendments
to the articles or a change of corporate jurisdiction (which could amount
to precisely the same thing) equal sharing of benefits may not significantly
vitiate the incentives to undertake the change. Thus, as with going-private
transactions, a case can be made for an appraisal right protecting hidden
values or extending beyond this to a full gain-sharing rule.

110 The corporate law of the jurisdiction in which the company is incorporated will be
instrumental in defining the relationship between majority and minority shareholders. A change
of jurisdiction may be one means by which the majority can alter the bargain between shareholders.
See, for example, W.L. Cary, "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware" (1974)
83 Yale Li. 663; E.L. Folk, "State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Management
Conduct" (1976) 31 Bus. Law. 1031; M.A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation:A Legal

Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976) at 319. Happily, empirical investigations of the results of
jurisdictional moves indicate that, on average, minority shareholders are no worse off, and in most

cases better off, as a result of the move. See P. Dodd & R. Leftwich, "The Market for Corporate
Charters: Unhealthy Competition versus Federal Regulation" (1980) 53 J. Bus. 259; B.D. Baysinger

& R.K. Butler Jr., "The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm" (1985) 28 J.L. &
Econ. 179; R. Romano, "Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle" (1985)
1 J. Law, Econ., & Org. 225. See also R.K. Winter Jr., "State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation" (1977) 6 J. Legal Stud. 251; D.R. Fischel, "The 'Race to the
Bottom' Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law" (1982)
76 N.W.U.L. Rev. 913. Some jurisdictional moves may nevertheless be undertaken for opportunistic
reasons, and the appraisal right might serve as protection against such opportunism.
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H. Valuation Objective and CorporationType
It has been suggested that the need for an appraisal right and the
optimal form of valuation principle will depend upon the trade-off between
the facilitation of productive fundamental changes and discouragement
of opportunism. This will vary with different types of fundamental changes.
The value of the appraisal right - and again, the optimal valuation
principle - may also depend on the type of corporation, further
complicating the search for a single statutory standard form of appraisal
right.
A number of factors are likely to determine the degree of opportunism
engaged in by public companies. Public companies with deep public
markets will usually be large issuers that expect to continually re-enter
the market in search of fresh infusions of equity capital. These corporations
are most subject to the discipline of the market, in addition to being
more likely targets of administrative scrutiny, and for these reasons are
less likely to engage in opportunistic behaviour. Although this market
discipline may be absent in going-private transactions, large public
corporations are the least likely to go private, whether the controlling
shareholder (if there is one) is itself a public corporation, a private
corporation, or an individual. Further, markets for managers will operate
to restrain managerial opportunism.''
On the other hand, the transaction and financing costs of taking
over large public companies will tend to be great, blunting to a degree
the efficacy of the takeover mechanism as a disciplinary tool. Moreover,
the degree of opportunism engaged in by the firm's managers is likely
to increase as the portion of the firm owned by the managers declines."12
As a general matter, the larger the corporation, the smaller the degree
of management ownership. Also, where share ownership is highly
dispersed, the collective action or free rider problem associated with the
protection of shareholder rights will be exacerbated, diminishing the
degree of direct oversight by shareholdersY3
As one moves to smaller public corporations whose shares are more
thinly traded, the degree of administrative and regulatory oversight may
slacken. Interest in these stocks is more likely to be episodic and the
degree of public scrutiny correspondingly less. Thus, the market is less
111 Fama, supra, note 33. A distinction should be drawn, however, between opportunism by
owner managers and non-owner managers: the former are less likely to worry about discipline
from the market for managers.
112 See Jensen & Meckling, supra, note 71. However, compare G.J. Stigler & C. Friedland,

"The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means" (1983) 26 J. Law. & Econ. 237.
113 See infra, Part VLA.1.
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likely than in the case of public corporations with deep markets to have
a constant flow of evaluative information. This may well result in a
tendency for the prices of thinly traded companies to experience short
run fluctuations away from the equilibrium or intrinsic value.114 It may
be that greater opportunities exist for the diversion of corporate assets
or share price manipulation. Such corporations are also more likely to
have concentrated share holdings, although the impact of concentration
is not entirely unambiguous. Shareholders with large interests may be
in a position to instigate actions favouring one constituency of shareholders
over another (or the majority at the expense of the minority), leading
to higher levels of opportunism. However, shareholders with significant
interests have a greater incentive to monitor management performance,
overcoming to a degree the collective action problem characteristic of
corporations with widely dispersed ownership. Thus, while there is some
reason to believe that anticipated agency costs may be higher in respect
of public corporations trading in thin rather than deep markets, it is
difficult without reliable evidence to draw any firm conclusions that might
justify a different form of appraisal right.
Private companies, which are structurally very different from public
companies, present quite different problems. Such corporations will have
a small number of shareholders, restrictions on the transferability of shares,
and a very limited market for the company's securities.1 15 The shareholders,
directors, and officers will often be the same people. Shareholders of
private companies will tend to have the same relationship and expectations
as partners. These shareholders will almost uniformly expect to share
equally in any gains experienced by the corporation, whatever the source.
At the same time, disputes between shareholders, as well as opportunistic attempts to engage in diversion of earnings or corporate assets
are not uncommon. In addition, as indicated in the earlier discussion
of the bail-out rationale, fundamental changes in private corporations
that diminish enterprise value may frequently be undertaken for opportunistic reasons. Thus, it becomes difficult to distinguish between the
bail-out and anti-discrimination rationales for the appraisal right. These
infra, Part VIII.E.
I15 In Ontario's Securities Act, supra, note 16 at s. 1(1)(3 1), a private company is defined
as "a company in whose constating document, i the right to transfer its shares is restricted, ii. the
number of its shareholders, exclusive of persons who are in its employment and exclusive of persons
who, having been formerly in the employment of the company, were, while in that employment,
and have continued after termination of that employment to be, shareholders of the company,
is limited to not more than fifty, two or more persons who are the joint registered owners of
one or more shares being counted as one shareholder, and iii. any invitation to the public to subscribe
for its securities is prohibited." See also CBCA, supra, note 1 at ss 2(6)-(8); OBCA, supra, note
2 at ss 1(1)(27), 1(6).
114 See
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differences suggest that a more generous evaluation principle is appropriate for private corporations; indeed, a strong case is made out in all
circumstances for the awarding of full participation in transaction
synergies and hidden values, allowing the applicant shareholder to receive
pre-transaction value where it is to his or her advantage to do so. 1 6
Yet another problem looms in the design of an effective statutory
appraisal right - workability. Before considering the question of the
differences between the appraisal right and other remedial techniques
addressed to the problems noted here, the practice and procedure of
the appraisal right in Canada will be explored.
V. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE APPRAISAL RIGHT
IN CANADA: CAN THE APPRAISAL RIGHT BE MADE
WORKABLE?
A. A Catalogueof PotentialProblems
Thus far, I have identified some reasons why shareholders might
value an appraisal right. However, whether or not a security with an
appraisal right is an efficient financial contract also depends on other
factors. These include whether an appraisal right can in practice be
designed to meet the theoretical needs of shareholders, and the extent
of the cost of exercise of the appraisal right to shareholders and to the
company.
'The company' must be recognized as a proxy for all those whose
claims on the enterprise may be affected by the payout of appraisal
claims. For the most part, these will be those shareholders who choose
not to exercise the appraisal right on any given fundamental change
since the statutory solvency tests that govern the appraisal provision forbid
appraisal payouts if the solvency of the enterprise (and hence the tickets
held by fixed claimants) would be jeopardized by the payments. 1 7 Ex
ante,it may not be clear to an individual shareholder whether the appraisal
right will represent a benefit (if exercised) or a cost (should the shareholder
remain in the company). Therefore, the shareholder will want to know
both the prospective benefits and the prospective costs.
The shortcomings of the appraisal right include at least the following.118 First, there is a tax cost. Cashing out of the enterprise via
116 See infra, Part V.D.
117 In fact, creditors and other fixed claimants bear at least part of the cost

-

the payout

may jeopardize the future solvency of the corporation and hence increase the risk of non-payment
to these constituents. See infra, note 156 and accompanying text.
118 See generally Manning, supra, note 10; Vorenburg, supra, note 10; Brudney, supra, note

75; J.E. Magnet, "Shareholders' Appraisal Rights in Canada" (1979) 11 Ott. L. Rev. 100.
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the appraisal route will give rise to a taxable event, the burden of which
might have been reduced or avoided altogether by going along with
the fundamental change in the form proposed. Second, most cashedout investors will reinvest their funds. This reinvestment will result in
brokerage costs that would not have been incurred had the investment
continued in the enterprise. Third, in the delay between dissenting from
the resolution adopting the fundamental change and the cash payout,
the shareholder may earn less than his or her investment, increasing
the cost of the appraisal right relative to other alternatives (that is, going
along with the transaction or cashing out in the market). Fourth, the
procedural hurdles whereby the shareholder claims his or her appraisal
right are often technical and treacherous for the shareholder, who may,
by making any of a number of technical errors, lose his or her appraisal
entitlement. Fifth, exercising the appraisal right is costly to the shareholder,
who will likely have to hire experts to give valuations of the shares
and pay a lawyer to pursue the claim. Some or all of these costs may
be irrecoverable in the appraisal proceeding. Sixth, claiming the appraisal
right generates uncertainties associated with valuation that are not present
if the shareholder accepts the terms of the proposed transaction or sells
in the market. Uncertainty is a cost to risk-averse shareholders, making
the appraisal procedure relatively unattractive. Finally, the appraisal right
is an unpredictable expense to the corporation that may deter or abort
productive fundamental changes.
B. The CanadianExperience
The CBCA appraisal provisions have been more successful at meeting
some of these criticisms than others. On balance, the Canadian experience
raises some serious questions about the value of the appraisal right to
shareholders, at least in its current form.
1. Tax cost
Election of the appraisal option by a dissenting shareholder may
trigger a taxable event for that shareholder. The fundamental change
dissented from may or may not also result in a taxable event for a nondissenting shareholder. It is clear that the decision of whether to elect
the appraisal right will be coloured by the relative tax treatment accorded
dissenting and non-dissenting shareholders. In determining whether it
is appropriate under the Income Tax Act to provide the same or differential
tax treatment to dissenters and non-dissenters (and whether, if the Act
fails to make the appropriate distinctions, a court should take the
differential tax treatment into account in appraising the value of the
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shares), a number of potential problems must be considered. The first
is that lessfavourable tax treatment for dissenters may create an artificial
disincentive to claiming the appraisal right, eroding the protection the
right affords shareholders under either the bail-out or anti-discrimination
rationales for the right. The second is that preferential treatment of
dissenters may result in shareholders claiming the appraisal right only
for tax reasons, a clearly wasteful and unproductive use of social resources.
The third problem will arise only where the Income Tax Act fails to
embody the theoretically appropriate distinctions (if any) between the
tax treatment accorded dissenters and non-dissenters. In such a case,
the court may wish to adjust the award of fair value in view of the
relative tax consequences in order to achieve the appropriate after tax
award of fair value. As noted below, not all the benchmarks for the
taxation of dissenters make it equally easy for a court to make the necessary
adjustments to achieve a satisfactory after-tax outcome.
In this section, I will suggest that, irrespective of the rationale and
circumstances under which the right is claimed, the appropriate tax
treatment of dissenters should be the same as that accorded non-dissenters.
In the context of a freezeout, there are at least three possible
benchmarks for fixing the tax treatment accorded to dissenters. The first
is that of remaining in the enterprise as if the transaction dissented from
had never occurred. The second is that accorded non-dissenting shareholders who accept the form and amount of consideration offered under
the terms of the transaction. The third is that of selling the shares in
the market. These will be dealt with in turn.
Had the transaction never-occurred, no taxable event would have
arisen. To the extent that any tax is levied on the appraised amount,
the shareholder is worse off by comparison. However, it is easy to overstate
the amount by which the shareholder is disadvantaged. Very few (if any)
shareholders will buy with the expectation of holding the shares indefinitely. In the normal course of events, the shares would have been disposed
of at some future date, and on that date a taxable event would have
arisen. Thus, the main component of what the shareholder has lost as
a result of the premature termination of interest is not the full amount
of the tax exigible on the appraised amount, but that amount less the
present value of the expected tax costs on future disposition. The shorter
the taxpayer's anticipated horizon to disposition at the date of the freeze
out, the smaller the loss associated with the unanticipated cashout and
the smaller the value of the appraisal right as protection against this
loss. Especially where taxation of the proceeds of disposition results in
a tax loss on the appraisal, the taxpayer may also suffer disadvantage
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as a result of losing control over the timing of the taxable event (for
example, by losing the ability to push tax losses forward into a year
in which offsetting taxable gains are expected).
This benchmark appears to be an inappropriate one in any case.
It makes an implicit but important assumption; that the appraisal right
is designed at least in part to protect shareholders against the tax
consequences of unanticipated termination of the investment. To a
shareholder holding a diversified portfolio of securities, the risk of such
an event and its resulting financial consequences can be reduced to a
minimum. Further, the shareholder's ability to orchestrate his or her
financial affairs so as to minimize the effect of unanticipated termination
cannot be replicated by the corporation. Any anticipated residual effect
on the risk-adjusted financial return from holding the shares can be
factored into the price paid for the shares.
Moreover, should the Income Tax Act fail to accord dissenters tax
treatment in accord with this benchmark, the court may wish to adjust
the award of fair value to yield an after-tax result similar to that
experienced by the shareholder had he or she not cashed out of the
company. It may be difficult or impossible for a court to determine the
particular dissenter's anticipated horizon to disposition had the freezeout
not occurred in order to accomplish this good.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, according dissenters superior
tax treatment to that given non-dissenters will result in an incentive to
claim the appraisal right purely for tax motives.
If it is inappropriate to accord dissenters more favourable treatment
than non-dissenters, it is also inappropriate to accord them ess favourable
treatment. According the dissenters inferior treatment will allow management to freeze shareholders out of the corporation at less than the
true value of the shares, confident that few shareholders will elect the
appraisal option.
Thus, the second benchmark is a more suitable standard. That is,
dissenters should receive the same tax treatment that non-dissenting
shareholders will receive under the terms of the transaction. This will
remove the tax system as a consideration either for or against electing
the appraisal option, allowing the decision to be made solely on the
basis of the anti-discrimination and bail-out rationales canvassed earlier.
For this same reason, the third benchmark - that of a sale in the market
- will be unsuitable unless non-dissenters receive the same tax treatment.
The situation is more complicated in cases not involving shareholder
freezeouts, under either the bail-out or anti-discrimination rationales. In
this situation, two possible benchmarks present themselves for the taxation

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 24 No. 2

of the proceeds of disposition arising from the appraisal. The first is
remaining in the enterprise, which will almost always be a non-taxable
event either because there will be no taxable disposition of the interests
of non-dissenters or because of the rollover accorded shareholders on
corporate reorganizations.1 9 The second benchmark is a sale of the shares
in the market, which will usually result in treatment of the proceeds
120
of disposition as a capital gain.
The first benchmark suffers from a computational difficulty. If those
who cash out are to truly receive the same tax treatment accorded to
non-dissenters, then there should be exigible tax on the award equal
to the present value of the future tax liability that would have resulted
on a sale of the shares in the ordinary course of events. A more easily
administered alternative, is available however. Where the dissenter uses
the proceeds of disposition to purchase replacement shares of another
corporation, then, on the assumption that these shares have the same
horizon to taxable disposition as those they replace, granting the taxpayer
a tax-free rollover on the proceeds of disposition resulting from the
appraisal will yield the same tax treatment for dissenters as nondissenters.121 This benchmark renders the tax system neutral as between
electing to 'go along' with the transaction (and, in this case, remaining
a shareholder) and electing the appraisal option.
Unfortunately, the latter solution is not perfect. Some shareholders
who already had plans to sell their shares in the market will take advantage
of the fortuitous event of a transaction triggering the appraisal right to
use the right as a means of achieving a portfolio adjustment without
tax cost. This will result both in an unwarranted tax expenditure by the
government and a socially unproductive expenditure of resources in
determining fair value for these dissenters.122 The second tax benchmark
(selling the shares in the market) will avoid this problem but win generate

119 Income Tax Act, supra, note 78 at s. 86.
120 Ibid at s. 39. Although recent changes to the Income Tax Act make capital gains nontaxable, this is subject to a lifetime exemption limit. Thus, capital gains treatment may result in
immediate tax consequences where the exemption has already been exhausted and a future tax
burden where the exemption has not yet been fully used up (see ibid. at s. 58(1)). Capital gains
treatment is only equivalent to a non-taxable event in the case of a shareholder with no reasonable
prospect of exhausting his or her lifetime exemption.
121 There is already precedent in the Income Tax Act for such a tax-free rollover where property
is destroyed or expropriated and replacement property is purchased within a specified period of
time (supra,note 78 at s. 44). It is arguable that s. 44 currently applies to a forcible termination
of a shareholding interest. An amendment to the Act would put the matter beyond doubt.
122 The marginal cost may not be great where other shareholders claim the right for legitimate
(that is, non-tax) reasons since the claims of all dissenters are joined together (that is, there is
only one adjudication of fair value). See, for example, CBCA, supra, note 1 at s. 184(21).
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a disincentive to claiming the appraisal right as compared to remaining
in the corporation, reducing the efficacy of the right.123 Thus, although
the choice between the two tax benchmarks is not completely uncontroversial, it would appear that the better benchmark in non-freezeout
cases is the same as that in cases involving freezeouts; that is, treatment
identical to non-dissenters. This will involve the tax treatment indicated
above.

Current tax treatment of the proceeds of disposition resulting from
an appraisal is not entirely satisfactory in all freezeout situations. A
strict reading of the Income Tax Act suggests that any purchase of shares
by the corporation, whether pursuant to the terms of a freezeout transaction
or as a result of an appraisal, will result in the same tax treatment the ideal result. 124 However, Revenue Canada has issued tax rulings in
the context of freeze out amalgamations which accord capital gains
treatment to dissenters; this is more favourable than the treatment accorded
non-dissenters.1 25 As noted, this simply encourages election of the appraisal
alternative in order to achieve the resulting tax advantage and results
in a socially unproductive use of resources in effecting appraised cashouts.
Nothing in the Act compels such treatment, and it would be better to
123 This is clearest where the appraisal right is claimed in order to prevent discrimination.
In such cases, the transaction may be a defacto freezeout: that is, engineered on terms that leave
the shareholder no realistic alternative but to claim the appraisal right to protect his or her investment.
Should dissenters be taxed less favourably than non-dissenters, this will widen the opportunity available
to management to discriminate. Where the right is claimed under the bail-out rationale, it might
seem more appropriate to use the market value standard since the appraisal right is a direct substitute
for a sale in the market. However, even in these cases, the efficacy of the right would be impaired
by failing to accord dissenters the same treatment as non-dissenters since the unequal treatment
would create an artificial incentive not to claim the right, denuding the protection afforded shareholders
against unwise (or opportunistic) fundamental changes diminishing enterprise value.
124 Where a corporation redeems, acquires, or cancels any of its shares by any means, this
may give rise to a deemed dividend to its shareholders. See ITA, supra, note 78 at s. 84(3). The
repurchase may also generate a capital gain or loss as well, to the extent to which the proceeds
of disposition exceed the adjusted cost base, less the amount of the deemed dividend (ITA, s. 54(hXx)
provides that the proceeds of disposition are reduced by the amount of the deemed dividend).
These rules, on their face, apply equally to a repurchase pursuant to the terms of a freezeout
transaction or by means of an appraisal. If the freezeout is effected by means of converting existing
shareholdings into redeemable preferred shares on an amalgamation and immediately redeeming
them, the situation is unaltered; the initial conversion is subject to a tax-free rollover, and the
subsequent redemption yields the results indicated above (ITA, s. 86(1)). Essentially the same result
is achieved if a freezeout occurs by means of a sale of assets followed by a winding-up and liquidation
of the corporation (ITA, ss 54(h)(x), 84(2)).
125 Although there is no reported tax ruling, the author has knowledge of one recent tax
ruling to this effect, and an informal conversation with an employee of Revenue Canada confirms
that this is the tax treatment that the department views as appropriate in the case of amalgamations.
Until recently, extending capital gains treatment to dissenting shareholders in a freezeout
transaction resulted in roughly the same treatment of dissenting and non-dissenting shareholders
since the taxation of deemed dividends and capital gains was approximately the same in a wide
range of situations. The recent amendment to the Income Tax Act exempting capital gains from
taxation (subject to lifetime limits) substantially alters this position (see supra, note 120).
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accord to dissenters the same deemed dividend treatment accorded to
non-dissenters. 126
A strict application of the Act in accordance with the above reading
(that is, deemed dividend treatment for dissenters) will result in inappropriate tax treatment in non-freezeout situations since dissenters will
bear a larger tax burden than non-dissenters. It would be more appropriate
to amend the Act to give dissenters capital gains treatment with the
option of utilizing a tax-free rollover where substitute shares are purchased
127
with the proceeds of disposition.
2. Brokerage Cost
It has sometimes been suggested, on the assumption that the
dissentient shareholder will reinvest the proceeds arising from the appraisal, that brokerage fees or other reinvestment costs be added to the
appraised value of the shares. As with added tax burden, it must be
recognized that the added cost at most includes the value of current
brokerage costs less the present value of the brokerage costs that would
have been incurred on a future sale in the ordinary course of events. 28
As in the case of tax costs, the objective should be to ensure equal treatment
of dissenters and non-dissenters in order to eliminate any artificial
incentive to claiming (or not claiming) the appraisal right.
It is also appropriate to draw a distinction between freezeout and
non-freezeout transactions. In respect of the former, it would not be
appropriate to make an allowance for reinvestment costs. Both dissenters

126 The department bases its position on the theory that the corporation resulting from the
amalgamation is a different entity in law than either of the pre-amalgamation corporate entities.
Thus, the purchase of shares in the pre-amalgamation corporation by the post-amalgamation entity
is, in law, equivalent to a purchase of shares by a third party. The argument fails to withstand
analysis on both policy and technical grounds. The policy considerations have already been made
clear. In respect of the latter, the appraisal provisions appear to contemplate a Us as between the
shareholder and the pre-amalgamation corporation. For example, in the CBCA, supra, note 1 at
s. 184, the provision allows a shareholder to dissent in respect of shares of a "corporation," and
s. 184(1) clearly identifies the "corporation" as the pre-amalgamation entity. Whether or not the
amalgamated entity is different in law from the pre-amalgamation entities, the cause of action
that arises from enlisting the appraisal right is one in respect of the pre-amalgamation entity, and
the tax treatment of the cashout should reflect this reality.
127 Where the shareholder does not purchase substitute shares, treating the disposition as an
event giving rise to a capital gain may result in a greater tax liability for the dissenter than the
non-dissenter (see supra, note 120). This has the salutary effect of ensuring that the appraisal right
is not claimed solely for tax reasons. Since the dissenter has the option of purchasing substitute
securities and receiving a tax-free rollover, there is no disincentive to claiming the right.
128 This does not necessarily imply that the date of resale be fixed in the mind of the buyer
at the time of purchase. An anticipated brokerage cost, as in the case of an anticipated tax cost,
may be calculated probabilistically, taking into account the probable time of disposition and
reinvestmenL
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and non-dissenters are forcibly cashed out; thus, claiming the appraisal
right results in no additional reinvestment burden for dissenters.
In respect of non-freezeout transactions, equal treatment of dissenters
and non-dissenters will involve adding the difference between present
reinvestment costs and the present value of normally anticipated future
reinvestment costs to the appraised value of the shares. This will necessarily
involve an element of imprecision; for example, should the court assume
that the seller will purchase substitute securities from a discount of a
full-service broker? Will the seller be entitled to a volume discount?
These questions are relatively easy compared to that of determining the
seller's horizon to disposition in the normal course of events in order
to compute the present value of future brokerage costs. Adding these
questions, particularly the last, to the agenda of issues canvassed in order
to determine fair value will result in considerable additional adjudication
expense, perhaps overwhelming the benefits to be achieved. As well,
adding reinvestment costs to the appraised amount will generate an
incentive to claim the right purely as a means of avoiding reinvestment
costs.
The first of these problems may be avoided by awarding reinvestment
costs according to a pre-determined schedule, computed and revised from
time to time on the basis of industry averages, and awarding a constant
fraction of these costs determined by computing a mean present value
of future reinvestment costs (based on a mean shareholder horizon to
disposition in the normal course of events). Unfortunately, this exacerbates
the second problem. A non-particularized assessment of brokerage costs
will tempt those with a short horizon to disposition to employ the appraisal
right as a cheap method of effecting a portfolio adjustment. No ideal
solution is available, but the schedule method may be a satisfactory
compromise.
Pending the adoption of a legislative (or regulatory) solution of this
character, it might be better, as a general matter, to leave the shareholder
to cover the brokerage costs generated by the reinvestment of the proceeds
of the appraisal, albeit at some cost to the efficacy of the appraisal right
in those situations where the shareholder has the option of remaining
in the enterprise or seeking an appraisal. This suggestion appears to
replicate current practice. Canadian courts have not (at least explicitly)
taken brokerage or other reinvestment costs into account in assessing
fair value under the statutes.
3. Delay cost
The appraisal provision of the CBCA allows the court in its discretion
award
"a reasonable rate of interest on the amount payable to each
to
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dissenting shareholder from the date the action approved by the resolution
is effective until the date of payment."' 29 This provision avoids a complete
sterilization of the dissenter's investment during the period between dissent
and ultimate cashout. However, the shareholder who dissents loses all
his or her rights as a shareholder, including the right to receive dividends,
generally within about one month from the date when the resolution
adopting the fundamental change is approved by shareholders. 30 The
date when the action approved by the resolution is effective could
conceivably be much later than the date at which the dissenting shareholder's capital loses its earning power. Thus, the provision ought to
be amended to allow the shareholder to start earning interest as soon
as the shareholder loses his or her entitlement to dividends.
The issue of interest may also arise where an appraised cashout
occurs under either the compulsory acquisition's' or oppression 32 provisions of the statute. In the former case, the CBCA allowance for interest
appears to be adequate in allowing the shareholder a "reasonable rate
of interest" from approximately the time at which he or she loses rights
as a shareholder. 133
In respect of the oppression remedy (where an appraisal is awarded),
the CBCA makes no express provision for interest, 34 but cases decided
under similar oppression legislation in British Columbia have awarded
interest from the date when the oppressive conduct arose.' 35 It appears
that a similar result could be achieved under the CBCA.136
129 CBCA, supra, note 1 at s. 184(25).

130 Section 184(11) of the CBCA, ibid, suspends the shareholder's rights upon sending the
notice required by s. 184(7) within twenty days of receipt of the corporate notice of the resolution
approving the change, which must be sent within ten days of the adoption of the resolution (ibid
at s. 184(6)). In the normal course of events (absent delay by the corporation in sending its required
notice, which extends the shareholder's response time), the shareholder will lose his or her rights
as a shareholder within thirty days of the adoption of the resolution.
131 Ibid at s. 199.
132 Ibid at s. 234.
133 The CBCA allows for a "reasonable rate of interest from the date [the shareholder] sends

or delivers his share certificates .. .("id at s. 199(17)). This date appears to roughly correspond
with the time when the shareholder loses his or her interest in the company (ibid at ss 199(5)(8)). See, for example, Re Whitehorse Copper Mines Ltd, supra, note 98.
134 However, the CBCA, ibid at s. 234(3)j), provides for "an order compensating an aggrieved
party" and appears therefore to allow for an award of interest on the appraised value. See also
note 135.
135 Diligenti v. RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd (No. 2) (1977), 4 B.C.L.R. 134 (S.C.) at 173;
Re Johnston and West Fraser Tunber Co. Ltd (1982), 133 D.L.R. (3d) 77 (B.C.S.C.) at 94, rev'd
on other grounds (1982), 19 B.L.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.). Both awards were made under the British
Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 76. Similar legislation in Ontario and other
provinces would likely permit a similar result. See, for example, Ontario Courts of Justice Act,
1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11, ss 137-139.
136 See, supra, notes 134-135. But see Re Bird PrecisionBellows Ltd, [1934] 3 All E.R. 444,
[1984] Ch. 419, affd [1985] 3 All E.R 523 (C.A.) (refusing to award interest in respect of an
appraisal under the English oppression provision).
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Of course, more than merely the issue of timing arises. Equally
important is the rate of interest that should be paid on the appraised
value of the shares prior to the date of payment. Claiming the appraisal
right transforms the shareholder's status from that of residual taker to
one of fixed claimant, thus substantially reducing risk. Thus, prima facie
it is appropriate to award a rate of interest approximating that paid by
the corporation to its unsecured creditors. In the main, it is probably
fair to say that the courts have awarded something less than this.137
It may be that this rate of interest should be even higher than that
demanded by the corporation's unsecured creditors, however, because
the claimant shareholder also faces a risk associated with the uncertainty
surrounding the determination of fair value. A fuller discussion of this
matter is withheld pending a consideration of those procedural and other
factors that help create this uncertainty and the means whereby it could
be reduced t38
Thus, both the basic statutory appraisal provision and the current
practice of courts in awarding interest could stand some improvement
although it is probably safe to say that the problem of delay cost is
not a serious one under the CBCA and cognate statutes given the statutory
allowance of some interest to dissenting shareholders pending payment.
4. Procedural hurdles
Experience with the somewhat Byzantine procedural provisions of
the CBCA has not been altogether happy. The statute requires a litany
of notices, counter-notices, and deadlines, and the shareholder who fails
to comply strictly with these provisions may be disentitled from exercising
his or her appraisal right. The labyrinthine provisions vastly increase
the possibility of fatal technical slips. 139

137 In the oppression context, see Diligenti v. RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd (No. 2), supra,
note 135 at 173 (awarding 8 percent interest in 1976); Re Johnston and West FraserTimber Co.
Ltd, supra, note 135 at 94. In the compulsory acquisition context, see, for example, Re Whitehorse
Copper Mines Ltd, supra, note 98; Cyprus Anvil Mining Corp. v. Dickson, supra, note 98 (both

cases awarding interest "at the rate of interest paid on moneys which are paid into court"); Canadian
Gas & Energy Ltd v. Sceptre ResourcesLtd, supra,note 107 (awarding a rate of 13.5 percent interest).
In respect of freezeout amalgamations, see Re Domglas Imc; Domglas Inc. v. Jarislowsky (1980),
13 B.L.R. 135 (Que. C.S.), affd (1982), 138 D.L.R. (3d) 521, 22 B.L.R. 121 (Que. C.A.) (awarding

13 percent interest); LoCicero v. B.A.CM. Industries Ltd, 28 B.L.R. 172 (Man. Q.B.) (awarding
interest at the prime rate).
138 See infra, Part V.B.6.
139 See CBCA, supra,note 1 at ss 184(5)-(8), (12), (14), (15). These procedures seem needlessly
complex and beg for simplification. Failure of the shareholder to observe a single deadline may
be fatal to the assertion of his or her claim, while failure of the corporation to observe a deadline

merely extends the period during which the shareholder's counter-responses must be made.
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The drafters appear to have aimed at creating a quasi-inquisitorial
procedure for determining "fair value." The court is empowered, on
application of the corporation or the shareholder, to "fix a fair value
for the shares" 140 and "may in its discretion appoint one or more appraisers
to assist the court to fix a fair value for the shares."14' The statute does
not indicate who bears the burden of proof in determining the fair value.
Nor does it provide for pleadings or discovery or indicate who is to
bear the cost of the court-appointed appraiser.14 2 In fact, the procedure
for appointing an appraiser has seldom been used. 43 In most cases, the
parties have enlisted the aid of their own expert witnesses, sometimes
calling a dizzying number.144 Thus, the reality is that the question of
determining fair value has been decided in a substantially adversarial
manner, but in some cases without the benefit of procedures such as
pleadings or discovery or even a clear idea of the party on whom the
burden of proof is placed. Without some or all of these procedural
advantages, it is difficult or impossible (at least where hidden values
or transaction synergies are in question) for the applicant to obtain the
crucial information needed to challenge the company's offered price.
The information will be in the possession of the company and otherwise
unavailable to the dissenter.
The courts have not been entirely unresponsive to these procedural
difficulties. In Neonex InternationalLtd v. Kolasa,145 Bouck J. converted

The procedures in the compulsory acquisition provision are considerably less complex, but
in some respects equally unforgiving, in that a failure to meet the statutory deadlines may disentitle
the shareholder from claiming an appraisal (although admittedly the result of so doing is only
to consign the shareholder to receive the price offered by the corporation on the initial takeover
- a price accepted by at least 90 percent of disinterested shareholders and thus probably fair)
(!bid at s. 199). No procedures are specified for a court-ordered appraisal under the oppression
remedy (ibid at s. 234).
140 Ibid at s. 184(20).
141 Ibid at s. 184(21).
142 The appraisal procedure in the compulsory acquisition provision, bid at s. 199, is very
similar in empowering the court to "fix a fair value for the shares of a dissenting offeree" and
in authorizing the court to "appoint one or more appraisers to assist the court to fix a fair value .... "
(ibid at ss 199(14)-(15)). There are no provisions regarding pleadings, discovery, or the final award
of costs. No procedures at all - for valuation or otherwise - are specified in the oppression
section, although the court has powers to give an order "requiring the trial of any issue," which
allows for a trial of the valuation issue (ibid at s. 234(3Xn)).
143 A number of cases decided under the British Columbia compulsory acquisition legislation
have appointed expert appraisers to assist the court. See, for example, Re Wall & Redekop Corp.
(1974), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 733, [1975] 1 W.W.R. 621 (B.C.S.C.); Re VCS Holdings Ltd and Helliwell
(1978), [1978] 5 W.W.R. 559, 5 B.L.R 265 (B.C.S.C.).
144 See, for example, Re Whitehorse Copper Mines Ltd, supra, note 98; Cyprus Anvil Mining
Corp. v. Dickson, supra, note 98 (both compulsory acquisition cases).
145 (1978), [1978] 2 W.W.R. 593, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 446, 3 B.LR. I (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter
cited to D.L.R].
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the dissenter's application 46 to determine fair value into an "action"
to give the claimant the benefit of pleadings and discovery. In order
that the company bear the burden of proof, the court ordered the company

to stand as plaintiff and the applicant as defendant in the reconstituted
action. 147 Bouck J. is not alone in attempting to fashion extra-statutory
procedures better suited for the determination of fair value and less slanted

48
in favour of the corporation.
Other courts have shown a willingness to interpret the statutory

procedures in a manner most favourable to the dissenting shareholder.
146 The application arose in the context of a freezeout amalgamation under s. 184 of the
CBCA, supra, note 1.
147 Neonex InternationalLtd v. Kolasa, supra, note 145. Bouck J.commented at 454 that:
Where an amalgamated company has only one easily appraised piece of property, the
appointment of an independent appraiser might be appropriate. It is not suitable for this
kind of a complaint due to the complex nature of the operations of New Neonex. Many
practical problems come to mind if the respondents' suggestion is followed. For example,
who would pay the cost of the appraiser during the course of such an inquiry? Costs are
a creature of statute and not the common law. An appraiser could take months or years
conducting an investigation. Generally speaking, the rules and procedure of this court only
allow an award of costs at the conclusion of a proceeding. They cannot be advanced part
way through to help finance the other side's claim or defence.
From whom would the appraiser take his instructions? Not from the Court, because
it must remain impartial if it is to perform its proper function. If the court did appoint
an appraiser, where does the onus of proof lie? Whose witness is the appraiser? What happens
if his evidence is shown to be erroneous? What other evidence would the court then have
to reach a decision?
Our procedure, our rules of evidence, and our adversary system cannot adjust to the
kind of inquiry [with court appointed appraisers] recommended by the respondents. Although
it may be tempting to embark upon a hearing of this nature and see if it can be done,
I believe the wisest course is to stick to what has been tried and tested in the past. In
the long run it will be less expensive.
148 In an application under the CBCA, supra,note 1 at s. 184 in Robertson v. CanadianCanners
Ltd (1978), 4 B.L.R. 290, the Ont. H.C. directed a trial of the issue of fair value, complete with
pleadings, discovery, and production, with the company as plaintiff. Steele L held that "I do not
believe ...that in an action such as this where the duty is upon the Court to determine what
the fair value is, that there is any real onus of proof on either party because the Court must come
to a conclusion itself' (ibid at 292-3). Nevertheless, he held that "[t]he Act casts upon the directors
an obligation to fix a fair value of the shares and to show by accompanying statements how it
was determined. I read this provision as casting upon the directors an obligation in the first instance
to justify the fair value .. " (ibid at 292). The court appears, therefore, to have at least cast
a tactical burden of persuasion on the company. The compulsory acquisition provision contains
no such provision requiring the company to determine a fair value for the purposes of making
an offer to the dissentient - since the takeover bid is itself an offer. Quaere if the result would
therefore be different.
See also Re Domglas Inc; Domglas Inc. v. Jarislowsky, supra, note 137 (following Robertson
and not specifically allocating the burden of proof); Denischuk and Bonn Energy Corp. (1983),
29 Sask. R. 156 (Q.B.) (holding that the corporation should assume carriage of the application
and adduce primary evidence of the shares' fair value); Les Investissements Mont-SoleilInc v. National
Drug Ltd (1982), 22 B.L.IR 139 (Que. C.S.) (not allocating the burden of proof but holding that
both parties should make it their goal to assist the court in calculating fair value).
Alberta's newly passed legislation has made a step towards rationalization of the procedures
by providing that, in connection with a dissent application, "the court may give directions for...
the trial of issues and interlocutory matters, including pleadings and examination for discovery"
(ABCA, supra, note 2 at s. 184(12)(b)).
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In Jepson v. The CanadianSalt Company Ltd149 the dissenting shareholder
appeared to have clearly failed to comply with the statute in a number
of respects that might have proved fatal to his appraisal application with
a less sympathetic judge. The court in each instance interpreted the statute
in the dissentient's favour, at least once in a manner that can only be
described as strained. 50
A true inquisitorial type of procedure would likely be superior to
an adversarial one in determining fair value. The costs of enlisting the
aid of a single appraiser will almost certainly be less than the costs
generated by the armies of evaluators often called in aid by the parties
to establish their case for fair value. Where transaction synergies or hidden
values are in question, an adversarial proceeding has the additional effect
of disadvantaging the dissenter who must obtain information controlled
by the corporation. At first blush, liberal discovery procedures allowing
the shareholder access to inside information appear to be an answer
Until recently, the compulsory acquisition provisions cast a heavy onus on the dissenter to
show that the price paid in the initial takeover to the 90 percent (or more) of accepting shareholders
was unfair. The reasoning of the leading English case, Re Hoare & Co. Ltd (1933), 150 L.T. 374,
[1933] All E.R. 105 (Ch.D.) was adopted by Canadian courts even where differences in the Canadian
legislation might have suggested a different result: Re Dad'sCookie Co. (B.C.) Ltd (1969), 69 W.W.R.
641, 7 D.L.R. (3d) 243 (B.C.S.C.); Re CanadianAllied Property Investments Ltd (1977), 3 B.C.LR.
366, 78 D.L.R. (3d) 132 (S.C.), affd (sub-nom. Gregory v. Canadian Allied Property Investments
Ltd) supra, note 78 (both decided under B.C. legislation); Re Whitehorse Copper Mines Lid, supra,
note 98 (decided under the CBCA at s. 199). But in Cyprus Anvil Mining Corp. v. Dickson, supra,
note 98, McEachern CJ.S.C. reversed the position he had earlier taken in Whitehorse and purported
to follow the approach of Steele J. in Robertson. However, the result appears to be a divided burden
of proof, with the court imposing an "onus upon any party to adduce evidence establishing, by
a balance of probabilities, the correctness of any contention upon which he relies" (ibid at 197).
There are good reasons for imposing a high standard of proof on dissenters on compulsory
acquisitions. See, supra, Part VI.E.2. But see also J.P. Chertkow, "Compulsory Acquisition of Shares
Under Section 199 of the Canada Business Corporations Act and Re Whitehorse Copper Mines
Ltd: An Offer You Can Refuse" (1982-83) 7 Can. Bus. LJ. 154.
In the compulsory acquisition context, see also Jefferson v. Omnitron Investments Ltd (1979),
18 B.C.L.R. 188 (S.C.) which, while putting an onus on the dissenter to show unfairness of price,
also submitted the valuation issue to trial with a "full right of discovery of documents and examinations
for discovery relating to the question of price" (ibid at 192). But see the English rule in In re
Evertite Locknus Ltd (1945), [1945] Ch. 220; In re Press Caps Ltd (1949), [1949] Ch. 434 (C.A.).
149 (1979), 7 B.L.R. 181 (Alta. S.C.).
150 The court held that an informal letter indicating the shareholder's dissent was adequate
notice under CBCA, supra, note 1 at s. 184, and also that a demand for payment that failed to
indicate the number of shares held by the applicant (as required to make the notice valid by s.
184(7)) was nevertheless proper because it referred to an earlier letter in which the number was
given. The applicants also failed to tender their shares within the statutory time limit; the court
held that certain representations by the company had induced them not to, raising an estoppel.
Finally, the application for a court determination of fair value appeared to have been outside of
the statutory period. The court appeared almost deliberately to misread the provision to bring the
applicant within its purview. See also Manning v. Harris Steel Group Inc. (1984), 59 B.C.L.R. 1
(B.C.C.A.) (technical violations of procedural provisions of B.C. statute held not fatal to shareholder's
application in the interests of furthering the policy of the appraisal provision); Roytor & Co. v.
Skye Resources Ltd (Ont. S.C.) [unreported] (shareholder dissent held not out of time); Re Brant
Investments Ltd andKeepriteInc., supra,note 10 (commenting on the difficulties caused the shareholder
by the shortness of time to make up his or her mind to claim the appraisal right).
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to this problem. However, liberal discovery generates fresh difficulties.
The information to which shareholders would gain access might be of
a highly sensitive nature, and its disclosure could irrevocably harm the
company's competitive interests. It may be necessary for management
to harbour the information and protect it from general disclosure. Liberal
discovery would work against this interest, especially given that it would
not be difficult for a competitor to take up a small shareholding in the
company against the day when the appraisal right may be triggered and
the opportunity to discover inside information arise. By contrast, an
inquisitorial proceeding might be combined with liberal investigatorial
powers and in camera hearings (excluding shareholder applicants). This
would allow for the revelation of possibly sensitive inside information
bearing on price and improve the accuracy of the appraisal without
harming the competitive interests of the corporation, but would necessarily
disentitle the applicant from participating in the determination of fair
value. It would be highly advantageous to have the valuation undertaken
by an expert tribunal or valuator rather than a court. The question of
valuation is a highly technical matter, and despite the noblest efforts
of judges, one which they are not likely to perform particularly well.151
Expert valuators might be culled from the ranks of the business community
including investment analysts, chartered accountants, and financial
economists.
The question of valuation ought to be referred to the expert tribunal
whether or not a question of calculating hidden values or synergies arises.
The determinion of a pre-transaction value is not without its own
difficulties given that either exogenous events (such as movements in
the market or changes in economic conditions) or the terms of the
transaction dissented from may have affected the market price after the
announcement of the proposed change. 52
Whatever procedure is ultimately adopted, it is at least clear that
the present procedures are caught in a legal limbo between an inquisitorial
and an adversarial procedure, with the advantages of neither.
5. Expense of exercise
There are two principal cost concerns: the shareholder who wishes
to claim the appraisal right and cash out of the company ought not
face costs that would inhibit him or her from doing so and destroy the

See infra, Part VIII.
152 This problem will arise in any case where the announcement of the fundamental change
and the valuation date are remote in time, as is almost always (in varying degrees) the case. Abstracting
away from the effects on price noted above will involve techniques beyond the competence of
courts. See infra, Part VII, and see Fischel, supra,note 10 at 893-94.
151
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efficacy of the right; 153 and the costs rule ought not invite minority
shareholders to abuse the appraisal right for its nuisance value.
Under existing practice, courts have tended to be generous to
claimants when awarding costs but nonetheless often follow the usual
rule that costs follow the relative success of each party in establishing
a claim in respect of "fair value."' 5 4 Under such a rule, the uncertainty
that inevitably attends the determination of fair value and the magnitude
of the potential costs may conspire to deter a normally risk-averse
shareholder from claiming the appraisal right if any other alternative
is available.155 Having the company bear the costs of the appraisal shifts
the burden of the costs to the body of shareholders who remain in the
company 15 6 and removes costs as an obstacle to the exercise of the right.
This does not, however, entirely answer the second concern. With
an unconditional indemnity as to costs, shareholders may be tempted
153 The costs of an appraisal can be considerable. See, for example, Re Whitehorse Copper
Mines Lid, supra, note 98 (a compulsory acquisition in which a total of eight expert witnesses
were called); Re Johnston and West Fraser Tnber Co. Ltd, supra, note 135 (an oppression case
where the petitioner ultimately bore all his own costs associated with the determination of a fair
price).
154 See, for example, LoCicero v. B.ACM Industries Ltd, supra, note 137 (costs awarded to
applicant where cashout price was closer to his suggested figure for "fair value"); Re Johnston
and West FraserTimber Co. Ltd, ibid (no award of costs because of divided success at valuation
hearing); Re Whitehorse CopperMines Lid, ibid (costs of appraisal on compulsory acquisition awarded
to applicants); Re Diligenti and RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd (No.2), supra, note 135 (costs of
appraisal pursuant to oppression application divided between parties following relative success at
hearing); Re Domglas Inc; Domglas Inc v. Jarislowsky, supra,note 137 (awarding costs of appraisal
on freezeout amalgamation to applicant where appraised value of $36 substantially exceeded
company's offer of $20). But see Canadian Gas & Energy FundLtd v. Sceptre Resources Ltd, supra,
note 107 (awarding the claimant party and party costs on a compulsory acquisition appraisal even
though the value awarded did not greatly exceed the offered price).
155 If the typology of reported cases is at least somewhat related to the underlying population
of disputes (although see G.L. Priest & B. Klein, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation" (1984)
13 J. Leg. Stud. 1), one would have expected a good deal more cases in situations where the
appraisal right was being voluntarily resorted to (that is, in cases other than freezeout or compulsory
acquisition situations). That very few cases have arisen in such situations may be telling in respect
of the current costs rules (it may also be a consequence of the many other infirmities of the appraisal
right). Indeed, at present, the appraisal right appears to be a realistic alternative mainly for wellheeled shareholders with large holdings.
156 The appraisal and oppression provisions forbid payment to shareholders following an order
to purchase if the corporation would thereby be rendered insolvent on either a current liabilities
or a net assets basis. Thus, the ostensible burden of the appraisal payouts falls on shareholders.
However, creditors and other fixed claimants (such as employees) may also bear part of the cost
if the probability of the firm being able to meet its fixed charges is reduced by the appraisal
payouts, increasing fixed claimant risk (CBCA, supra, note I at ss 184(26), 234(6)). See OBCA,
supra, note 2 at ss 184(28), 247(6). There is no such solvency test in the compulsory acquisition
provisions in the CBCA at s. 199 and OBCA at s. 187. These provisions provide no guidance
in a case where the appraisal payouts threaten to render the corporation insolvent. Equally inexplicable
is the omission of a solvency test in respect of the OBCA provision allowing a shareholder to
"put" his or her shares to the corporation upon the acquisition by a single shareholder of 90 percent
or more of the shares of a class (OBCA s. 188). It is conceivable that the shareholder may be
able to trump the interests of creditors and employees, who would thereby end up paying the
full cost of the cashout. This is an obviously inappropriate result.
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to exploit the appraisal right for its nuisance value. By exercising the
right, shareholders could threaten to impose the cost of an appraisal
on the company. They may be able to secure a payout that exceeds

the real value of the shareholdings only because it is cheaper for the
company to agree to cash them out at the excessive price than to proceed
to a valuation.
A suitable compromise may be to impose the costs of valuation
on the company subject to a discretion of the court to "order otherwise"
if the applicant claims the appraisal right, bargains for a settlement, or
proffers a valuation in bad faith. 157 A similar technique to balance the
two concerns is to allow the court discretion to find that the appraisal
right shall not be available to some or all shareholders in respect of
any given transaction. 158 There is no reason why a court might not be
given both levels of discretion. The importance of the costs issue cannnot
be overstated: effective costs provisions are essential for effective shareholder remedies.
6.

Adjudication risk

As noted above, invocation of the appraisal right under current
procedures and cost rules is attended by a considerable amount of
uncertainty,159 arguably tending to deter a normally risk-averse share157 See OBCA, supra,note 2 at s. 105(6). See also Wallerteinerv. Moir (No.2) (1975), [1975]
I All E.R 849 (CA.) (the court has an equitable jurisdiction to order the company to indemnify
the plaintiff for costs in a derivative action, provided the plaintiff was acting in good faith and
it was reasonable and prudent in the company's interest for the plaintiff to bring the action); Turner
v. Mailhot (1985), 28 B.L.R. 222 (Ont. H.C.) (the CBCA provides a statutory footing for a similar
court-ordered indemnification in similar circumstances). See generally lacobucci, Pilkington &
Prichard, supra,note 13 at 175.
158 The Ontario legislation gives the court a discretion to declare that the appraisal right
"will not arise upon the taking of the proposed action" (OBCA, ibid at s. 184(29)). It is not clear
if the court may declare that this is the case in respect of a specific transaction but applying
to aft appraisal claimants, in respect of a specific transaction and specific claimants, or both. Probably
the former was intended because the provision, for which there is no counterpart in the CBCA,
was evidently included in the OBCA to avoid a possible multiplicity of triggering events in respect
of complex fundamental changes.
159 The adversarial technique for determining fair value probably adds to the uncertainty facing
the claimant by increasing the range of potential values that a court might find to represent fair
value. See, for example, the differences in valuation advanced by experts called for either party
in DiMgenti v. RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd (No. 2), supra, note 135 where the court ultimately
averaged the figures put forward by the experts for each side. See Re Johnston and West Fraser
Tunber Co. Ltd, ibid, where the court at 86 commented that
[AII four experts expressed divergent or conflicting opinions as to market value. Different
assumptions were advanced by each expert which, depending on the one accepted, had
a profound effect on the resulting market value. The assumptions reflect the subjective
experience and opinions of the particular expert propounding their acceptance.... One gained
the impression that one could readily commence such a study with a preconceived market
value in mind and, by the application of selected assumptions, readily provide calculations
which supported the preconceived result.
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holder from claiming the right. It is also arguable, however, that the
risk of the adjudication is entirely diversifiable. If so, investors holding
diversified portfolios should be indifferent to an increase in such risk. 60
In practice, however, the shareholder may not view adjudication
risk with such equanimity. Claiming the appraisal right is an infrequent
event. Deciding whether or not to claim the right might, as a psychological
matter, be subject to a consideration of the total risk of the appraisal.
The prudent course would be to treat the risk of adjudication as a cost
to the shareholder.
The uncertainty associated with the process of fixing a fair value
would be reduced if the suggestions pertaining to procedures and costs
were adopted. Uncertainty may further be reduced if, as suggested below,
greater reliance is placed on pre-transaction market price as the basic
tool for valuing a dissenter's shares. 61
While the degree to which adjudication risk may affect the shareholder's decision of whether or not to claim the appraisal right cannot
be quantified, the presence of this risk indicates that courts should err
on the side of generosity in awarding pre-payment interest to the appraisal
claimant. Thus, the standard considered earlier (the rate of interest paid
to the corporation's unsecured creditors) may in fact be too conservative;
a rate perhaps one or two percentage points higher might be more
appropriate.
7.

Cost to the company: the chilling effect on fundamental changes

One of the more vigorously debated points in the literature on
appraisal rights is whether or not the appraisal right is likely to be costly
for the company (aside from the potential competitive cost noted above)
and the related point of what effect this will have on the undertaking
of fundamental changes.' 62
Manning suggests that "[f]rom the perspective of the company, these
statutes can be a frightful nuisance, drain, and burden." He argues that
See also the heroic efforts of McEachern CJ.S.C. in Re Whitehorse Copper Mines Ltd, supra, note
98 and Cypns Anvil Mining Corp. v. Dickson, supra, note 98 in determining the fair value of
thinly traded public companies.
160 See supra,Part III.A.l.

See infra, Part VIII.
162 Earlier, it was suggested that a valuation rule yielding participation in hidden values or
synergies of the transaction may tend to discourage productive fundamental changes and hence
generate economic losses. This must be separated from a concern that the cash drain generated
by widespread exercise of the appraisal right will abort the fundamental change. In the former
case, the concern is with the question of structuring appropriateincentives to undertake productive
fundamental changes. In the latter case, the concern is primarily one of the effect of the payouts
on working capital and the resulting illiquidity and increased financial risk.
161
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a "sudden and largely unpredictable drain is imposed upon the corporation's cash position" at a time when "the enterprise is more apt to
be in need of a blood transfusion than a leeching."163 He further suggests
that if there are sufficient dissenters, the transaction may be entirely
aborted.
Manning's argument has been met by Eisenberg with equal vigour
on two fronts. First, there "may be a short-run need for a cash input,
but it is seldom material."' 64 Second, to the extent that the number of
dissenters grows or threatens to grow, this will exert a salutary effect
upon management by inducing them to attempt to secure the best deal
possible for the shareholders.1 65
In the author's view, the Eisenberg arguments carry greater force.
The author knows of no case involving a large public company where
the number of dissenters was so great as to threaten the fundamental
change. Should such a case arise, any fundamental change that succeeded
in attracting so many dissenters is not likely to be the sort of beneficial
fundamental change that there is great concern about saving.1 66 Given
the general apathy of shareholders, a vigorous dissent expressed through
the widespread exercise of the appraisal right is likely to be symptomatic
of a deep-seated infirmity in the fundamental change. As has already
been suggested, 167 the value of the appraisal right lies precisely in its
potential to deter value-decreasing transactions, while permitting valueincreasing transactions to go forward.
C. Summary
However theoretically attractive the appraisal right is, unless it can
be made to work in practice, it cannot fulfil its potential function. Some
relatively acute practical difficulties presently diminish the effectiveness
of the appraisal right.
It is clear that amendments can be made to the procedural and
costs provisions of the CBCA and cognate statutes that would improve
the efficacy of the appraisal right. These changes would have the effect
of reducing the delays and uncertainties as well as the costs of the appraisal
right. Changes might also be made in the federal taxation legislation.
163 Manning, supra, note 10 at 234.

164 Eisenberg, supra, note 38 at 73.
165 Ibid at 83-84. It would appear that E.L. Folk was the first to suggest this point as a

rationale for the appraisal right in "De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Electronics
Inc." (1963) 49 Va. L. Rev. 1261.
166 See supra, note 109 and accompanying text.
167 See supra,Part III.D.
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A minor amendment is indicated in the provision allowing for payment
of interest on the dissenter's shares. The awarding by the courts of a
somewhat more generous interest rate paid on appraised value prior to
actual payment is suggested. These improvements would make appraisal
right more attractive as a remedial option.
VI. THE APPRAISAL RIGHT AND OTHER REMEDIAL
TECHNIQUES: DOES THE APPRAISAL RIGHT HAVE A
UNIQUE ROLE TO PLAY?
One final issue that will be canvassed before suggesting the optimal
form of the valuation objective accompanying the statutory appraisal
right is the question of what special role the appraisal right can play
in furthering the anti-discrimination and bail-out rationales. If other
market or legal devices can perform the same function or perform it
more efficaciously than the appraisal right, there is little need for this
right. It is suggested that the appraisal right may service these interests
in a way that is not entirely duplicated by other remedial techniques.
A.

The Appraisal Right as Cure for or Prevention of Discrimination

1. The alternatives
The utility of a shareholder appraisal right depends to a considerable
degree on the utility and scope of other remedies available to prevent
an opportunistic redistribution of enterprise values. These other techniques
include subjecting the transaction to a test for business purpose or for
fairness; requiring prior administrative or court approval; requiring
management to submit to shareholders a valuation of terminated shares;
putting in place a liability rule of mandated 'full disclosure' in favour
of shareholders; applying a liability rule for trading on inside information;
or requiring a majority of the minority approval whether by means of
a class or intra-class vote. In order to determine the role of the appraisal
right in preventing or curing the harms caused by opportunism, the
potential shortcomings of each of these techniques is examined as well
as the potentially unique role that might be played by an appraisal right.
Since a large part of the difficulty in drawing a line between
productive and unproductive fundamental changes consists of separating
those transactions with a genuine business motive from those that have
a purely or partly redistributional motive, the minority shareholder's first
line of defence might be to subject the transaction to a test for a legitimate
'business purpose'. Such a requirement has not often been explicitly
resorted to in Canada although the presence or absence of some
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demonstrable business motive will undoubtedly colour a court's attitude
168
to the transaction if challenged.
A requirement to make out a business purpose may well eliminate
those transactions that manifestly lack any business purpose. But, as in
other contexts, subjecting fundamental changes to a business purpose
test will not entirely protect minority shareholders against redistributional
predation. An opportunistic redistribution may easily be engrafted upon
a transaction with a legitimate business purpose to lend it an air of
propriety. Alternatively, a transaction yielding real economic gains may
be structured in a manner that is unnecessary to attain the increase in
value in order to disenfranchise the minority. Although courts and
securities regulators are no longer as deferential to majority rule as they
once were, nor as slow to review the bonafides and the business purpose
of corporate fundamental changes, 169 it seems clear that the courts' natural
reticence to sit as a review panel on business judgements renders a business
purpose test a leaky sieve in preventing opportunistic redistribution.
A business purpose test, in addition to being under-inclusive, may
in some situations be over-inclusive. Where a court is called upon to
review the business purpose of a transaction, there is the danger that
a court anxious to preserve minority shareholder rights will strike down
those transactions whose business purpose cannot - either because of
complexity, uncertainty of attainment, or the danger of jeopardizing
sensitive information - be adequately communicated to the court. In
either case, the difficulty with a business purpose test arises from the
questionable institutional competence of the courts to stand as a review
70
tribunal in questions of business judgement.
Moreover, a strategy of reliance upon the invocation by disgruntled
minority shareholders of fiduciary duties or the oppression remedy to
prevent opportunistic transactions runs into the problem of collective
action and free riders. An assertion of lack of business purpose presents
168 It would be misleading to suggest that the courts have never insisted on a valid business

motive. A number of cases have imposed such a requirement in the context of two-step freezeouts
under the compulsory acquisition legislation. See the English cases of In Bugle Press Ltd (1960),
[1961] Ch. 270, [1960] 3 All E.R 641 (C.A.); Blue Metal Industries Ltd v. Dilley (1969), [1970]
A.C. 827 at 849 (P.C.); and in Canada, Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co. (1953), [1953] 2 S.C.R
204. At least one court has interpreted the arrangement provision in a like fashion. See Re Standard

Manufacturing Company and Baird (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 697 (Nfld. S.C.), holding that the
arrangement provisions cannot be used to effect an eviction without some benefit accruing to the
company. The Standard case echoes earlier cases involving attempted evictions of minority
shareholders by means of amendments to the company's constitution. See ag. Brown v. British
Abrasive Wheel Co., Lid (1919), [1919] 1 Ch. 290; Dafen Tmplate Co., Ltd v. lanelly Steel Co.
(1907) Ltd (1920), [1920] 2 Ch. 124, 89 LJ. Ch. 346.
169 See MacIntosh, supra, note 35.
170 Cf Borden, supra,note 78.
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a complex factual issue to a court. Trial of the issue is an expensive
and time-consuming affair attended by much uncertainty. Few minority
shareholders holding small stakes in the company (many of whom have
a purely transient interest) will stand to gain sufficiently to make a suit
worthwhile. Further, where the plaintiff is unable to secure contribution
towards costs from other shareholders - but all shareholders stand to
gain equally from success - each minority shareholder has a strong
incentive to let someone else sue. Although costs rules in the federal
and Ontario legislation now allow a shareholder to seek an indemnity
from the corporation in a derivative action, 'costs follow the event' is
still the rule of usual application without right of contribution from other
shareholders or the benefit of an indemnity from the corporation.' 7 t A
similar collective action problem plagues a requirement that insiders
demonstrate the 'fairness' of the price paid to evicted minority
shareholders.

172

The collective action problem, however, is not entirely insurmountable. One way to reduce its impact is by empowering a publicly funded
administrative agency to function as an oversight body administering
to shareholder rights much as an indenture trustee serves the interests
of bondholders. The federal and Ontario statutes, for example, now give
standing to administrative officials to undertake actions alleging oppression,173 and a recent case suggests that the action may be undertaken

in the form of a class action on behalf of minority shareholders.

74 Further,

171 It is unclear whether a shareholder may seek indemnity with respect to an oppression
action. See, for example, CBCA, supra, note 1 at s. 233, especially s. 233(d) (court powers in
a derivative action), and s. 234(3) (court powers in an oppression application).
172 Courts in Great Britain and in Canada have required that the proposed fundamental change
be fair in a number of contexts requiring court approval for the change. These include reductions
of capital and statutory arrangements. These putative fairness tests have tended sometimes to mean
little more than ensuring that all relevant procedures have been complied with and that all required
majorities have been obtained, although the Canadian courts have at times been very active in
policing the fairness of statutory arrangements. Increasingly, the courts have interpreted the statutory
oppression remedy as imposing a general requirement of fairness; the result of finding a lack of
fairness could be either liability or the enjoining of the transaction. Thus, a generalized fairness
doctrine seems already on the horizon. See MacIntosh, supra, note 35. The issues of fairness and
business purpose are closely intertwined; the absence of a legitimate business purpose may suggest
an absence of fairness by implicating opportunistic motives. A general requirement of fairness is
plagued by the same question of judicial competence as that of business purpose.
173 CBCA, supra, note 1 at ss 231, 234; OBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 247. Under the CBCA
the administrative official (the "Director") may also commence a derivative action in favour of
the corporation (CBCA s. 231). The OBCA may permit the same result although the statute is
not quite so explicit (OBCA s.244). See also Ontario SecuritiesAct, supra,note 16 ats. 132 (permitting
the Commission to commence a derivative action in favour of the corporation in the case of insider
trading). Both the CBCA and the OBCA permit administrative officials to intervene in a variety
of other circumstances. See, for example, CBCA ss 119, 131, 138, 148, 151, 161, 185.1, 204,
197, 198, 206, 222, 236. The OBCA contains similar provisions.
174 See Sparling v. Royal Trustco Ltd (1984), 24 B.L.R. 145 (Ont. C.A.).
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the Ontario Securities Commission and its counterparts in other provinces
exercise a powerful oversight function in respect of the activities of all
publicly traded corporations, and the ministrations of the administrators
are not infrequently set in motion by private complaint.
Despite these openings for administrative intervention, the federal
incorporation legislation (which has set the pattern for legislation in
Ontario and five other Canadian provinces) was designed to be primarily
"self-enforcing" by means of private action. 175 Indeed, the Canadian
experience under the former Letters Patent regimes indicates that administrative involvement in corporate fundamental transactions as a
matter of course is impractical owing to the inevitably limited resources
of the designated oversight bodies and the overwhelming number of
transactions presented for approval. 176
However, administrative oversight need not be structured as a
mandatory administrative sanction in order to be effective. Where
oppressive conduct is alleged, a minority shareholder has the opportunity
to consult administrative officials with a view to the latter undertaking
an action on his or her behalf or on behalf of all minority shareholders. 177
This ad hoc administrative intervention may be an effective way of
overcoming the collective action problem. It is reasonable to expect that
this mechanism will be increasingly resorted to in Ontario and other
provinces with similar administrative oversight bodies in the future.
In going-private transactions (and perhaps other fundamental
changes), another strategy for preventing the exploitation of material
insider information is requiring full disclosure of any material information
bearing on price. The OBCA and Ontario Securities Commission require,
in addition to the shareholder approvals noted below, that an "independent" valuation of forcibly terminated participating shares be prepared
in connection with any going-private transaction and that a summary
of the valuation be sent to shareholders. 178 Even aside from the collective
action problem that exists if the valuation or summary sent to shareholders
is deficient, this protective device may also be deficient in an important
respect. It is somewhat doubtful that any valuer appointed and instructed
by management may be relied upon to uncover any hidden values that
management or the majority shareholders are anxious should remain
a source of private gain. Any firm that is hired by management and
175 Dickerson Report, supra, note 3 at paras. 13, 14, 496.

176 See eg. Ontario, Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law (Chairn A.F.
Lawrence) at para. 1.1.7. [hereinafter Lawrence Report].

177 See Sparlingv. Royal Trustco Ltd, supra,note 174.
178 OBCA, supra,note 2 at ss 189(2)-(3); Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1.
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that hopes or expects to receive further work from the corporation or
to be hired by other corporate managers inevitably finds itself in a position
where the greatest rewards may arise from pessimistic assessments of
value that coincidentally mirror those publicly expressed by management.
Under the federal and Ontario legislation, insider trading attracts
criminal and civil sanctions. However, rules forbidding insider trading
(or mandating a corporate valuation in the interests of preventing insider
trading) are plagued by difficulties of discovery in the best of circumstances. These difficulties are exacerbated in the case of pure goingprivate transactions. Shareholders will frequently be unable to acquire
the information necessary to ground the liability. Exposure of a misstatement respecting values at the time of going private, or of the
exploitation of inside information, necessarily involves uncovering objective information that reflects on the accuracy of the information given
shareholders. Where the company continues as a public entity, subsequent
performance or corporate events may furnish the required information.
However, once the company has gone private, there is by definition no
market price available to give clues as to captured hidden values.
Coincidentally, public disclosure obligations cease, drying up the flow
of readily available information.179
Further, in respect of many fundamental changes, such as an
amendment to the articles of incorporation to alter the terms of outstanding
securities, the legislation forbidding insider trading will not usually apply.
The Ontario legislation, for example, enjoins only insider trading in
connection with the sale or purchase of a security.' 80
Rules mandating disclosure of information known to insiders or
acquirors bearing on the value of the target company suffer from the
same infirmities that plague insider-trading liability.181 Procedural requirements designed to ensure that shareholders assent to the fundamental
change are another possible protective mechanism. In addition to the
approval of a majority of shareholders, the federal and Ontario legislation
typically require approval by any affected class of shareholders on the
179 The newly expanded rules for examination on discovery alleviate the problem to some
degree. See Rules of Civil Procedure,0. Reg. 560/84 (as amended). Rule 30.02(1) requires that
any relevant documents in the possession, control, or power of a party must be disclosed on discovery.
Rule 30.02(4) allows a court to order that such disclosure obligation shall extend to subsidiary,
controlled, or affiliated corporations of a corporate party to the action. In addition, rule 31.06
permits liberal discovery (including cross-examination) of any person examined on discovery.
180 Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 16 at s. 131. See also s. 75 (criminal liability).
181 See, for example, Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 16 at ss 74-75; Regulation Made Under
the Securities Act, R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 910 (as amended), at ss 163-75, and Forms 32-34; Ontario
Securities Commission Policy 9.1. See also In The Matter of Canada Cement LaFargeLimited and
StandardIndustries, (1980) Bulletin of Ontario Securities Comm. 400.
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undertaking of a fundamental change.182 This may be insufficient protection where interested insiders control sufficient shares to determine
the result of any class vote. The protection afforded minority shareholders
is substantially enhanced where company-wide and class votes are taken
so as to exclude those shareholders in a position of conflict of interest
that is, where required approvals must be given by a 'majority of
the minority'. In Ontario, both by legislation and administrative fiat, goingprivate transactions must receive the approval of a majority of the
disinterested minority of all affected classes before a going-private
183
transaction may proceed.
These approvals, while highly suggestive of the fairness of the
transaction, are nonetheless not foolproof guarantees. Management's
control over the proxy machinery and ability to control information
reaching shareholders, coupled with shareholder apathy, may result in
class majority of the minority approvals even where the transaction affects
minority shareholders adversely.
Finally, in the case of going-private transactions, the disciplinary
mechanisms of the market restraining purely redistributional action
slacken or disappear. A company that is going private will have few
worries about the action adversely affecting its cost of capital since the
company will not be seeking further public funding so long as it continues
to remain a private company. 184
2. The appraisal right
Adoption of an appraisal proceeding may confer benefits on both
the company and dissenting shareholders by virtue of being a relatively
cheap dispute resolution mechanism. Although the appraisal right has
been criticized as being slow, uncertain, and costly, 85 it may be advantageous to both majority and minority shareholders if it is cheap
relative to other available relief. While liability entitlements arising under
182 See, for example, CBCA, supra, note I at ss 170, 177, 183, 203, 204. Cf OBCA, supra,
note 2 at ss 169, 175, 181, 183, 189.

183 OBCA, ibid at s. 189; Ontario Securities Commission Policy 9.1. The requisite supramajority depends on whether or not the consideration is payable wholly or partly in non-cash

consideration and whether or not the offered cash consideration is at least as great as the prepared
valuation (OBCA s. 189(4); Policy 9.1 II. B). The stock exchanges also insist on majority of the
minority voting approval in some situations involving fundamental changes. See generally MacIntosh,
supra, note 35.
184 This review of various shareholder protective devices is not an endorsement of all or
any of these protections. Rather, it is merely an inventory of some of the reasons why these protections
will not be complete guarantees against opportunistic conduct of managers or shareholders for
the purpose of determining what unique role the appraisal right might serve.
185 See supra,note 28 and following text.
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common law or statutory fiduciary or oppression rules require a complex
and expensive adjudication of right, the appraisal right is a strict liability
entitlement that arises as of right merely on the happening of stated
occurrences. 86 Although trial of the issue of "fair price" has often proved
difficult and expensive, 87 by reducing the arena of conflict to this single
issue the appraisal procedure leads to a reduction in the joint company-shareholder expenses of dispute resolution. In many cases, the result
of the determination of right under a relevant liability rule (for example,
fiduciary duties or the oppression remedy) offers no greater protection;
the courts simply order the buyout of minority shares at an appraised
value.188 Thus, in many cases the appraisal right leads to comparable
relief. It also often avoids the problems associated with minority holdouts
that attend the conferral of powers of veto on minority shareholders
(either individually or as a group). 8 9
The strict liability character of the appraisal entitlement is important
in relation to more than merely the issues of costs and relief. Where
an adjudication of entitlement involves trial of complex issues of law
and fact - as in the case of allegations of breach of fiduciary duty
or of oppression - a great amount of uncertainty is introduced into
the determination of right. Uncertainty is a cost to risk-averse plaintiffs
- the greater the uncertainty surrounding the outcome, the less likely
it is that a minority shareholder will be willing to sue to defend his
or her rights. Resort to the appraisal right restricts the ambit of uncertainty
to the issue of cashout price and eliminates any uncertainty associated
with entitlement (provided the minefield of procedural requirements is
crossed without a fatal accident). All other things being equal, this renders
the appraisal right a comparatively attractive entitlement.
Moreover, the appraisal right is an individualized entitlement. Class
and majority of the minority requirements protect respectively discrete
and fluid bodies of minority shareholders in the company. The appraisal
right, by contrast, protects individual shareholders by allowing any
186 At least in respect of the basic s. 184 appraisal entitlement. A somewhat different role
is reserved for an appraisal pursuant to an oppression application (see infra, Part VI.D).
187 See infra, Part VIII.

188 See, for example, Re Mason and Intercity PropertiesLimited (1984) 2 A.C.W.S. (2d) 524
(Ont. S.C.) aff'd (1984), 34 A.C.W.S. (2d) 366 (Ont. Div. Ct); Miller v. E Mendel Holdings Ltd
(1984), 26 B.L.R. 85 (Sask. Q.B.); Mason v. MO.W. Holdings Ltd (1983), 23 Man. R. (2d) 260
(Q.B.); Johnston Sale4 McKay and Dragon Investment Ltd v. West Fraser 7"unber Co. Ltd (1981),
29 B.C.L.R. 379 (S.C.), rev'd (1982), 37 B.C.L.R. 360, 140 D.L.R. (3d) 574 (C.A.); Diligenti v.
RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 36 (S.C.). In these cases the shareholder would
have been quite happy to have secured the remedy without going to the expense, difficulty, and
risk of showing oppression.
189 See supra,note 10.
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shareholder to exercise his or her appraisal entitlement regardless of the
opinion of any other shareholder respecting the fairness or propriety of
the transaction.
The individualization of the entitlement answers to an extent the
problem of collective action; it does not, however, entirely overcome
it. A free-rider problem arises insofar as the court hearing to determine
fair pricejoins and binds all dissenting shareholders. 190 Hence the valuation
hearing confers joint benefits191but, at least in the CBCA and most cognate
statutes, without a right of contribution from other shareholders or payment
of costs by the company. 192 This problem might be remedied, along the
lines suggested earlier, by redesigning the costs provisions so that the
193
company routinely pays part or all of the costs of the appraisal.
B. The AppraisalRight and the Bail-out Rationale?
In addition to those advantages already noted, the appraisal right
has perhaps an even more special role to play where it is claimed under
the bail-out rationale. In many situations where the shareholder claims
the right under this rationale, the essence of the protection conferred
will be against unwise business decisions. The decision dissented from
will not typically attract liability under relevant fiduciary or fiduciarylike norms (like the oppression remedy) or for breach of the duty of
care and skill. Similarly, where the reason for claiming the right under
the bail-out rationale is opportunisticrisk shifting that diminishes enterprise
value, it will frequently be difficult to convince a court that a simple
shift in the risk of the enterprise constitutes oppressive conduct. 194 The
appraisal right thus confers protection that is not duplicated by the
techniques explored above in relation to problems of discrimination. 195

190 A court hearing need not arise unless the company and one or more dissentients fail
to agree on a cashout price; however, the price offered to all such dissentients of any given class
or a series must be the same (CBCA, supra, note 1 at s. 184(19)).
191 The appraisal right may also conferjoint benefits ifsufficient shareholders dissent, threatening
to cause such a cash drain on the corporation that the fundamental change is abandoned. The
author knows of no case where this has occurred.
192 This problem has been overcome in the Alberta legislation by having the company pay
the costs of the appraisal proceeding. ABCA, supra, note 2 at s. 184(11)(b) provides that "[a]
dissenting shareholder... except in special circumstances shall not be required to pay the costs
of the application or appraisal." It is not entirely clear what licence this gives minority shareholders
to hire expert witnessess, at the cost of the company, to contest the company's asserted fair price.
193 See ibid and Part V.B.5, supra.

194 Although see Re Mason and Intercity PropertiesLimited, supra, note 188.
195 This does not by itself mean that this protection has any value; only that, if the protection
is otherwise valued, the appraisal remedy is one of a very few ways of conferring this protection.
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VII. A MENU APPROACH TO A NON-MANDATORY
STATUTORY APPRAISAL RIGHT
Before evaluating the impact of appraisal rationale, transaction type,
and corporation type on the selection of a statutory appraisal right, it
is appropriate to consider another fundamental question: Should the
statutory appraisal right be mandatory or merely presumptive in character?
The choice between these two alternatives reflects a choice between
the two principal functions of corporate law.
In this section, it is suggested that the case for a mandatory statutory
appraisal right is weak. However, a case is made for a non-mandatory
(or 'permissive') statutory appraisal right or a number of appraisal rights
with alternative valuation objectives. These might be selected at will
by any company for incorporation into the company's constitutional
documents, with the option of declining to have any appraisal right at
all.
A. A Mandatory or Pennissive AppraisalRight?
In one aspect, corporate law is 'enabling'; that is, it supplies a type
of standard form contract with terms that the parties in the greater number
of corporations would in any case agree to in an environment where
transaction costs were zero or negligible. Wearing its enabling mantle,
corporate law supplies rules that are presumptive rather than prescriptive
in character. The motivating reason for rules of this character is the
reduction of the transaction costs of financial contracting; the statutory
standard form renders it unnecessary to specifically contract to a given
outcome. Under this rationale, there is no reason to prevent those involved
in a corporation from contracting to other rules where they consider
it appropriate to do so. The enabling function of corporate law seeks
to assist in the process of private ordering.
In another aspect corporate law is 'regulatory', supplying minimum
standards of performance or otherwise regulating the conduct of the affairs
of the corporation. Regulatory law by its nature gives rise to mandatory
rules. It is necessarily based on the presumption that private ordering
- market contracting - is failing to produce an entirely efficient financial
contract.1 96
196 Of course, transaction costs may inhibit the process of bargaining to the same financial
contract as we would see in a zero transaction costs environment. This is also an instance of
market failure. However, the type of market failure that is sufficient to ground mandatory rules
is generally some failure of the activities of the corporation, or the nature of its legal relationship
with its security holders, to be reflected in its cost of capital. Even in the case of 'last period
problems', where those exiting the market (for example, by retirement or cessation of business)
'take the money and run' without fear of market reprisals, presumptive rules allowing for contracting
out (supplemented by anti-fraud rules) are adequate as long as these problems are anticipated
by the market.

1987]

The Shareholders' AppraisalRight in Canada

It is difficult to make out a strong case for regulatory rules with
respect to public companies with widely traded securities. The evidence

is fairly strong that markets for the securities of such companies operate
with a high degree of efficiency.1 97 Although there are undeniably 'agency
It may sometimes be possible to justify mandatory rules under the enabling function. Mandating
a restricted number of standard form financial contracts lowers the aggregate market costs of
pricing securities. It is obviously expensive to determine and price each feature of the rather complex
financial contract between shareholder and corporation that is embodied in lengthy documents
such as the articles, by-laws, and other constitutional documents of the corporation. If the degree
of variance in these financial contracts is reduced, securities may be priced at reduced cost, securing
(other things being equal) a net social gain. Of course, other things do not remain entirely equal;
there is a loss resulting from restricting the scope of possible financial contracting. The case in
favour of mandatory provisions under the enabling function thus depends on the relative magnitude
of these efficiency gains and losses. It may well be that the argument has the greatest force in
the case of thinly-traded public companies where the marginal reduction of information and pricing
costs associated with mandating specific features of the company-shareholder contract might tend
to be the greatest. Where, however, (as in the appraisal right) it is unclear what the most efficient
form of contract is, it would be imprudent to mandate any specific form of appraisal right in
the interests of a reduction of information costs.
197 An elementary finance textbook that reviews the theory and evidence in a highly readable
form is Brealey & Myers, supra, note 18 at 254-75. See also Lorie, Dodd & Kimpton, supra,
note 76; Malkiel, supra, note 76. For a more technical analysis see Tinic & West, supra, note
18. The classic review, although necessarily dated, is Fama, supra, note 76. These investigations,
focusing on the American market, have tended to confirm the efficiency of securities markets
in respect of information as to past price movements ('weak form' efficiency), publicly-available
information which may impact on securities prices ('semi-strong form' efficiency), but not in respect
of insider information ('strong form' efficiency).
The evidence is considerably less well developed in respect of Canadian markets. It would
appear, however, that stock price movements exhibit a similar random character. See C.H. Rorke
et aL, "The Random Walk Hypothesis in the Canadian Equity Market" (1976) 8 J. Bus. Admin.
23.
The evidence is mixed in respect of the efficiency of Canadian securities markets as to publicly
available information. The following studies suggest semi-strong form efficiency. J.P. Williamson,
"Performance of Canadian Mutual Funds, 1961-70" (1971) 36:3 Bus. Q. 94; D. Grant, "Investment
Performance of Canadian Mutual Funds; 1960-1974" (1976) 8 J. Bus. Admin. 1; A.L. Calvert
& L Lefoll, "The CAPM Under Inflation and the Performance of Canadian Mutual Funds" (1980)
12 J. Bus. Admin. 107; A.L. Calvert & L Lefoll, "Performance and Systematic Risk Stability of
Canadian Mutual Funds Under Inflation" (1981) 8 J. Bus. Fin. & Acc. 279; W.M. Lawson, "Market
Efficiency: The Trading of Professionals on the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1980) 12 J. Bus. Admin.
41. Some studies appear to show inefficiencies: G. Charest, "Returns to Dividend Changing Stocks
on the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1980) 12 J. Bus. Admin. 1; G. Charest, "Returns to Splitting
Stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1980) 12 J. Bus. Admin. 19. Other studies apparently
showing inefficiencies are collected in J.P. Williamson, "Canadian Capital Markets" in Consumer
and Corporate Affairs Canada, Proposalsfor a Secuiies Market Law for Canada, vol. 3 (1979)
1.However, it should be noted that the conclusions in these earlier works are based on the observed
relationship between risk and return and therefore depend critically on an accurate measurement
of risk. Relatively recent developments suggest that there are serious statistical biases in the
measurement of risk in thinly-traded stocks - which of course dominate in Canadian capital markets
- that were not taken into account. Thus, these studies must now be regarded as of questionable
validity. See E. Dimson, "Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading" (1979)
7 J. Fin. Econ. 179; Fowler, et aL, supra, note 26; R. Roll, "A Possible Explanation of the Small
Firm Effect" (1981) 36 J. Fin. 879.
As in the United States, Canadian markets have not been found to be efficient as to inside
information. See Fowler et al, supra, note 45; Fowler & Rorke, supra, note 45; Baesal & Stein,
supra, note 45.
Canadian markets appear to be less transactionally efficient than American markets. See Tinic
& West, supra, note 44.
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costs' associated with public corporations, these costs are anticipated by
the market and reflected in the firm's cost of capital and the wages
paid its managers. The price a shareholder pays for a security in a widely
held public company is the market's best estimate of the intrinsic worth
of the security based on all publicly available information and incorporating an anticipation of future contingencies that may disadvantage
minority shareholders, such as freezeouts and discriminatory alterations
of the articles. Thus, the financial contract that this type of firm offers
shareholders is reflected in its cost of capital. 98 This supplies a potent
incentive for the firm to design a contract that will result in an optimal
cost of capital for the firm. Thus, there is little need for a mandatory
appraisal right.
In the context of private corporations, strong arguments can again
be made against a regime of regulatory, as opposed to enabling, rules.
Many private companies are in effect 'incorporated partnerships' with
a small number of participants. The constitutional or other documents
that together constitute the financial contract of the parties, can be, and
usually is, highly tailored to meet the specific needs of these participants.
Regulatory rules become less necessary to the extent that the parties
regulate their own relationship with specific contractual provisions. In
fact, given the heterogeneity of interests to be protected in a private
corporation and the relatively large variance in the type of financial
contract struck, mandatory rules will unduly inhibit the process of
contracting to achieve the accommodation of specific preferences. It would
appear that presumptive rather than mandatory rules are indicated.
The dominant form of corporate enterprise in Canada is the public
company whose shares trade in thin markets. Such companies appear
at first sight to present the strongest case in favour of mandatory rules.
It has already been suggested that there may be some reason to believe
that agency costs will be higher in respect of such corporations. Moreover,
most of the evidence of the efficiency of the stock markets has been
developed in the context of public companies trading in deep markets. 99
Even if agency costs are higher in thinly traded public companies, however,
there is no a priori reason to believe, nor is there reliable evidence
suggesting, that the market inappropriately discounts any added risks
of investing in such companies.200 The available evidence tends rather
to suggest that Canadian markets are efficient in the semi-strong form

198 See ibid and Jensen & Meckling, supra, note 71.
199 See supra, note 197.
200 Ibid
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despite the number of thinly traded companies. 20 1 Thus, there are still
potent incentives for thinly traded companies to select a form of financial
contract that will minimize its cost of capital. It is likely that investors
in such corporations demand and receive a risk premium for investing
in an enterprise with a higher risk of discrimination against minority
shareholders. Thus, as a general rule, permissive or enabling rules are
appropriate in the context of Canadian capital markets.
B.

The Optimal Form of the Statutory Valuation Principle and the
Indeterminancy of Pure Theory

It has been suggested that the two main functions served by an
appraisal right are under the bail-out and anti-discrimination rationales.
A close examination of the different rationales for the appraisal right
suggests that the valuation objective might well vary depending on the
rationale under which the appraisal right is claimed.
If, for example, a dissentient shareholder enlists the protection of
the appraisal right in a situation where there has been, or is alleged
to have been, substantive discrimination between shareholders, the optimal
valuation objective may include an assessment of hidden values captured
by some shareholders to the exclusion of others or an assessment of
transaction synergies.
If, on the other hand, the reason for claiming the right is to avoid
the consequences of an unwise fundamental change, the more appropriate
valuation objective is to value the dissentient's shares on a pre-fundamental
change basis in order to provide protection from the effect or anticipated
effect of the change on the enterprise. 202
The optimal valuation objective may also vary depending on the
type of transaction under consideration. For example, as indicated above,
going-private transactions present far greater dangers of opportunistic
redistribution than two-step takeovers, and fewer opportunities for generating economic gains. Therefore, these transactions present a stronger
case than other types of fundamental changes for a full gain-sharing
rule. Finally, the appropriate valuation principle may depend on the type
of corporation.
Obviously, taking all of these factors into account at once might
yield an extremely complex and unwieldy form of statutory appraisal
Ibid
The distinction between awarding a post- and a pre-fundamental change value is not
a distinction between looking backward and looking forward. Valuation is always looking forward,
projecting a stream of enterprise earnings and applying an appropriate discount rate. The crucial
difference between the two methods is the selection of the notional enterprise of which the dissentient
shareholder is taken to be a part; that is, the pre- or post-fundamental change enterprise.
201

202
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right. Even more than this, it would appear that the question of what
constitutes an optimal statutory appraisal form cannot be determined
from pure theory alone. The answer will ultimately depend on several
matters that are fundamentally empirical: the degree of opportunism in
the marketplace; the extent to which legal and market constraints operate
to prevent opportunism; the extent to which a rule of unequal sharing
is necessary to encourage productive fundamental changes; the magnitude
of negotiating, monitoring, enforcement, and other transaction costs under
each rule. Variation in any of these parameters may produce widely
differing results.
These are matters about which little hard (or at least systematic)
empirical evidence exists. However, there is an important source of indirect
evidence about the relative weights of these factors; private ordering
arrangements in the marketplace. If appraisal rights are an efficient feature
of the shareholder's financial contract, we would expect to see them
introduced in an attempt to reduce the cost of capital. By the same
mechanism, we might gain some insights into the optimal form of the
discrimination principle and hence the appropriate method of valuing
dissentient shares on an appraisal. Other insights may be gained from
the empirical investigations of economists.
C. The Evidence from the Market
The record from the market is less than it might be. At common
law, the rule in Trevorv. Whitworth2oi made it impossible for a corporation
to repurchase its issued shares. This foreclosed the opportunity of offering
appraisal rights. At the same time that this prohibition was lifted in Canada,
mandatory appraisal rights were enacted in many Canadian jurisdictions.
Thus, there is little opportunity to observe the market-generated contract.
This does not mean, however, that there is no market record at
all to consult. The federal legislation and cognate statutes allow for
contracting out of the appraisal requirement in some situations. Further,
although the statutory appraisal rights are otherwise mandatory, it is
possible for a corporation to offer appraisal rights where not mandated
by statute.
The difficulty is that no systematic evidence exists to indicate the
frequency of contracting out, nor as to how often appraisal rights are
voluntarily given where not mandated. Anecdotal evidence suggests, at
least, that contracting out is not an infrequent event. Such evidence also
indicates that corporations sometimes offer appraisal rights where not
203 (1887), 12 App. Cas. 409 (H.L.).
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mandated by statute. 204 However, the implications of the latter type of
event are not entirely clear, such occurrences may be a response to purely
market forces, or an attempt to conform to perceived legal norms, which
20 5
may or may not be efficient.
It may be significant that the rule in Trevor v. Whitworth persisted
for as long as it did without change. If there is some tendency in the
common law towards efficiency, 206 and appraisal rights are an efficient
a much
feature of a shareholder's financial contract, one would anticipate
207
shorter life for the rule in Trevor than was in fact the case.
204 See, for example, Stevens v. Home Oil Co. Ltd (1980), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 297, 28 A.R.
331 (Q.B.) (transaction made conditional upon majority of the minority approval although not
required by statute).
205 One might look also to bond covenants to see if appraisal rights are a common feature
of trust indentures. Since debt holders are protected in the main by contract rather than by statute,
the debt relationship may yield clues as to the optimal form of shareholder financial contract.
Although bondholder votes are frequently required in respect of recapitalizations or changes in
the terms of outstanding bonds, appraisal rights in favour of dissentient bondholders are rarely
if ever observed.
This evidence must be used with extreme caution, however. Debt holders, in contrast to
shareholders, are not residual claimants, and, as a result, the value of an appraisal right in favour
of bondholders may differ from the value to shareholders. Further, the nature of bondholder-shareholder conflicts of interest, while in some ways similar to shareholder-shareholder conflicts, may
be sufficiently different to render direct comparisons misleading. Equally important, bond covenants
are typically enforced by the indenture trustee, surmounting the collection action problem. Many
of these bond covenants protect bondholders against change in the risk of the investment and
indirectly influence the firm's investment decisions, perhaps rendering the appraisal right a superfluous
protection. See, for example, Smith & Warner, supra, note 20; A. Barnea, R.A. Haugen & L.W.
Senbet, Agency Problems and FinancialContracting (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985).
Thus, the absence of appraisal rights in bond covenants is at best merely suggestive evidence,
and far from conclusive of the absence of an efficiency rationale to the shareholder appraisal right.
206 G.L. Priest, "The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules" (1977)
6 . Leg. Stud. 65; P.H. Rubin, "Why is the Common Law Efficient?" (1977) 6 . Leg. Stud.
205; R. Posner, "A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common
Law" (1981) 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 775. See, however, Priest & Klein, supra, note 155 throwing some
doubt on the efficiency theory.
207 The Ontario legislation of 1882 did in fact allow for share repurchase, but only with
approval of a company-wide supra-majority. An Act to confer additionalpowers upon Joint Stock
Companies, 45 Vict., c. 17, s. 9. This provision was soon merged with the provisions allowing
for a reduction of capital, which could only be effected with both shareholder supra-majority approval
and supplementary letters patent. The repurchase provision reappeared in truncated form in 1900
in An Act to Amend The OntarioCompaniesAct, 63 Vict., c. 23, s. 2. This Act allowed the repurchase
of preference shares, again only upon approval of a supra-majority of shareholders and with
supplementary letters patent, in addition to a determination by the Provincial Secretary that the
repurchase was "bona fide in character." This provision was in turn merged with the reduction
of capital provision in the statute. Thus, while share repurchase continued to be possible in the
Ontario (as it was in the federal) legislation, this was so only through the reduction of capital
provisions with demanding mandatory shareholder protections. Thus, share repurchase was not
possible as a normal incident of corporate management. The CBCA and cognate statutes presently
allow share repurchase limited only by solvency tests (CBCA, supra, note I at ss 32-33; OBCA,
supra, note 2 at ss 30-31).
Those who use the efficiency theory to buttress the argument in favour of the efficiency of
the appraisal right bear the burden of explaining why American corporate law generally permitted
appraisal rights while Commonwealth law did not. See Fischel, supra,note 10 at 881-82.
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Other evidence suggests that in most cases the optimal valuation
objective for the appraisal right will be pre-transaction market value.
Empirical investigations of such phenomena as going-private transactions,
mergers, takeover bids, jurisdictional moves, spin-offs, and sell-offs
confirm that on average these transactions generate real economic gains
and are not merely instances of redistribution effected by opportunistic
insiders. 208 While not all individual transactions generate gains, and some
(like 'shark repellent' charter amendments) appear to generate losses
more frequently than gains,209 there is little in the finance literature to
suggest that appropriation of hidden values is the key impetus behind
a wide variety of fundamental changes. Of perhaps even greater interest,
these same empirical investigations suggest that minority shareholders
frequently participate in the synergies or other gains generated by these
transactions by virtue of the terms offered them in the transaction.210

To the extent that this is true, a valuation objective that includes a
calculation of transaction synergies (whether out of a concern to protect
appropriation of hidden values, from notions of what constitutes fair
treatment of minority shareholders, or otherwise) may be entirely unnecessary or even lead to double counting of transaction synergies in
favour of dissenting shareholders. If the latter is true, the appraisal right
will only serve as an invitation to opportunism for minority shareholders,
who will find it worth their while to dissent only to capture a greater
portion of the gains. This in turn will reduce the probability that productive
fundamental changes will occur.211

208 See, for example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, supra,note 78 (going private transactions);
Romano, supra, note 110 (changes in jurisdiction); P. Dodd, "Merger Proposals, Management
Discretion, and Stockholder Wealth" (1980) 8 J. Fin. Econ. 105 (mergers); Eckbo, supra, note
73 (mergers); Jensen & Ruback, supra, note 73 (changes in corporate control); K. Schipper &
A. Smith, "Effects of Recontracting on Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Voluntary Spin-offs"
(1983) 12 J. Fin. Econ. 437 (spin-offs); A. Klein, "Voluntary Divestitures: Motives and Consequences"
(Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Chicago, 1983) [unpublished] (sell-offs and spin-offs).
209 See supra,notes 80 and 82.
210 See supra, note 208.
211 The evidence also suggests that in some transactions (like negotiated mergers) one party
to the transaction may capture all the gains which arise; indeed, in a competitive market for corporate
acquisitions, one would expect all the gains to go to the 'acquired' firm (whether pursuant to a
negotiated acquisition or not). See Jensen & Ruback, supra, note 73. In these transactions especially,
awarding dissenting shareholders an appraised 'fair value' that includes an assessment of transaction
synergies will only encourage withholding of approval by individual shareholders in an attempt
to secure a higher payoff. Such an award would be difficult to justify under either the bail-out
or anti-discrimination rationales. See also K. Schipper & R. Thompson, "The Impact of MergerRelated Regulations on the Shareholders of Acquiring Firms" (1985) 23 J. Acct. Res. 184; K.
Schipper & R. Thompson, "The Impact of Merger-Related Regulations Using Exact Distributions
of Test Statistics" (1985) 23 J.Acct. Res. 408.
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D. The Menu Approach
What evidence there is from the market does not, therefore, strongly
confirm the value of the appraisal right.212 Neither does the market suggest
a valuation objective more favourable than pre-transaction market value
if the appraisal right is an efficient shareholder protection. However,
a statutory appraisal right might be capable of curing some of the
deficiencies that stand in the way of an effective market-generated
appraisal right or one with a valuation objective extending to hidden
values or transaction synergies. In an unregulated market, appraisal rights
might fail to develop only because the costs of exercise, as well as the
difficulties of drafting and valuation, may overwhelm any benefits
achieved by the right. Drafting a valuation rule is a difficult task that
is very often not something with which public accountants or corporate
lawyers feel comfortable. Establishing procedures for carrying out the
valuation may be both cumbersome and expensive. The benefits of
contracting to an appropriate appraisal right and providing suitable
mechanisms to secure effective implementation may not justify the effort.
These infirmities could be overcome by the provision of a number
of 'off-the-rack' statutory standard forms with streamlined, low-cost
procedure and reliable, expert valuation. Providing more than one statutory
standard form may serve a wider range of interests than is presently
served by the unitary and mandatory statutory appraisal right. In addition,
it may achieve, by lowering the costs of the appraisal procedure, what
private ordering is unable to do. At the very least, presenting the option
of selecting from amongst a number of statutory standard forms can
do little harm. If the appraisal right has little or no value (or is actually
harmful), a corporation may simply stipulate in its constitutional documents that no appraisal right will be available.
These statutory standard forms might be cast as follows. Where
a claim is made under the basic appraisal provision in respect of all
public corporations and all types of fundamental transactions, and without
considering the rationale under which the right is claimed, the appraisal
valuation should yield only a pre-transaction market price exclusive of
any hidden values or transaction synergies. However, this statutory right
should be permissive in character. An alternative menu of valuation options
should be made available for adoption if desired. One option would include

212 This might be so for a number of reasons: where, for example, the degree of opportunistic

behaviour engaged in by shareholding majorities is not great, where other legal remedies (or the
market) are an adequate answer to problems of opportunism, where the costs of the appraisal
right (to shareholders and to the company) overwhelm any gains which arise, or where there is

some combination of these or other factors.
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in the appraised fair value any hidden values arising from the transaction. 213
Another would include hidden values and a pro rata share of transaction
synergies; only this valuation principle seeks to ensure full substantive
equality of treatment. Any corporation would have the option of selecting
any (or none) of the statutory valuation procedures or any other valuation
procedure in respect of any type of fundamental change. The costs of
so doing would be minimal since the statutory procedure would specify
the valuation objective and procedure, and the preferred rule would only
need to be incorporated by reference into the corporation's constitution.
Where the baseline valuation technique selected by the corporation
departs from a pre-fundamental change value, an additional election could
be made in the corporation's constitutional documents, permitting shareholders to select a valuation based on pre-fundamental change value.
This would protect against discrimination while preserving the ability
of shareholders to elect the bail-out alternative.
Thus, in every case, an appraisal procedure could be tailored to
the transaction and corporation type, permitting the valuation objective
to vary depending on the rationale under which the right is claimed.
Where a case of oppression is made out, the court ought to be
given discretion to apply whatever valuation objective it chooses based
on the factors enumerated above, unless the parties have foreclosed the
issue by appropriate private ordering arrangements. This recognizes the
fact that parties cannot be expected to draft complete contingent contracts
determining the outcome in every possible event of discrimination, even
where the statutory standard form makes contracting cheaper and easier.
The oppression provision should therefore be seen as supplying a residual
category of appraisal event.
With respect to private companies, all of the valuation objectives
available to public companies should be equally available. However, given
the probable expectations of shareholders in most private corporations,
the 'default' rule (that which applies if the articles are entirely silent
on the question of appraisal rights) would be a valuation yielding full
substantive equality of treatment for all transactions, irrespective of the
rationale under which the right is claimed and whether it is claimed
under the basic appraisal or oppression provision. Because of the likelihood
of unwise or opportunistic fundamental changes that have the effect of
diminishing enterprise value, shareholders should presumptively be given
the ability to elect pre-transaction market value. Again, the basic statutory

213 Thus, the valuation tribunal would be called upon to ferret out and evaluate any inside
information bearing on security value as opposed to merely assessing publicly available information.
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appraisal provision would be permissive in character, allowing for
contracting out.
Thus, the question of the appraisal right's efficiency and of the optimal
form of valuation principle would be left, in most cases, in the market
itself. The statutory provision would serve an enabling function, assisting
private ordering by reducing the transaction costs of arriving at a specific
contractual outcome.
VIII.
A.

CURRENT VALUATION PRACTICE IN CANADA
Generak Valuation Objective

The CBCA extends an appraisal right to shareholders irrespective
of whether or not there is a public market for the company's shares.
No distinction is made in the valuation objective as between public
companies with deep markets, public companies with thin markets, and
private companies. Nor is any distinction in valuation objective made
between different types of fundamental changes or different reasons for
claiming the appraisal right.
The statute as enacted in 1975 entitled the dissenting shareholder
to fair value, excluding any value reasonably attributable to the anticipated
adoption of the resolution affirming the fundamental change. 214 The statute
was amended in 1978 to entitle the shareholder to fair value "determined
as of the close of business on the day before the resolution was adopted
5
or the order was made."21
As originally enacted, the statute was responsive to one of the most
potent reasons for having an appraisal right in the public corporations
context - the inadequacy of the market exit option where stock prices
adjust too quickly for shareholders to avoid the market's unfavourable
verdict on the proposed fundamental change. The 1978 amendment results
in a failure of the appraisal right to wash out the drop in price from
the appraised value.2 16
Interestingly, the change was made with a view to benefitting
shareholders by enabling them to participate in any anticipated value

214 S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, s. 184(3).
215 S.C. 1978-79, c. 9, s. 60(2).
216 That is, assuming that the valuation date necessarily determines the valuation objective
to be used - an assumption that the drafters of the statute appear to have implicitly adopted
but one that does not necessarily follow as a matter of logic. See infra, notes 241-242 and
accompanying text.
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generated by the transaction.2 17 Unfortunately, the amendment fails to
recognize that the valuation objective may vary depending on the rationale
under which the appraisal right is claimed.2 t8 Neither the statute as
originally drafted nor the amendment give the court the flexibility it
needs to respond to this factor. Since the provision is mandatory, there
is no option of contracting around the specific valuation objective to
29
yield the desired form of protection. 1
If the recommendations respecting the valuation objective suggested
earlier were adopted, the default rule in all cases involving public
corporations would be a non-sharing rule based on pre-transaction market
value. In all cases involving private corporations, the default rule would
be full gain sharing (while permitting the shareholder to elect the pretransaction alternative). However, flexibility is achieved by allowing any
corporation to stipulate in its constitutional documents that a different
valuation principle be used (or that there be no appraisal right at all)
in some or all transactional circumstances or by enabling shareholders
to elect a specific valuation objective.
217 The change appears to have been a response to a rash of freezeout amalgamations and
the failure of the statute as originally drafted to allow the forcibly cashed-out minority to participate
in the anticipated gains of the transaction. See, for example, the comments of Bouck J.in Neonex
International Ltd v. Kolasa, supra, note 145. See also LoCicero v. B.A.CM Industries Ltd, supra,
note 154 (decided under a statute identical to the CBCA as originally drafted, and refusing to
add anticipated tax savings to appraised value). The amendment essentially restored the provision
of the Draft Bill of the Dickerson Committee, which would have provided that fair value be
"determined as of the day before the resolution was adopted by the shareholders of the corporation"
(see supra, note 3 at cl. 14.17(3)). In contrast to the basic appraisal right under s. 184 of the
CBCA, supra, note 1, the compulsory acquisition provision (s. 199) does not indicate a valuation
date. Two western cases have reached different conclusions as to whether transaction synergies
are to be included in the valuation. See Canadian Gas & Energy Fund Ltd v. Sceptre Resources
Ltd, supra, note 107 (holding that the value of a dissenter's shares should reflect the value of
thepre-transactional entity, thereby excluding transaction synergies); CyprusAnvilMiningCorporation
v. Dickson (1982), 40 B.C.L.R. 180, 20 B.L.R. 21 (B.C.S.C.) (holding that the fair value of the
dissenter's shares should be based on the value of the corporation's properties when combined
with the operations of the acquiror, and hence including transaction synergies). See also Re Ripley
InternationalLtd, (1977), 1 B.L.R. 269 (Ont. H.C.) (denial of approval for statutory arrangement
because of the failure of the scheme to allow the cashed-out minority to participate in anticipated
tax savings); Re Mason and Intercity PropertiesLimited, supra, note 188 (an oppression case in
which an appraised buyout of the petitioner's shares was ordered "at a fair value" but "with nothing
added for denial of opportunity to participate in future growth" because the petitioner was found
to be "to some degree the author of the awkward predicament in which she finds herself"; ibid
at 11). See also infra, note 229 and accompanying text, and OBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 189(2)(a)
(apparently excluding transaction synergies from the valuation required for a going-private
transaction).
218 See Parts III
and IV,supra.
219 The availability of the appraisal right is not made subject to the articles or by-laws or
to a unanimous shareholder agreement as are other provisions in the statute. See ag., CBCA, supra,
note 1 at ss 97, 98, 133. Nevertheless, at least one court has held that where a private agreement
specifies the procedure for valuation, that procedure pre-empts a court determination of fair value.
See MICA Management v. Lockett (1986), (Ont. S.C.) [unreported]. However laudable the result,
quaere if the court read the statute correctly.
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B. Public Companies with Deep Markets
As noted above, one of the criticisms of the appraisal right in the
context of public companies with deep markets is that "in the end [the
shareholder] will be awarded the market price of the shares. He could
have gotten that in the first place by the rather simpler method of calling
his broker." 220 The few decided cases in Canada in the context of large
public companies do indicate an inclination to award market price.22'
When we recall the rationales underlying the appraisal right, however,
it is plain that this criticism misses the point. Where the right is invoked
under the bail-out rationale, awarding a current market price will prove
an inadequate protection owing to the rapid adjustment of security prices
to the announcement of the change. Similarly, where the right is claimed
under the anti-discrimination rationale, the market price will reflect the
anticipated effects of the discrimination on security prices.
However, it is unnecessary to abandon market price as an indication
of value. Indeed, if the anticipated effects of the change can be isolated
and removed, the market price that prevailed before the fundamental
change was announced is the most reliable gauge of value for widely
traded public corporations. As Fischel has suggested, 222 sophisticated
econometric techniques can be used to "reconstruct" a putative market
price as of the valuation date absent the effects of the proposed
fundamental change by using the market price of the shares before any
public announcement of the change and projecting this price forward
to the valuation date.2 23
Where pre-transaction market value is the relevant valuation objective, this reconstructed price should be determinative of the cash-out

220 Manning, supra, note 10.
221 Re Montgomery and Shell CanadaLtd (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 116 (Sask. Q.B.) (awarding

market price under s. 184 of the CBCA, supra, note 1 to a petitioner in the context of a large
public company where a class of shares superior to those of the petitioner were created); Lough
v. CanadianNaturalResourcesLtd(1983),45 B.C.L.R 335 (S.C.) (following Montgomery and awarding

market price under s.231 of the B.C. Company Act, supra, note 9 on a continuance in a new
jurisdiction, again in the context of a large public company with a reasonably deep market). See
also Canadian Gas & Energy Fund Ltd v. Sceptre Resources Ltd, supra, note 107 (using market
price mainly, but not exclusively, to calculate fair value).
222 Fischel, supra, note 10.
223 In Canadian Gas & Energy Fund Ltd v. Sceptre Resources Ltd, supra, note 107, the court

used a pre-announcement date market price to assist it in determining the fair value of the dissenter's
shares on a compulsory acquisition under s. 199 of the CBCA, supra, note 1. In some situations
it may not be adequate protection to award a market price calculated immediately before the first
public announcement of the fundamental change; many event studies show that the price adjustment
begins before and is largely complete by the time of the first public announcement - owing,
in many cases, to advance leakage of information and possibly insider trading. See eg. E.F. Fama
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price. Where the valuation objective extends to an assessment of hidden
values or transaction synergies, unless there exists inside information
showing the shares to be worth less than the market price, 224 the
reconstructed market price should serve as a baseline or minimum value
to which the hidden values or transaction synergies are added.
C. Public Companieswith Thin Markets
As a general matter, the observations about public companies trading
in liquid markets apply to public companies trading in thin markets.
However, in respect of the latter, market price cannot be relied upon
as a completely reliable barometer of value. Thus, the appropriate
valuation technique may involve supplementing the information supplied
by the market price with a capitalization of anticipated earnings or, if
there is an imminent probability of winding up, a calculation of net asset
value.

2 25

Canadian courts have tended to resort almost exclusively to the
capitalization of earnings technique where the company's securities are
traded in a thin market.226 These valuations invariably exceed the market
price. Most courts in valuing minority shareholdings have not made any
discount from a pro rata participation in the going-concern value of
the enterprise;227 this is so even where the dissenters bought those shares
at a market price that incorporated a minority discount. 228 Further, in
at least three cases involving freezeout amalgamations, the courts have
applied a 10 to 20 percent premium as compensation for forcible taking

et aL, "The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information" (1969) 10 Int. Econ. Rev. 1; Jarrell,
"Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation"
(1987) [unpublished]. Regression techniques are available for isolating with a fair degree of accuracy
the time at which information first started to 'leak' into the market; it is this price, free from
the anticipated effects of the fundamental change, which should be projected forward to the valuation
date in reconstructing market price.
224 The probability of this is likely to be quite small. Were the shares worth less than the
market price, management would have an incentive to release the information bearing on value
in order to secure approval of the fundamental change and to avoid dissent.
225 A valuation by means of the net assets technique must include an assessment of break
up, sale, and distribution costs. See obiter comments in Re Domglas Inc.; Domglas Inc v. Jarislowsky,
supra, note 137; Re Montgomery and Shell CanadaLid, supra,note 221.
226 Re Wall & Redekop Corp., supra, note 143 (freezeout amalgamation); Re Whitehorse Copper
Mines Ltd, supra, note 98 (compulsory acquisition); Les Investissements Mont-Soleil Inc. v. National
Drug Limited, supra, note 148 (freezeout amalgamation); LoCicero v. B.A.C.M. Industries Limited,
supra, note 137.
227 Ibid
228 If minority interests are worth less than a controlling interest, this will be reflected in
the price at which the stock trades in public markets. See, ,g., comments of Greenberg J. in Domglas,
supra, note 137, at 13 B.L.R. 171.
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without application of a minority discount.229 Two of these cases have
also allowed shareholders to participate in transaction synergies.230 In
one case the court stated that the market price of the shares sets a price
below which the court will not go in making an appraisal of their value.231
The valuation techniques and objectives applied by courts in valuing
the shares of thinly traded public companies are flawed in a number
of respects. Too little attention is paid to market price. In an efficient
market, the market price of thinly traded companies may temporarily
deviate from the equilibrium price, but these fluctuations should nonetheless centre on the equilibrium price. Thus, the market price is still

a potent indication of value.
It is incorrect to add a premium for forcible taking. In some cases
involving forcible taking of property (especially real estate), a premium
on account of the forcible taking is appropriate where there is a significant
likelihood of a sentimental or personal value in the property taken (that
is, the expectation that there will be a 'consumer surplus'). 2 2 The value
of an investment is precisely its sale value; investors do not generally
hold securities because of a sentimental or personal attachment to a
particular company. Even allowing for such interests in the extraordinary
case, the relative rarity and probable lack of intensity of the sentimental
interest and the added difficulty and cost of accounting for these
attachments (particularly given their necessarily subjective nature) argue
strongly in favour of ignoring such interests as a general, if not absolute,
rule in share appraisals.233

229 ReDomglasInc; Domglaslnc v.Jarislowskysupra,note 137 (20 percent); Leslnvestissements
Mont-Soleil na v. NationalDrugLimited, supra,note 148 (20 percent); LoCicerov. B.A.CM Industries
Limited, supra, note 137 (10 percent).
230 See Domglas and Les Investissements,ibid In respect of participation in transaction synergies,
see supra, note 217 and accompanying text.
231 Domglas, ibid See also LoCicero v. B.A.CM. Industries Limited,supra, note 137.
232 See J.L. Knetsch & T.E. Borcherding, "Expropriation of Private Property and the Basis
for Compensation" (1979) 29 U. T. W.237. Nevertheless, enactments allowing for an expropriation
of real property do not typically allow for an expropriation premium. See, eg., ExpropriationAct,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 148; ExpropriationAct, R.S.C. 1970, C-16 (Ist Supp.). See also Drew v. The Queen
(1961), 29 D.L.R. 114, [1961] S.C.1. 614.
233 In Re Shoppers City Ltd and M, Loeb, Ltd (1968), [1969] 1 O.R. 449 (H.C.), Stark J.
rejected a personal or sentimental attachment as a reason for blocking a compulsory acquisition.
A shareholder testified that the thirteen shares he held were a Christmas present from his wife,
and that he planned to give them to his three-year-old son on his twenty-first birthday. According
to Stark J.: "Such a reason is no doubt a very satisfying one as far as the individual is concerned
but it is not one to which, on my reading of the cases, I could properly consider" (ibid at 454).
The facts in this case illustrate the difficulties (and potential abuses) recognition of such interests
would create. See also In re Griemon, Oldham & Adams Ltd (1966), [1968] CIL 17 at 32; Re
Mason and Intercity PropertiesLimited, supra, note 188. Nevertheless, in In The Matter of M. Loeb,
Limited,supra,note 10, the Ontario Securities Commission took into account the professed sentimental
attachments of minority shareholders in refusing a request for an exemption from the OSC's
requirement for a majority of the minority approval in a case of a going-private transaction.
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As suggested earlier, if the market exacts a minority discount (and
the shares were purchased subject to the market discount), a court should
confers an unbargained-for windfall on
do the same. To do otherwise
234
shareholder.
dissentient
the
Arguably, there is a sort of 'rough justice' in awarding a pro rata
share of capitalized earnings value and adding an eviction premium in
cases involving freezeouts. If the valuation objective extends to a
calculation of hidden values or transaction synergies, the imponderables
of these calculations may lead to a systematic under-assessment that
is thereby partly corrected. However, the valuation objective will not
235
always include an assessment of hidden values or transaction synergies.
Further, a product of the rough justice approach may be systematic overcompensation of appraisal claimants even where a broader valuation
objective is indicated, resulting in excessive use of the appraisal right
and a corresponding discouragement of fundamental changes. It is better
to improve both the theoretical and practical accuracy of the accounting
process by clarifying the valuation objective and fashioning procedures
that are designed to make the achievement of that objective possible.
D. Private Companies
Private companies present the greatest conceptual and practical
difficulties for the valuation of minority shareholdings. Many small, private
corporations are essentially incorporated partnerships; shareholders are
often actively involved in the management of the corporation, and the
shareholders' and managers' mutual trust and confidence is an important
part of the relationship of the corporate constituents. It is commonplace
that in large, public corporations management and ownership are divorced;
in a small, private concern they are frequently wedded. Usually, there
are strict restrictions on the transferability of shares in order to recognize
and accommodate the interest of those who continue in the enterprise
in selecting new 'partners'. 236 Even where the continuing shareholders
are receptive to admitting new partners, it will often be difficult to find
those willing to consign their money to an unknown enterprise run by
persons who are strangers. Thus, there is no 'market' for the corporation's

234 See supra, notes 226-227 and accompanying text.
235 Under the baseline valuation rule above, the court would not calculate either of these
values.

236 There may, of course, be other reasons for restrictions on transfer, such as securing statutory
rights or exemptions accorded only to "private" companies. See, eg., Ontario Securities Act, supra,
note 16 at s. I(1)(31).
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securities in any conventional sense and no 'market' price to use as a
benchmark of value.
It is therefore necessary to value the dissenter's securities by
capitalizing a projected stream of enterprise earnings and to determine
the dissenter's share of enterprise value on this basis. This is often an
exceedingly difficult task. It may be impossible to find similar companies
for the purpose of making earnings and cost of capital comparisons and
projections given the differentiated nature of the businesses of small private
companies.
Whether a minority discount should then be applied to the shares
is also a difficult issue. The answer will almost never be as straightforward
as with a publicly traded company and will tend to be highly fact-specific.
A number of factors will be important. If it can be determined that the
shareholder bought into the enterprise at a minority discount, receiving
apro ratashare of going concern value might confer a windfall - whether
the reason for cashing out is oppressive or opportunistic conduct of other
shareholders or a disagreement about the conduct of the business. On
the other hand, if the shareholder was a founding member of the company
and the reason for leaving is oppressive conduct on the part of other
shareholders, awarding a pro rata share of enterprise value might be
more appropriate. The distinction between these two cases centres on
the differences in shareholder expectations. In the latter situation, the
shareholder explicitly or implicitly expects to remain in the company
for the long haul and to benefit pro rata in any increase in enterprise
value. Although a sale of the shares to an arm's length third party might
not be possible without a minority discount, the sale would not, in the
normal course of events, have occurred but for the oppressive conduct.
Hence, sale value is not the relevant standard. In the former case, awarding
a pro rata share of enterprise value would confer a windfall gain on
the shareholder. The above distinctions are precisely those adopted by
the English Chancery Court in Re Bird Precision Bellows, 237 which also
sensibly suggests that if the petitioner has done something to justify his
or her exclusion from the company by the other shareholders, this may
be a good reason for applying a minority discount.
Although the Canadian courts have generally adopted a capitalization
of earnings approach in valuing the shares of private corporations, 238
Supra, note 136.
238 See, eg., Kummen and Kummen v. Kummen-Shipman Ltd, Kummen and Kummen (1983),
[1983] 2 W.W.R. 577 (Man. C.A.); Re Johnston and West FraserTnber Co. Ltd, supra, note 135;
Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd, supra, note 136; Dih'genti v. RWMD Operations Kelowna Ltd (No.
2), supra, note 135. See also Re National Building Maintenance Ltd (1970), [1971] 1 W.W.R. 8
(B.C. S.C.), purporting to adopt a "liquidation" measure of value but appearing to employ a
capitalization of earnings approach.
237
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they have not been unanimous on the issue of a minority discount. Nor
have their decisions been as successful as Re Bird in clarifying the relevant
factors. Some courts have drawn a distinction based on whether the actual
purchaser of the shares (pursuant to the court order to purchase) is buying
into a minority shareholding. Where this is not the case, these courts
have ruled that a minority discount is inappropriate. 239 Other courts have
240
applied a minority discount.
A more satisfactory approach would be to consider the circumstances
in which the shareholder bought or otherwise acquired the shares, the
rationale under which the right is claimed, and, in general, any other
factors that might bear on shareholder expectations.
Of course, these difficulties might be cured by explicit party stipulation or by statutory provision. In respect of the former, it is interesting
that a method occasionally chosen for cash-out valuation in private
corporations, where relevant arrangements have been drafted into the
constitutional documents or shareholder agreements, is valuation based
on book value. The dependency of book value on historical costaccounting data virtually assures that this method will undervalue the
shares of the departing shareholder. There is little doubt that book value
is sometimes chosen as a valuation technique because its sheer simplicity
avoids an expensive valuation and because corporate lawyers and
accountants justifiably feel ill-equipped to draft or perform valuations
based on earnings capitalizations. This should not be taken as conclusive
proof that book value is the optimal valuation rule; book value is clearly
239 In Diligenti v. RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd (No. 2), bid, the court ordered the company
to purchase the petitioner's shares in an oppression action without exacting a minority discount,
commenting that:
the result [of the purchase] will be that existing shareholders will simply consolidate their
positions. They do not become minority shareholders as a result of the purchase - they
are already, as individuals, minority shareholders; in this case they become holders of onethird of the shares instead of one-quarter. Their position in relation to each other is not
changed.
(ibid at 166). Other courts have adopted the reasoning in the Diligenti case: see Re Abraham and
Inter Wide Investments Ltd (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 460 (H.C.) (an oppression case in which the company
was ordered to buy out the minority shareholder complainant); Kummen and Kummen v. KummenShipman LtD Kummen and Kummen, ibid (oppression action in which majority shareholder was
ordered to buy out the single minority shareholder). See also Re National Building Maintenance
Ltd, ibid See also OBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 189(2Xb), and Regulation Made Under the Securities
Act, R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 910 (as amended), s. 164(lXc) (in each case, requiring that the independently
prepared valuation for purposes of a going-private transaction not reflect a minority discount).
240 Re Mason and Intercity PropertiesLimited, supra,note 188 (an oppression case in the context
of a private family corporation awarding a minority discount on the somewhat cryptically stated
grounds that "[o]therwise the court would not only be correcting an intolerable situation but would
be going further and confer a benefit not being enjoyed by the majority"; ibid at 11); Invin v.
D.W. CoatesEnterprisesLd[1985] 3 W.W.R. 765 (B.C. C.A.) (upholding the decision of an arbitrator
under a buy-sell agreement to exact (a minority discount); Re Johnston and West Fraser Timber
Co. Ltd, supra, note 135 (oppression).
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the favoured valuation technique. Further, as indicated earlier, one of
the virtues of a statutory valuation procedure (complete with an expert
valuation tribunal) is to improve upon private-ordering arrangements by
supplying a reliable low-cost valuation mechanism that private-ordering
arrangements could not produce because of the costs involved.
It was suggested earlier that the presumptive statutory standard form
valuation objective ought to be one of full gain sharing for private
corporations. This standard form of appraisal right might also presumptively require that no minority discount be exacted on the appraisal
valuation (a result contrary to that in the public corporations context)
unless otherwise ordered by the court. This would appear to best conform
to the most usual expectation of shareholders in private corporations
while leaving room for argument, based on the factors enumerated above,
that a minority discount is appropriate. As usual, the parties would be
free to alter this presumption by express provision.
E. Valuation Date
As noted above, the CBCA and cognate statutes instruct the court
to fix fair value at the close of business on the day before the resolution
approving the fundamental change is adopted.241 It would be more
appropriate to fix the valuation date at the time when the shareholder,
having claimed the right, loses rights as a shareholder and is entitled
only to a payment of interest on the appraised value of the shares. Since
this date might vary for shareholders claiming the right,242 convenience
suggests that a valuation date be fixed at the end of the period during
which they lose their rights as shareholders.243
F. The Effect of Insider Trading on the Existence of a Control Position
on Valuation
It has sometimes been asserted that the value of the appraisal right
lies in the fact that values in the stock market do not necessarily correspond
241 See supra,note 215 and accompanying text.
242 See supra, note 130.

243 Although this might appear to suggest that transaction synergies necessarily be included
in fixing fair value, this is not the case. There is no necessary connection between when the date
for the valuation is fixed and whether the valuation is based on pre- or post-transaction value.
For example, if the valuation date is fixed at a point one month after the approval of the transaction,
a pre-transaction share value can be computed by using a pre-announcement date market value
and using widely accepted statistical techniques to construct a putative share price at the valuation
date. See supra, notes 220-224 and accompanying text. The valuation date indicated in the text
is chosen so as to avoid any sterilization of the shareholder's investment between the valuation
date and the time when the shareholder loses his or her rights as a shareholder.
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with intrinsic value.244 Thus, R.M. Buxbaum has suggested that a good
reason for eliminating the "public market" exception seen in a number
of American statutes "lies in the retreat from the sanctity of a stock
exchange mechanism as a reflector of 'true' values... "245 Those voicing
this point of view usually attribute the failure of market price to reflect
true values to distortions produced by insider trading, the existence of
a large control position, thin trading, or simply the whimsy and caprice
of the market, which responds randomly to events of uncertain purport.
Indeed, the courts have tended to discount market price where there
is some evidence of insider trading or the overhang of a control position,
at least where the stock is thinly traded.246 This view is supportable only
on the assumption that securities markets operate with pronounced
inefficiency. As indicated above, these arguments are generally fallacious.
Available evidence confirms the efficiency, not the inefficiency, of securities
markets.
It is more correct to argue that market prices, while efficiently
impounding publicly available information, do not reflect information
that is available only to insiders. Insider information is, by definition,
not publicly available and is not therefore reflected in the price established
in public markets.241
The failure of the public price to reflect inside information is
significant only where the valuation objective includes an assessment
of hidden values. Even where hidden values form part of the assessment
of fair value, the market price also supplies important evidence of value.
Nor is the fact of insider trading, by itself, likely to distort prices.
Unless insiders are engaged in conscious market manipulation, the effect
of insider trading is likely to improve rather than disturb the efficiency

244 See eg. Chertkow, supra, note 148; B.L. Welling, Corporate Law in Canada:The Governing
Princ les (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) at 545 and 554, note 338; J.E. Magnet, "Shareholders'
Appraisal Rights in Canada" (1979) 11 Ott. L. Rev. 98 at 106; R.M. Buxbaum, "The Dissenter's
Appraisal Remedy" (1976) 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1229 at 1247-49; M.A. Eisenberg, "The Legal
Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking" (1969) 57 Calif.
L. Rev. 1; Eisenberg, supra, note 38 at 81-82. Perhaps the most cogent statement of this position
may be found in Note, "A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting
Shareholder's Right of Appraisal" (1976) 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1023.
245 Buxbaum, ibid at 1247.
246 Re Whitehorse Copper Mines Ltd, supra,note 98; Neonex InternationalLtd v. Kolasa, supra,
note 145; Re Wall & Redekop Corp., supra, note 143; Re Domglas Inc; Domglas Inc. v. Jarislowsky,

supra, note 137; Les Investissements Mont-Soleil Ina v. NationalDrug Ltd, supra, note 148; Cyprus
Anvil Mining Corp. v. Dickson, supra, note 98. See also Re Montgomery and Shell Canada Ltd,
supra, note 221 (awarding market price where there was an active public market in the shares
and no evidence of insider trading activity); Lough v. Canadian Natural Resources Limited, supra,
note 221 (following Montgomery and using market value where active public market).
247 See supra, note 76 and accompanying text.
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of the market-pricing mechanism.248 Since insiders possess more accurate
information about intrinsic value than the market does, insider trading
will push the market towards intrinsic value by sending it a signal about
these hidden values.249 Thus, at most, the presence of insider trading
should be the start of a further inquiry into whether there has in fact
been manipulation of securities prices by means of the insider trading
or, where hidden values form part of the valuation, exploitation of hidden
values. 250
The question of accounting for the effects of a control position is
really the same as whether or not a minority discount is appropriate.
As suggested earlier, in the case of publicly traded companies such a
251
discount is appropriate.
The existence of a large control position may affect the price of
the securities in public hands, but this is not evidence of a distortion
in the price. It is clear that control shares are more valuable than noncontrol shares; this may reflect the ability to consume perquisites or an
anticipation of being able to capture a premium price for the shares
should there be a takeover or sale of control. 252 However, a shareholder
who buys shares at a discount reflecting the existence of a control position
will receive windfall compensation if a court, in valuing the securities,
fails to apply a minority discount.
The existence of a control position, it is true, may substantially reduce
the float of publicly traded securities and hence reduce the reliability
of the market price. However, the only reason to discount market price
as an indication of value in such a case would be because the float
has been reduced to a point that renders the publicly traded price of
questionable accuracy - and not because of the existence of a control
position, simpliciter.In most public companies with dominant or controlling
H.G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (New York: Free Press, 1966); H.G.
Manne, "Insider Trading and the Law Professors" (1970) 23 Vand. L. Rev. 547. But cf M. Mendelson,
Book Review (1969) 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 470; J.A.C. Hetherington, "Insider Trading and the Logic
of the Law" [1967] Wisc. L. Rev. 720; R.A. Schotland, "Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne"
(1967) 53 Va. L. Rev. 1425.
249 This is not intended to constitute a normative argument in favour of insider trading but
purely a description as to the likely effects of insider trading in the absence of market manipulation.
250 In an adversarial proceeding, the onus of disproving such manipulation might well be
cast on those claiming the market price is a fair one, given that these parties will have monopoly
access to the relevant information.
251 Since the market is one of minority interests, using market price will automatically yield
a minority discount.
252 See eg. RC. Lease, JJ. McConnell & W.H. Mikkelson, "The Market Value of Differential
Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations" (1984) 57 J. Bus. 443; R.C. Lease, JJ. McConnell
& W.H. Mikkelson, "The Market Value of Control in Publicly Traded Corporations" (1983) 11
J. Fin. Econ. 439; H. Levy, "Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock" (1983)
38 J. Fin. 79.
248
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shareholders, the market float will still be quite sufficient to generate
a reliable market price.253
IX. IN SEARCH OF A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRIGGERING
EVENTS: A FEW PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
Manning has forcefully suggested 254 that those events which typically
trigger the appraisal right255 arise from legal and constitutional considerations that have little to do with a unified or coherent conception of
the appraisal right as a functional economic tool.256 If the appraisal right
is regarded as protection against untoward events in the life of the
enterprise potentially causing economic losses to the shareholder, then
why, for example, should the signing of a potentially unfavourable
collective agreement or a general decline in the stock market caused
by threat of nuclear war not trigger the appraisal right?
There are unquestionably innumerable events in the life of the
enterprise that may affect the value of the shareholder's investment, and
the appraisal right is triggered by only a very few of these. In the main,
it is substantial structural changes that trigger the appraisal right, such
as an amalgamation, a sale of all the company's assets, or significant
changes in the shareholder's financial contract with the company affected
by alteration of the articles of incorporation.
The statutory selection of triggering events can easily be justified
by reference to a small number of defining principles: the likely magnitude
of the effect of the change on either the risk or expected return of the
investment; the frequency of the event; the risks of opportunism accompanying the event; and the degree to which the company can affect the
outcome of the event.
The greater the magnitude of the effect on risk or return, the more
likely it is that shareholders will value the protection yielded by the
appraisal right. The greater the frequency of the transaction, the greater
253 In Re Montgonezy and Shell CanadaLtd, supra,note 221, where the court awarded market
price on an appraisal valuation, there was in fact a large control position (held by the parent
of Shell Canada). Nevertheless, the court concluded that market price was an appropriate measure
of value.
254 Manning, supra, note 10.
255 Manning had in mind American statutes with triggering events defined somewhat more
narrowly than in the CBCA and cognate statutes, although the latter draw their inspiration and
a good deal of their substance from the former. One noteworthy difference is the inclusion in
Canadian statutes of changes in the primary constitutional document of the corporation as a triggering
transaction for the appraisal righL Another is the inclusion in the Canadian statutes of continuance
in another jurisdiction as a triggering transaction.
256 The constitutional argument, needless to say, has little relevance in the Canadian context.
Nevertheless, Canadian appraisal provisions draw their inspiration from the American statutes with
the exceptions noted ibid.
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is the nuisance and probable expense to the company of maintaining,
in effect, a standing order to purchase. With greater risks of opportunistic
redistribution accompanying the transaction, the value of the protection
afforded shareholders by the appraisal right will be greater. Finally, to
the extent that the company cannot affect the outcome of the event,
the corporation may become a general insurer against business risk, an
event that would seriously destabilize the company and imperil its
existence.
As noted earlier, shareholders (at least those in public companies
who are able to diversify their holdings) are generally unconcerned about
changes in the level of unsystematic risk of the company, and it will
be changes in systematic or market risk or in security value that will
attract their attention. Changes in the financial contract are infrequent,
with a potentially enormous effect on the market risk or expected return
of the shareholder's investment. The risks of opportunism are great. The
event is wholly within the control of the company. It is not at all surprising
that such changes are typically included on the list of triggering events.
The same logic would explain the inclusion of a continuation of the
company's existence in another jurisdiction; that other jurisdiction may
have a very different corporate law and hence a very different 'background
standard form' financial contract. An amalgamation, a sale of all or
substantially all of the company's assets, or a winding-up are also relatively
infrequent events of potentially great significance to the corporation and
the shareholder. These events may either involve a recapitalization of
the enterprise that has the same result as a change in the terms of
outstanding securities or substantially alter the nature of the business
carried on. In each of these cases, the event is an internal one over
which the corporation has control. These changes may bring into play
either the bail-out or anti-discrimination rationales for the appraisal right
or both of them.
External events such as a buildup of superpower tension that depress
the market are entirely beyond the control of the corporation. It makes
little sense for the corporation to insure equity holders against these.
A security with a generalized put option, exercisable virtually at will
when external events threaten the shareholder's investment, would significantly destabilize the corporation and is not likely to represent part
of any efficient financial contract. Of course, the risk of opportunism
associated with events beyond the control of the corporation is, by
definition, nil.
Other internal events, such as the signing of a potentially unfavourable
collective agreement, are within the company's control, and may significantly affect the shareholder's investment. But, in general, these will
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be events of both greater frequency and lesser significance. Moreover,
the risks of opportunism associated with such events (at least, as between
managers and shareholders or shareholders inter se) are likely to be far
less than in significant structural or constitutional changes, and in most
cases there will be no such risk at all. Thus, the statutory selection of
triggering events appears to be not nearly so indefensible as Manning
suggests, and indeed seems to have a workable economic logic to it.257
Admittedly, however, Manning's criticism is not entirely without
foundation. It would be difficult and probably impractical to define a
comprehensive list of those discriminatory events against which shareholders might choose to be protected by an appraisal option. It is also
difficult to define the formal character of triggering events (for example,
an 'amalgamation', or the sale of all or substantially all the corporation's
assets) so as to ensure uniform treatment across events having divergent
formal characteristics but substantively equivalent effects. 258 It is therefore
appropriate to vest in the court a residual discretion to order an appraisal
for those instances of discrimination that are not transactions or events
that the statute or parties specifically designate as triggering events. 259
In the CBCA and cognate statutes, this has been achieved in connection
257 Cf Eisenberg's response to Manning's criticisms, supra, note 38 at 73-7.
258 The CBCA and cognate statutes fail to achieve complete consistency. For example, although
shareholders of a company selling all of its assets will get an appraisal right, shareholders of the
company buying the assets will not, even though, as an economic event, the purchase may have
as much or more effect on the buying company's shareholders as the seller's (CBCA, supra, note
1 at s. 184). Similarly, where a parent company amalgamates a wholly owned operating subsidiary
into another company, the interposition of the holding company deprives the true owners of the
subsidiary (the shareholders of the parent) of the appraisal option. One mechanism for avoiding
statutory appraisal rights - the effecting of what is in substance a merger by means of the issuance
of a large block of shares by the target in return for the assets of the acquiror - has provoked
some interesting jurisprudence and commentary in the United States. See Farrisv. Glen Alden Corp.
(1958), 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25. See Folk, supra, note 165. For a thorough review of the technical
inconsistencies in the American legislation, see S.H. Schulman & A. Schenk, "Shareholders' Voting
and Appraisal Rights in Corporate Acquisition Transactions" (1983) 38 Bus. Law. 1529. See also
Buxbaum, supra, note 244 for a review of the California legislation. Although it is beyond the
scope of this article to review the technical inconsistencies in the CBCA and cognate legislation,
suffice it to say that many of the inconsistencies noted by Schulman and Schenk are present in
the Canadian legislation as well.
259 This discretion might be of at least two varieties: a discretion that attaches only when
some form of appraisal right (whether a statutory standard form or otherwise) has been selected
and is in conformity with the valuation objective chosen; or a general residual discretionary power
to order an appraisal with the valuation objective to be determined by the court. It is probably
better to vest the broader discretion in the court, allowing it remedial flexibility where events arise
that were not anticipated by the parties ex ante and in respect of which the risk has not been
allocated. Unfortunately, the broader discretion introduces a danger that a court may (by accident
or design) upset a prior allocation of risk by the parties should it order an appraised cashout.
The seriousness of this problem depends on the courts' sensitivity in divining the true ambit of
the prior allocation of risk and the degree of willingness to resist tampering with this allocation.
The CBCA and cognate statutes currently vest the court with a virtually unrestricted discretion
to order an appraisal (see infra, notes 260-261).
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with an application under the oppression provision by allowing the court
to order 260 that the corporation purchase the shares of the applicant at
2 61
an appraised value.
One feature of the Ontario legislation, however, that cannot readily
be explained by reference to any of the above defining principles is the
unavailability of the statutory appraisal right to classes of shareholders
that are not entitled to vote on the resolution approving the fundamental
change. 262 It has been suggested here that one of the primary raisons
d'etre for the appraisal right is protection against discriminatory fundamental changes initiated by shareholders or classes of shareholders
exercise powers of control. The dangers of opportunistic predation are
only enhanced in respect of those classes of shares that do not vote.
One would therefore have thought that it is these classes to whom the
appraisal right has greatest value. Should the statute continue to offer
shareholders an appraisal right, logic and internal consistency suggest
that the Ontario legislation should be amended to conform to the CBCA
in offering appraisal protection to non-voting classes of shareholders.
X. CONCLUSION
The Dickerson Committee set out to design a regime of rules for
fundamental changes in which the appraisal right was the Archimedean
pivot. The tool was designed to supplement existing remedies and to
strike an appropriate balance between majority and minority shareholders.
In theory, there may well be reasons that shareholders would desire the
protection afforded by the appraisal right. The protection may be against
unwise business decisions that threaten to diminish security values or
against the effects of discriminatory treatment of a shareholding constituency. There are also reasons, in theory, for specifying a different
valuation objective, depending on the rationale under which the appraisal
right is claimed. Transaction and corporation type may also influence
the optimal valuation objective.
This theory cannot, however, be divorced from a host of practical
considerations. The value of both the appraisal right as prevention of
or cure for discriminatory action and the optimal form of valuation
objective wil depend on the degree to which opportunism is a problem
260 CBCA, supra, note 1 at s. 234.
261 Ibid s. 234(3)(f. where this has occurred, the court has usually ordered a trial of the

issue of cashout price under s. 234(3)(n).
262 OBCA, supra, note 2 at s. 184(1) gives the appraisal right to "a holder of shares of any
class or series entitled to vote on the resolution." By contrast, the CBCA, ibid at s. 184(1) affords
an appraisal right in respect of designated transactions to "a holder of shares of any class." See
also OBCA ss 184(2), 169 and CBCA ss 184(2), 170 (furnishing an appraisal right to shareholders
entitled to a class vote, such vote arising where the class is affected directly or indirectly whether
or not the class is otherwise entitled to vote).
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in the marketplace. This in turn depends on the adequacy of alternative
rights and remedies to which shareholders may have resort. The appraisal
right must be seen as part of a larger tapestry of shareholder protections
both in the law and in the marketplace. In this constellation of protections,
the appraisal right may have particular advantages associated with the
relative cost of its exercise and the manner in which it responds to collective
action problems.
It is clear that the appraisal right generates its own costs, not the
least of which is the cost of the valuation itself, especially where a
calculation of hidden values or transaction synergies is involved. A
generous valuation objective may also discourage the undertaking of
productive fundamental changes. At least in freezeouts of public shareholders affected by a publicly traded parent, an appraised 'right of reentry' might overcome some of these problems. Pure theory alone can
determine neither whether the appraisal right constitutes an efficient
feature of the shareholder's financial contract nor the optimal form of
valuation objective. Although there is empirical evidence suggesting that
pre-transaction market value may be the optimal valuation objective,
the evidence is determinative neither of this question nor in deciding
whether the appraisal right under any valuation objective has any value
to shareholders. Thus, the case in favour of the appraisal right has not
been conclusively affirmed or disproved.
At the very least, however, it can be said that a mandatory statutory
appraisal right is likely to interfere with the process of private ordering
through which an efficient financial contract is struck. A case can be
made only for a presumptive appraisal right or for a menu from which
the corporation may choose an appropriate appraisal right or no right
at all. A presumptive right fulfills the enabling function of corporate
law and serves to lower the transaction costs of financial contracting.
It can also be said with some confidence that the current statutory
appraisal right suffers from procedural, cost, taxation, and other operational infirmities that render it a less attractive remedial option than
it might be. The valuation process would be much improved by entrusting
the task to an expert tribunal or valuator rather than (as at present)
to the courts. 263 What is eminently clear from the brief history of the
appraisal right in Canada is that it has largely failed to fulfill the role
assigned to it by the Dickerson Committee as the centrepiece of the
fundamental change provisions.
263 The suggestion of entrusting commercial matters to a specialized tribunal is not entirely
novel. See eg. the Lawrence Report, supra, note 176 at paras. 14.1.1-14.1.3; L.C.B. Gower, The
Pinciplesof Modern Company Law, 4th ed. (London: Stevens, 1979) at 718.

